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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Outline
It is no longer than sixty years ago that events in Europe triggered the second
World War. Now, Western Europe is one of the most economically integrated regions in
the world. Soon, Western Europe will extend its borders towards the East, when 10 new
accession countries will join the European Union. While economic integration was especially
intense in Europe, it occured in the overall trend towards globalization. Trade, information
flows, as well as financial transactions occur more and more at a global level. In fact, for
many corporations, it is diﬃcult to determine whether they should be considered American,
European, or Asian. News reaches us ”live” through CNN from all over the world, while
the total value of daily cross-border transactions often surpasses several trillions of euros.
The increased economic integration has important repercusions for the financial
system, whose ultimate aim is to channel savings in the economy to productive investments.
A simple outline of the financial system is given in Figure 1. One can distinguish between
2three channels. First, savings may find their way directly to investments. For instance,
a venture capitalist may directly participate in the capital of a newly started company.
Second, savings may go through markets. For instance, corporations may issue corporate
paper as to finance their working capital needs. Similarly, a company can issue corporate
bonds as to finance long-term investments. And of course, investors may directly participate
in the capital of corporations by buying (listed) shares. Finally, savings may find their way
to investments through intermediaries. The banking sector, at least in their traditional role,
transforms short-term deposits (savings) to long-term credit to the corporate sector. The
intermediation role of banks is crucial as they alleviate the asymmetric information problem
between the investor at the one hand, and the project holder at the other hand. Recently,
other intermediaries have gained importance, such as pension and investment funds, as well
as insurance companies.
S A V I N G S 
I N V E S T M E N T S
MARKETSINTERMEDIARIES
Financial Institutions
Pension Funds
Investment Funds
Insurance Companies
Financial Conglomerates
Money Market
Bond Market
Equity Market
Derivatives Market 
Figure 1: A Simple Representation of the Financial System
Economic integration, financial liberalization, as well as globalization in general have greatly
aﬀected the financial system. I briefly outline some of the recent trends.
3First, the relative proportion of financing directly through the markets has in-
creased relative to intermediated financing. Continental Europe has often been described
as a bank-based system, owing to the prominent role traditionally played by banks in the
major economies of the euro area, while the US/UK financial system has long been recog-
nised as the foremost example of market-based system. Recent evidence suggests that
European corporations more and more finance themselves directly through the markets.
This is mainly reflected in the surge of the corporate bond market and the increasing num-
ber of corporations with a credit rating. While until 1999 the rating distribution of new
issues was skewed to the higher rated companies, during the last year, issuing behavior has
been especially strong in the A and BBB segment. Securitization, where traditional loans
and mortgages are packaged together and sold as securities, is further undermining the
traditional intermediation role of banks. Also the success of the ”New Markets” for equity,
especially for small and technology firms, at the end of the 1990s suggests an increasing role
for direct market financing.
Second, there is compelling evidence that markets have become more integrated,
in a sense that European securities are increasingly accessible to all Europeans at the same
price under the same terms. Yield diﬀerentials in the unsecured money market have virtually
disappeared, while integration is increasing in the secured money, bond and equity markets.
As far as banks are concerned, the corporate segments seems to be reasonably integrated,
even though there are still considerable diﬀerences in retail interest rates across countries.
Financially integrating markets may have an important beneficial impact on the economy.
In better integrated and developed markets, corporations have access to a larger pool of
4financing, at a lower cost. Similarly, investors have access to a larger number of financial
assets, which allows them to construct portfolios that have a higher expected return - risk
trade-oﬀ and better suits their specific needs. Integration is however not complete. Further
integration is expected when all of the various measures outlined in the Financial Services
Action Plan are implemented (expected by 2005). Issues the FSAP hopes to deal with
include among others money laundering, investment services, implementation of new Basel
capital rules, international accounting standards, as well as better supervision of financial
conglomerates. These policy initiatives are likely to be complemented by the beneficial
eﬀects of competition between market participants to become the most liquid and complete
market, or to deliver to cheapest and safest trading, clearance, and settlement system.
The higher degree of market integration is also reflected in the portfolios of households
and institutional investors, who have generally increased the proportion of non-domestic
assets in their portfolios. The apparant shift in asset allocation paradigm, especially for
institutional investors, from a country to a sector orientation is a further sign of increasing
internationalization.
Third, there are serious concerns that the increasing internationalization of asset
markets has come at a cost, in a sense that the systemic risk of the financial system as a
whole has increased. A systemic event is defined as ”an event where the release of ”bad
news” about a financial institution, or even its failure, or the crash of a financial market leads
to considerable adverse eﬀects on one or several other financial institutions or markets, e.g.
their failure or crash” (De Bandt and Hartmann (1998)). These contagion or domino eﬀects
were especially apparant in the Mexican Tequila crisis of December 1994, the Asian Flu in
5the last half of 1997, the LTCM debacle and Russian Cold in August 1998, the Brazilan
Sneeze in January 1999 and the NASDAQ Rash in April 2000. Currently, the international
community is investigating ways to mitigate the risks of contagion for the stability of the
financial system, and hence to avoid the large economic costs from a systemic crisis.
The aim of the three papers in this dissertation is to increase the understanding of
the (changing) financial system. The first paper, co-authored by Rudi Vander Vennet and
Astrid Van Landschoot, is entitled ”Bank Characteristics and Cyclical Variations
in Bank Stock Returns”. This paper contributes to the discussion on how to increase
the stability of the international financial system. More specifically, the paper investigates
(1) whether banks are vulnerable to changes in the prevailing credit conditions, typically
associated with business cycle downturns, and (2) whether banks can hedge against a de-
terioration in the credit conditions by holding a larger capital buﬀer, or by functionally
or geographically diversifying their activities. A thorough understanding of these issues
is of high importance for national and international bank supervisors and regulators, as a
deterioration of bank health may be transmitted to the real economy and may raise ques-
tions about the systemic stability of the financial sector. The question whether adequate
capitalization is perceived by the stock market as a structural hedge against negative eco-
nomic shocks is an important one, given that one of the main pillars of the proposed new
prudential strategy of Basel II is to introduce elements of market discipline in the super-
visory process. Similarly, the examination of the impact of functional and geographical
diversification of banking institutions on their risk profile may provide useful input to the
discussion on the gradual broadening of banking powers. The case of Europe, where banks
6have had a relatively high degree of freedom to pursue strategies of geographical and func-
tional diversification is moreover interesting for other systems, like the one in the United
States, where freedom was relatively limited until recently. The results clearly indicate that
bank stock returns exhibit two states. The first state, which seems related to business cycle
expansions, is characterized by a low level of conditional volatility and a high mean return.
Reversely, the second state, typically observed during recessions and financial market tur-
moil, is associated with high volatility and a low mean return. Moreover, we show that
the conditional variance of bank stock returns is positively related to lagged changes in the
nominal short-term interest rate. We report a statistically significant link between bank
stock returns and three economic state variables. The sensitivities to these instruments is
generally substantially higher (in absolute value) in the recession state. This indicates that
banks react asymmetrically to business cycle news depending on whether the economy is
booming or in a recession. We do not find that banks with a diﬀerent strategy react in a
systematically diﬀerent way to business cycle news contained in our instruments. However,
we do find some evidence suggesting that relatively poorly capitalized and specialized banks
react significantly stronger to business cycle news in recession states relative to their better
capitalized and diversified peers.
The second paper, entitled ”Volatility Spillover Effects in European Eq-
uity Markets: Evidence from a Regime-Switching Model” focuses entirely on Eu-
ropean Equity markets. As equity are to be linked to the performance of the real economy,
the risk factors driving European stocks may change when the underlying economy changes.
Similarly, increasing European (World) financial integration may induce a shift from local to
7European (World) risk factors. In this paper, I therefore investigate whether the eﬀorts for
more economic, monetary, and financial integration in Europe have fundamentally altered
the intensity of shock spillovers from the US and aggregate European equity markets to 13
European stock markets. From a practitioners point of view, a better understanding of how
markets move together may result in superior portfolio constructing and hedging strategies,
while economists may mainly be interested in the actual drivers of shock spillover intensi-
ties. By means of a regime-switching model, I show that regime switches in the spillover
intensities are both statistically and economically important. For nearly all countries, the
probability of a high EU and US shock spillover intensity has increased significantly over
the 1980s and 1990s, even though the increase is more pronounced for the sensitivity to EU
shocks. Surprisingly, the increase in EU shock spillover intensity is mainly situated in the
second part of the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s, and not during the period directly
before and after the introduction of the single currency. In fact, in many countries, the
sensitivity to EU shocks dropped considerably after 1999. Over the full sample, EU shocks
explain about 15 percent of local variance, compared to 20 percent for US shocks. While
the US - as a proxy for the world market - continues to be the dominating influence in Euro-
pean equity markets, the importance of the regional European market is rising considerably.
Next, I look for the factors that have contributed to this increased information sharing. I
consider instruments related to equity market development, economic integration, monetary
integration, exchange rate stability, and to the state of the business cycle. Results suggest
that countries with an open economy, low inflation, and well developed financial markets
share more information with the regional European market. There is some evidence that
8shock spillover intensity is related to the business cycle. Finally, I find some evidence for
contagion from the US to the local European equity markets during highly volatile periods.
The third paper, entitled ”A Conditional Intertemporal CAPMwith Regime
Switches in the Prices of Risk”, and co-authored by Lorenzo Cappiello, contributes
to a long outstanding discussion on what determines expected returns. While the paper
focusses on the US market, the results can be generalized to other markets. More specifi-
cally, we test the conditional Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) of Merton (1973) for stocks,
treasury bills, and government bonds, where the short rate is included as an intertemporal
risk factor. The conditional CAPM argues that expected returns are proportional to the
conditional risk of the market portfolio. The ICAPM extends the single-period CAPM to a
multi-period model. Merton (1973) showed that in this case investors do not only want to
hedge against market risk, but also against intertemporal risk, i.e. the risk that investment
opportunities may adversely change in the future. The paper first gives a brief theoretical
discussion of the ICAPM. Next, we estimate a multi-asset conditional CAPM with a con-
stant price of market risk. The market risk is governed by a flexilble multivariate GARCH
model with asymmetry. We document several interesting results regarding the interaction
between the three assets’ second moments. We find that the conditional equity market
variance reacts asymmetrically to both stock and treasury bill returns, while treasury bill
and government bond returns respond symmetrically to each other’s shocks. Neverthe-
less, we find that the price of market risk is not overly sensitive to the specification of the
variance-covariance dynamics, especially not when the model is estimated with a student - t
distributed likelihood function. The price of market risk is positive and statistically signifi-
9cant. This suggests that the inclusion of additional assets increases the power and eﬃciency
of tests of the conditional CAPM. Next, we extend the model as to include the short rate
as an intertemporal risk factor. Many previous studies have shown that the short rate has
leading indicator properties both for the business cycle and for stock returns. We consider
both the case of constant and time-varying prices of intertemporal risk. Time variation in
the prices of risk is introduced by means of Hamilton’s regime switching model. We find the
intertemporal risk premium to be important for treasury bills and government bonds, but
not for stocks. Two regimes are identified that appear to be related to economic expansions
and recessions respectively. While during expansions investors tend to look more at market
risk, during recessions the focus shifts to intertemporal risk. Our results also suggest that
treasury bills and government bonds are not good hedges against business cycle downturns.
The final chapter gives an overview of the main contributions and results of this
dissertation. All three papers in dissertations use both (multivariate) conditional volatil-
ity as well as regime-switching models. Therefore, to conclude the introduction, I briefly
introduce these methodologies.
1.2 Conditional Volatility Models
1.2.1 Introduction
It is now common knowledge that equity return variances are not constant through
time. A large body of empirical literature, going back to Mandelbrot (1963), has argued
convincingly that risk characteristics vary considerably through time. Even when the uncon-
ditional covariance matrix for the variable of interest may be time invariant, the conditional
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variances and covariances may still be time-varying, conditional on past information. As
many financial (and non-financial) applications, such as portfolio allocation, dynamic asset
pricing, option pricing, and term structure modeling involve conditional second moments,
a large body of literature has focussed on modeling volatility. Most of these studies rely
upon the seminal work of Engle (1982), who introduced the AutoRegressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) class of models. In this introduction, I will first give a brief
introduction to univariate ARCH type of models. As all papers in this thesis use multi-
variate conditional volatility models, in the second part I will introduce the most popular
multivariate ARCH type of models. This introduction is incomplete in many ways. First,
in my discussion of ARCH models, I restrict myself to the most popular models. Second, I
only focus on ARCH type of models. Alternative models of conditional volatility, such as
stochastic volatility or implied volatility models from option pricing are not discussed here.
In addition, I will not cover various other measures of volatility based upon e.g. volume or
price range. For a discussion of those, I refer to e.g. Alizadeh et al (1999).
1.2.2 Univariate ARCH Models
Many general introductions to ARCH have been written before (see e.g. Bollerslev
et al. (1992, 1994)). Here, I will introduce this methodology by means of a conditional
version of the Capital Asset Pricing model (CAPM). Suppose rw,t represents the time
t excess return on the world market portfolio. As holding this portfolio involves risks,
investors will require a recompensation. However, investors will only be remunerated for
the proportion of risk that cannot be diversified away, the amount of systematic risk. By
definition, the most diversified portfolio is the world market portfolio, so that its total
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risk is equal to its systematic risk. The conditional CAPM of Sharpe (1964), Lintner
(1965), Mossin (1966), and Black (1972) states that the remuneration investors can expect
from holding the world market portfolio is proportional to its total risk, measured by its
conditional variance:
rw,t = βV art−1[rw,t] + εw,t (1.1)
εw,t =
p
hw,tt (1.2)
t ∼ i.i.d. N (0, 1) (1.3)
where β represents the market price of risk - the amount of compensation per unit of market
risk, εw,t is the unexpected return at time t, and ht is the world market’s conditional
variance. For the time being, we assume that t is standard normally distributed, even
though in practice one may want to use other distributions, like a student− t or generalized
error distribution (GED). The literature has come up with a large number of specifications
for ht. One of the most successful models is Bollerslev’s (1986) generalization of Engle’s
(1982) ARCH model, the so called GARCH(p, q) specification, given by
ht = w +
pX
i=1
αiε
2
t−i +
qX
j=1
βjht−i (1.4)
The conditional variance ht is a linear function of past squared innovations, and of past
conditional variances. This specification captures some important regularities of asset return
volatilities. First, the distribution of asset returns tends to be leptokurtic (fat tailed).
This means that extreme returns are more likely than an i.i.d. normal distribution would
predict. GARCH eﬀects typically produce unconditional distributions with fatter tails than
the normal distribution. Second, volatility clustering refers to the observation that ”large
12
changes in asset returns tend to be followed by large changes, of either sign, and that small
changes tend to be followed by small changes” (Mandelbrot (1963)). Volatility clustering is
generated by GARCH models thanks to the high degree of persistene typically found when
estimating GARCH models.
In most empirical applications, a GARCH(1,1) fits the conditional variance of the
majority of financial time-series reasonably well (see e.g. French et al. (1987) and Pagan
and Schwert (1990)). In this case, equation (1.4) simplifies to
ht = w + αε2t−1 + βht−1 (1.5)
To guarantee a positive variance at all instances, it is imposed that w > 0, and that α, β > 0.
Bollerslev (1986) showed that this model is covariance stationary if and only if α+ β < 1.
It is instructive to rewrite the GARCH(1,1) process as follows:
ht = w + α
¡
ε2t−1 − ht−1
¢
+ (α+ β)ht−1 (1.6)
or
ht = w + α
¡
ε2t−1 −Et−2
£
ε2t−1
¤¢
+ (α+ β)ht−1 (1.7)
The α coeﬃcient measures by how much a ”volatility surprise” yesterday feeds through
into the next period’s volatility, while α+ β measures the rate at which this eﬀect dies out
over time. In many high frequency financial data, the estimate of α + β is close to one.
If α + β = 1, then the volatility process contains a unit root, implying that shocks have a
permanent impact upon volatility at all horizons. For these instances, Engle and Bollerslev
(1986) and Nelson (1990) developed the Integrated-GARCH(p,q), or IGARCH(p, q).
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The unconditional volatility of the GARCH(1, 1) model is given by
E
£
ε2t
¤
= h =
w
1− α− β (1.8)
The fourth moment exists when 3α2 + 2αβ + β2 < 1, and is given by
E
£
ε4t
¤
=
3w2 (1− α− β)£
(1− α− β)
¡
1− β2 − 2αβ − 3α2
¢¤
The coeﬃcient of Kurtosis (relative to the normal distribution) is then given by
κ =
h
E
£
ε4t
¤
− 3E
£
ε2t
¤2i
E
£
ε2t
¤2
=
6α2¡
1− β2 − 2αβ − 3α2
¢ (1.9)
which is greater than zero under the assumptions that α, β > 0. This shows that the
GARCH(1,1) is leptokurtic, and hence exhibits heavy tails.
A disadvantage of the standard GARCH model is that it imposes that the condi-
tional volatility of an asset is aﬀected symmetrically by positive and negative innovations.
However, there is a large literature documenting asymmetries in conditional volatilities:
large negative return innovations increase conditional volatilities proportionally more than
positive shocks of an equal magnitude (see e.g. Black (1976), Christie (1982), French et
al. (1987), Schwert (1990), Nelson (1991), Campbell and Hentschel (1992), Cheung and Ng
(1993), Glosten et al. (1993), Bae and Karolyi (1994), Braun et al. (1995), Duﬀee (1995),
Bekaert and Harvey (1997), Ng (2000), and Bekaert and Wu (2000) among others). To ex-
plain asymmetry in stock return volatility, two theories have been suggested. Black (1976)
and Christie (1982) ascribed asymmetry to a leverage eﬀect : a drop in the value of the stock
(negative return) increases the financial leverage of a firm (its debt-to-equity ratio rises),
14
and hence the stock’s riskiness. Alternatively, Pindyck (1984), French et al. (1987), and
Campbell and Hentschel (1992) argued that asymmetry may simply reflect the existence
of time-varying risk premiums, the risk premium eﬀect. They start from the assumptions
that there exists a positive intertemporal relationship between conditional volatility and
expected returns, and that conditional volatility is persistent. In this case, an (anticipated)
rise in volatility increases expected returns, which requires an immediate drop in the cur-
rent stock price. As a result, while the leverage hypothesis claims that return shocks lead
to changes in the conditional volatility, the risk premium theory argues that changes in
conditional volatility drive return innovations. What eﬀect dominates is not clear from the
literature. While Christie (1982) and Schwert (1989) admit that leverage eﬀects do not
account for the full asymmetric response, a recent paper by Bekaert and Wu (2000) merely
supports the risk premium story.
Some studies have investigated asymmetries in interest rates. In this case, the
asymmetry is caused by the boundary of zero interest rates. When interest rates fall (and
prices increase), interest rate volatility tends to fall (see e.g. Engle et al. (1990), Chan et.
al. (1992), and Brenner et al. (1996)). For exchange rates on the other hand, no evidence
has been found in favor of volatility asymmetry.
Given its empirical success, numerous papers have introduced asymmetries in the
standard GARCH model. Most papers are built as to capture the leverage eﬀects in con-
ditional volatility. Two popular models are the exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model of
Nelson (1991), and the Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) (GJR henceforth) model.
15
In its simplest form, the EGARCH model can be written as:
log
¡
σ2t
¢
= ω + α
|εt−1|
σt−1
+ γ
εt−1
σt−1
+ β log(σt−1) (1.10)
There are two big diﬀerences with the standard GARCH model. First, the EGARCH spec-
ification is in logs. The advantage is that one does no longer need to impose constraints on
the parameters as to guarantee a positive variance at all instances. Second, the parameters
α and γ capture two important asymmetries in conditional variances. If γ < 0, negative
shocks will have a larger impact on conditional variances that positive shocks (leverage ef-
fect). Due to the parameter α, expected to be positive, large shocks (of any sign) will have
a larger impact compared to small shocks.
The GJR model uses a dummy variable to indicate whether news is good or bad.
An indicator function It is defined which is equal to 1 when the most recent innovation is
negative, εt < 0, and zero otherwise. The specification for the conditional volatility is then
given by
σ2t = ω + αε
2
t−1 + βσ
2
t−1 + γItε
2
t−1 (1.11)
If there is a leverage eﬀect, then one expects γ > 0. Several authors have shown that the
GJR model outperforms other asymmetric GARCH models. Engle and Ng (1993), using
Japanese stock returns, found that the GJR specification significantly outperforms other
asymmetric volatility models. Hagerud (1997) reports similar results for a set of Nordic
stock returns.
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1.2.3 Multivariate Conditional Volatility Models
Many financial models depend upon a good specification of conditional covari-
ance. For instance, the conditional CAPM states that the expected return on an asset is
proportional to its conditional covariance with the world market portfolio. Furthermore,
the performance of portfolio selection models does not only depend upon a good prediction
of expected returns, but also upon a correct assessment of how the diﬀerent candidate assets
will co-move. This argument holds even more for models that try to quantify the total risk
of individual portfolios.
In this short overview, I discuss some of the more popular multivariate GARCH
models. Where possible, I show how these models can be extended as to include asymmetry.
Suppose we want to determine the expected return of an asset with return ri,t.
According to the conditional CAPM, the expected return is proportional to the conditional
covariance of the asset’s returns with those of the market portfolio. The expected return
on the world market portfolio on the other hand is proportional to its conditional variance.
This yields the following model:
ri,t = βi,tCovt−1 [εi,t, εw,t] + εi,t
rw,t = βw,tV art−1 [εw,t] + εw,t
εt = [εi,t, εw,t]
0 ∼ N (0,Ht)
This model does not impose any constraints upon the specification of the conditional
variance-covariance matrix Ht. In their seminal paper, Bollerslev et al. (1988) were the
first to model Ht according to a multivariate GARCH model. In their V ech model, the
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conditional covariance matrix is specified as follows:
V ech (Ht) = C+
qX
i=1
AiV ech
¡
εtε0t−i
¢
+
pX
j=1
BiV ech (Ht−j) (1.12)
where V ech (.) denotes the column stacking operator of the lower portion of a symmetric
matrix, V ech (Ht) is a 3×1 vector whose first and third element represents the conditional
variance of respectively asset i and the world market portfolio, while the second element
refers to the conditional covariance between the two assets. Likewise, Ai, i = 1, ..., q and
Bi, i = 1, ..., p are 3× 3 parameter matrices. In what follows, I assume that p = q = 1, so
that
V ech (Ht) = C+AV ech
¡
εtε0t−1
¢
+BV ech (Ht−1) (1.13)
The V ech model has two important disadvantages. First, the estimated conditional covari-
ances are not guaranteed to be positive definite at all instances. Moreover, until now, it
proved very diﬃcult to impose restrictions on the parameters as to guarantee a positive
definite covariance matrix. Second, the number of parameters to be estimated becomes
quickly prohibitive, even for small models. The total number of parameters to be estimated
is N(N + 1)/2 + (p+ q)N2 (N + 1)2 /4, where N is the number of assets. Even for N = 2
and for p = q = 1, the number of parameters to be estimated amounts already to 21. For
N = 5, the number increases to 465, which is clearly infeasible to estimate. Technically the
V ech model is easily extended as to allow for asymmetry, even though this further enlarges
the parameter space.
To limit the number of parameters, Bollerslev et al. (1988) imposed the parameter
matrices A and B to be diagonal. In this case, the conditional volatilities and covariances
depend only upon past values of itself and past values of the own squared residuals (vari-
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ances) and the own cross-product of residuals (covariances). By imposing this assumption,
the number of parameters is reduced to 3N(N + 1)/2. For instance, for N = 2 (N = 5)
only 9 (45) parameters have to be estimated. Notice that in some applications, the assump-
tion of diagonal parameter matrices may be too restrictive. For instance, as I show in the
last paper of this dissertation, the conditional volatility of stock returns depends also upon
(asymmetric) shocks in the treasury bill market.
While imposing the diagonality constraint reduces the number of parameters, esti-
mation is often troublesome because no assumptions can be imposed to guarantee a positive
definite covariance matrix at all observations. Baba et al. (1991) and Engle and Kroner
(1995) adapted the V ech model as to guarantee positive definiteness of the conditional
covariance matrix. This model, generally referred to as the BEKK model, is given by
Ht = C+Aεt−1ε0t−1A
0 +BHt−1B (1.14)
where C, A and B are N ×N parameter matrices, with C symmetric and positive definite.
The asymmetric BEKK model was introduced by Kroner and Ng (1998), and is given by
Ht = C+Aεtε0t−1A
0 +BHt−1B+Dηt−1η
0
t−1D
0 (1.15)
where
ηt−1 = εt−1 ¯ 1 {εt−1 < 0} (1.16)
where ¯ denotes the Hadamard (element by element) matrix product. The number of
parameters in this model is N(N + 1)/2 + 3N2. The (asymmetric) BEKK model has been
used in many applications for which the number of assets is reasonably small. In this
dissertation, the asymmetric BEKK model is used in the second and third paper. Often
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further assumptions are imposed as to reduce the number of parameters. When A, B, and
D are assumed to be diagonal, the model reduces to
Ht = C+aa0 ¯ εtε0t−1 + bb0 ¯Ht−1 + dd0 ¯ ηt−1η0t−1 (1.17)
where a, b, and d are N × 1 vectors of parameters which include the diagonal elements of
A, B, and D respectively. This reduces the number parameters to N(N + 1)/2 + 3N.
Finally, the Constant Correlation Model of Bollerslev (1990) restricts the con-
ditional covariance between two asset returns to be proportional to the product of the
conditional standard deviations. Moreover, the correlation coeﬃcients are assumed to be
constant through time. More specifically, the conditional covariance matrix is given by
Ht = ztΓzt (1.18)
where zt is a diagonal matrix with the conditional volatility on the diagonal, and Γ =
¡
ρij
¢
,
for i, j = 1, ..., N. The big advantage of this model is the reduced number of parameters.
When a simple asymmetric GARCH(1,1) is chosen for the univariate conditional variance
specifications, the number of parameters equals those of the diagonal BEKK model. How-
ever, in many empirical applications, the assumption of a constant correlation coeﬃcient
may be too restrictive, given strong evidence in favor of time-varying correlations.
The models outlined until now have considerably less parameters than the original
V ech model, but are still hard to estimate when the number of assets is larger than 5.
Models that are specially constructed for these large-scale problems include the factor-
ARCH of Engle et al. (1990), the orthogonal GARCH of Van Der Weide (2002) and the
Dynamic Conditional Correlation Model of Engle (2002). As these models are not of direct
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relevance for the topics discussed in this dissertation, I refer to the individual references for
more information.
1.3 Regime-Switching Models
1.3.1 Introduction
Regime-switching models were introduced to the economics profession by Hamilton
(1988, 1989). The aim of the original model was to improve upon the determination of the
current and future state of the business cycle. He proposed a model in which the growth
rate of the trend function of US GNP switches between two diﬀerent states according to a
first-order Markov-process. He found that the two states correspond to normal growth and
recession states respectively, and that a typical economic recession is characterized by a 3%
permanent drop in the level of GNP.
Methodologically speaking, the paper was innovative in three ways. First, real
GNP growth was allowed to follow a nonlinear stationary process rather than a linear
stationary process. The nonlinear nature of his model proves especially useful for modelling
processes subject to discrete shifts in regime, even more when the dynamic behavior of the
model is markedly diﬀerent across regimes. I give three examples of series exhibiting discrete
shifts in their stochastic process. First, the interpretation of surprises in unemployment
figures may be very diﬀerent depending on whether the economy is in a boom or a recession.
Second, the conditional volatility of US short-term interest rates increased dramatically
when in October 1979 the Federal Reserve changed its policy target from the level of interest
rates to the quantity of money, only to come back to normal levels in October 1982, when
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interest rates became again the policy target. Third, the persistency of the conditional
volatility process of equity returns is typically much higher in stable periods than in times
of market turmoil. The second important contribution of Hamilton’s model was that it no
longer treats shifts in regimes as directly observable. Neftçi (1984) for instance supposed
the economy to be in a recession when unemployment was rising, and in a boom otherwise.
Hamilton however developed a technique that is capable to draw probabilistic inference
about shifts between states, using a nonlinear filter and smoother. This methodology allows
to uncover optimal statistical estimates of the state of the economy inherent in the data-
generating process of US real GNP. As mentioned before, the states roughly correspond
to booms and recessions. Finally, he developed an algorithm to estimate the population
parameters by standard maximum likelihood, and showed how this technique may be useful
for forecasting.
Since its introduction, the original regime-switching model has been extended and
applied in many ways. In economics, Hamilton’s original model has not only been success-
fully used in business cycle studies (see e.g. Ahrens (2002), Kim and Piger (2002), Layton
and Katsuura (2001), Kim and Nelson (1998), Ghysels (1997), Krolzig (1997), Diebold and
Rudebusch (1996), Layton (1996), Durland and McCurdy (1994), Filardo (1994), Lahiri
and Wang (1994), Lam (1990)), but also for forecasting inflation (Bidarkota (2001), Chen
(2001), Brunner and Hess (1991)), for investigating the impact of nonlinearities in the
Philips curve (Ferri et al. (2001), Ho (2000)), for investigating lending behavior of banks
(Asea and Blomberg (1998)), for explaining housing prices (Roche (2001)), for modelling
the waves and persistency in merger and acquisition activity (Barkoulas et al. (2001)), as
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well as for modelling political change (Blomberg (2000)).
Recently, regime-switching models have become more and more popular in finance.
Before describing various applications in finance, I will first give a brief introduction to the
specification, estimation, and testing of regime-switching models. Having done that, I will
elaborate on the various applications of this type of models in the finance literature.
1.3.2 Specification, Estimation, and Testing
Given that this thesis is largely focused on modelling returns, I will introduce
regime-switching models in the standard asset pricing framework. For a more general de-
scription, see chapter 22 of Hamilton (1994). Suppose ri,t is the excess return on a stock i,
and rw,t is the excess return on a world portfolio. Excess returns have an expected com-
ponent E [ri,t|Ωt−1] , and an idiosyncratic component εt, where Ωt represents the time t
information set. Investors typically require a compensation for those risk components that
cannot be diversified away. The static Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe
(1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966), and Black (1972) argues that, in equilibrium, only
market risk cannot be diversified away. In this framework, stocks will earn an expected
return proportional to the quantity of market risk they incorporate, where the quantity of
risk is measured by the covariance of excess returns on the stock and the market:
E [ri,t|Ωt−1] = E [rw,t|Ωt−1]V ar [rw,t|Ωt−1]Cov[ri,t, rw,t|Ωt−1] = λM,tCov[ri,t, rw,t|Ωt−1] (1.19)
where Cov and V ar are the covariance and variance operator respectively, and λM,t the
price of risk, defined as the unit compensation for market risk. While this single factor
model is usually rejected by the data in favor of a multifactor model, I use this simple
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specification for expository reasons. There is considerable evidence that prices of risk vary
with the business cycle. Therefore, one way to proceed is to relate the price of market
risk to a set of instruments Xt that are shown to be related to the business cycle, for
instance by assuming λM,t = β0Xt, or, if prices of market risk are imposed to be positive,
λM,t = exp(β0Xt). Frequently used instruments are dividend yields, earnings yield, the
(change in) yield on short-term T-bills, the term spread between the yields on long-term
government bonds and short-term T-bills, and the credit spread between the yield on high
and low grade bonds. Most studies however assume the relationship between the price
of market risk and the business cycle instruments to be linear. Recently however, several
authors have used regime-switching models to show that the risk-return relationship may
be state-dependent. Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) for instance found that the
conditional distribution of stock returns diﬀers between recession and expansion states.
More specifically, the probability of staying in the low variance, high mean state is high
after recessions, while it drops down immediately before and during downturn periods. In
Chauvet and Potter (2001), both return and volatility processes diﬀer depending upon a
two-state latent variable. The two states are supposed to be recession and boom states
respectively. They find that the risk-return relationship is very diﬀerent across the business
cycle: while there is a negative relationship between conditional expectation and variance
around economic peaks, it is positive around business cycle troughs1.
In what follows, I am going to develop a simple conditional CAPM with regime
1More specifically, Chauvet and Potter (2001) found that the negative risk-return relationship around the
beginning of a recession is caused both by a substantial rise in volatility, related to the increased economic
uncertainty, and decreasing expected returns, in anticipation of decreasing company earnings. The positive
risk-return relationship around economic peaks on the other hand is the result of high expected returns in
anticipation of an economic recovery on the one hand, and high volatility caused by uncertainty of the true
recovery date.
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switches in the prices of risk. Suppose the price of risk can take on two values, λM,1 and
λM,2. Let SM,t ∈ {1, 2} represent the state of investor’s preferences at time t. At each point
in time, the price of market risk is then given by
λM,t =



λM,1 if SM,t = 1
λM,2 if SM,t = 2
(1.20)
so that expected returns are determined by the following equation:
E [ri,t|Ωt−1] = λM,SM,tCovt−1[ri,t, rw,t] (1.21)
Notice that for simplicity I assumed here that only the price of market risk is state de-
pendent, and not the conditional covariance. The time evolution of the unobserved state
variable SM,t is assumed to follow a first-order markov chain with constant transition prob-
abilities:
Pr (SM,t = 1|SM,t−1 = 1) = P
Pr (SM,t = 2|SM,t−1 = 1) = 1− P
Pr (SM,t = 2|SM,t−1 = 2) = Q
Pr (SM,t = 1|SM,t−1 = 2) = 1−Q
where P and Q represent the probabilities of remaining in the past state.
Before we can estimate equation (1.21), we need to provide a model for world
market returns, as well as for the variance-covariance matrix Ht. Assume model (1.21)
also holds for the market portfolio, so that its expected return will be proportional to its
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conditional variance. The set of equations to be estimated is then given by
ri,t = µi,t (SM,t) + εi,t = λM,SM,tCovt−1[ri,t, rw,t] + εi,t
rw,t = µw,t + εi,t = λW,tV art−1[rw,t] + εw,t
εt = [εi,t, εw,t]0
εt|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0,Ht)
where the latent regime variable SM,t is governed by the following transition probability
matrix
Π =


P 1− P
1−Q Q

 (1.22)
The specification of the conditional variance-covariance matrix may be given by any of the
multivariate GARCHmodels described in the previous section. This model can be estimated
by standard maximum likelihood techniques in a recursive way similar to GARCH type of
models. Suppose that f (rt|Ωt−1) is the density function of rt = [ri,t, rw,t]0 , conditional on
the time t− 1 information set. This density function can be separated as follows
f (rt|Ωt−1; θ) =
2X
j=1
f(rt, SM,t = j|Ωt−1; θ)P (SM,t = j|Ωt−1; θ)
=
2X
j=1
f(rt, SM,t = j|Ωt−1; θ)Pjt
where Pjt is the ex-ante probability of being in state j. Under conditional normality, the
density function is given by
f(rt, SM,t = j|Ωt−1; θ) = (2π)−
n
2 |Σ|−n2 exp(−1
2
(rt − µ (St = j))0 |H|−1 (rt − µ (St = j)))
where µt =
¡
µi,t (SM,t) , µw,t
¢02.We can decompose the ex-ante probability of being in state
2Notice that µi,t (SM,t) and µw,t are also conditional upon the time t− 1 information set. For notational
clarity, I have removed references to Ωt.
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j as follows:
P (SM,t = j|Ωt−1; θ) =
2X
k=1
P (SM,t = j|SM,t−1 = k)P (SM,t−1 = k|Ωt−1; θ), j = 1, ..., 2.
where P (SM,t−1 = k|Ωt−1; θ) represents the filtered probability, which indicates the state
of the economy at time t, using all the information available at time t. Assume that
the model for the conditional variance-covariance matrix only uses past returns, so that
Ωt = [rt, rt−1, ..., r1, r0]
0 , as is the case in the typical GARCH type models. We then can
decompose the filtered probability as follows:
P (SM,t−1 = k|Ωt−1; θ) = P (SM,t−1 = k|rt−1,Ωt−2; θ)
=
P (SM,t−1 = k, rt−1|Ωt−2; θ)
P (rt−1|Ωt−2)
=
f(rt−1|SM,t−1 = k,Ωt−2; θ)P (SM,t−1 = k|Ωt−2; θ)
2P
j=1
f(rt−1|SM,t−1 = j,Ωt−2; θ)P (SM,t−1 = j|Ωt−2; θ)
We can now write the ex-ante probability P (Si,t = j|Ωt−1; θ) as the following recursive
process:
p1t = P
·
g1,t−1 (1− p1t−1)
g1,t−1p1t−1 + g2,t−1 (1− p1t−1)
¸
+
(1−Q)
·
g2,t−1 (1− p1t−1)
g1,t−1p1t−1 + g2,t−1 (1− p1t−1)
¸
where
p1t = P (SM,t = 1|Ωt−1)
g1,t = f (rt|SM,t = 1,Ωt−1)
g2,t = f (rt|SM,t = 2,Ωt−1)
Given initial values for the ex-ante probabilities, one can construct the likelihood iteratively.
The parameters of the model are estimated by maximizing the loglikelihood function with
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respect to θ :
£(rt|Ωt−1; θ) =
TX
t=1
lnφ(rt|Ωt−1; θ)
The model and the construction of the information set imply that the loglikelihood function
can be written as
£(rt|Ωt−1; θ) =
TX
t=1
lnφ(εt|Ωt−1; θ)
where the density function φ(.) is a weighted average of the two state dependent densities,
where the weights are determined by the ex-ante probabilities:
φ(εt|Ωt−1; θ) = p1tf(rt, SM,t = 1|Ωt−1; θ) + (1− p1t) f(rt, SM,t = 2|Ωt−1; θ)
Using numerical algorithms, this loglikelihood function is maximized with respect to the
parameter vector θ. All estimations in this dissertation have been performed in MATLAB,
using the fmincon constrained optimization function with the BFGS quasi-newton updating
scheme. To avoid local maxima, all optimizations were started from at least 10 diﬀerent
starting values.
Evaluation of regime-switching models is complicated by the fact that standard
distribution theory for hypothesis testing does not apply. More specifically, testing a regime-
switching model against linear alternatives is troubled by Davies’ (1977) problem, in which
a nuisance parameter is not identified under the null hypothesis. Suppose the economy is
in state 1, and we want to test whether there is statistical evidence for a second regime. A
first problem is that under the null hypothesis of only one regime (the linear model), the
transition probabilities P and Q are not identified, so that the sample likelihood surface is
flat (under the null) with respect to these parameters. Second, the scores with respect to P ,
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Q, and the parameters in the second regime are identical to zero when evaluated at the null
hypothesis, so that the score has a zero variance. Both problems are suﬃcient to render
standard likelihood ratio (LR) tests inapplicable. LR test procedures to deal with these
problems were developed by Hansen (1992) and Garcia (1998). Essentially, Hansen (1992)
showed how to simulate an upper bound for the distribution of the maximum of the stan-
dardized likelihood ratio process. His method is however computationally very intensive,
certainly for more complex regime-switching models3. By assuming that also the transition
probabilities P and Q are nuisance parameters, Garcia (1998) is able to derive analytically
the asymptotic null distribution of the LR test statistic for some regime-switching mod-
els, hereby significantly reducing computational burden. Unfortunately, extensions of his
method to more complex regime-switching models is not straightforward. Instead, similar
to Cecchetti et al. (1990), Lam (1990), and Ang and Bekaert (2001), we will derive the
empirical distribution of the LR test statistic by simulation. This empirical distribution is
obtained in three steps. First, a large number (e.g. 500) of series based upon the linear
model are simulated. Second, both the linear and regime-switching model are estimated by
maximum likelihood, yielding a distribution for the likelihood ratio statistic. Finally, the
probability that the null hypothesis does not hold is obtained by calculating the percentage
of simulated LR test statistics larger than the actual LR statistic. Once the regime-switching
model cannot be rejected against the linear alternative, tests on other parameters can be
performed in the normal way (Likelihood Ratio test, Wald Test), hereby conditional on the
existence of two regimes.
3Hansen’s method involves the evaluation of the likelihood across a grid of diﬀerent values for the regime-
dependent parameters, as well as for the transition probability parameters. Even though each likelihood
is maximized only with respect to the nuisance parameters (other parameters are imposed), this procedure
becomes quickly extremely computationally demanding.
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1.3.3 Some Extensions to the basic Model
In the previous section, a standard regime-switching model was outlined. In this
thesis, two recent innovations in the standard model will be used. First, Filardo (1994)
showed how to make the transition probability matrix time varying. Second, Hamilton
and Susmel (1994), Cai (1994), and Gray (1996) introduced regime-switching models in the
(G)ARCH literature.
Regime-Switching Model with Time-Varying Transition Probabilities
Similar to Hamilton’s seminal paper, Filardo (1994) uses a regime-switching model
to characterize the dynamics of the business cycle. He argues however that the original
model is too restrictive, as it imposes that the expected durations of expansions and re-
cessions are constant through time4. Intuitively, the expected duration of an expansion
and a contraction is likely to be related to the nature and magnitude of some exogenous
shocks, on macroeconomic policy, and on the underlying strength of the economy. Filardo
(1994) shows that conditioning the transition probabilities on current information improves
forecasting performance of business cycle turning points.
Suppose we want to make the transition probabilities governing the price of market
risk dependent upon previous information zt, where zt = [zt, zt−1,..., z0]0. The transition
4If state 1 represents a recession, state 2 a boom, and if the transition probability matrix is as in (1.22),
then the expected durations of a recession and a boom are given respectively by 1/ (1− P ) and 1/ (1−Q) .
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probabilities are then given by
Pr (SM,t = 1|SM,t−1 = 1, zt) = P (zt)
Pr (SM,t = 2|SM,t−1 = 2, zt) = Q (zt)
and the transition probability matrix becomes:
Π (zt) =


P (zt) 1− P (zt)
1−Q (zt) Q (zt)


Many functional forms are valid to map the information variable zt to the open interval
(0, 1) , while keeping the log-likelihood function well defined. The logistic function, probit
function, Cauchy integral and piecewise continuously diﬀerentiable functions are all possible
candidates. As in most studies, in this thesis I will use the logistic function:
P (zt) =
exp(ζP + ξ
0
Pzt)
1 + exp(ζP + ξ
0
Pzt)
Q (zt) =
exp(ζQ + ξ
0
Qzt)
1 + exp(ζQ + ξ
0
Qzt)
In this specification, the model with constant transition probabilities corresponds to the
restriction that ξP = ξQ = 0. Notice that this test is not troubled by Davies’ problem, as
both specifications have two regimes. Because also the functional form and the restriction
satisfy the necessary conditions, a standard Likelihood Ratio test can be applied.
Regime-Switching Volatility Models
As argued in the previous section, there is considerable evidence that the volatil-
ity of equity returns varies significantly through time. In empirical studies, the conditional
heteroskedasticity models of Engle (1982, arch), Bollerslev (1986, garch), and Nelson
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(1994, egarch) have been most popular. These type of models are however not without
problems. First, while the parameters of (E)(G)ARCH processes are typically highly sig-
nificant, they are not stable through time (see e.g. Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), Engle
and Mustafa (1992)). Second, forecasting performance of these types of volatility mod-
els is rather disappointing (Pagan and Schwert (1990), Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990,
1993), Hamilton and Susmel (1994)). Hamilton and Susmel (1994) for instance estimated
a Student-t GARCH(1,1) model with asymmetry and found that this models yields poorer
multi-period volatility forecasts than a constant variance model. In particular, multi-period
GARCH forecasts of volatility are typically too high in periods of above-normal volatility.
Third, parameter estimates for GARCH type of models typically imply a suspiciously high
degree of persistence. Consider the following model:
rt = µt + εt
εt = σtt, t ∼ N(0, 1)
σ2t = ω + αε
2
t−1 + βσ
2
t−1 + ζmax(−εt, 0)2
This a the popular Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) asymmetric volatility model.
Hamilton and Susmel (1994) show that the persistence of this model can be calculated as
λ = (α+ β + ζ/2)
Estimates of this model using weekly returns on a value-weighted portfolio of stocks listed
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) between July 1962 and December 1987, implied a
λ of about 0.96. This means that shocks now have a considerable impact on future volatility
(e.g. in 6 month’s time: (0.96)26 = 0.346). Notice that such a high degree of persistence
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is hard to reconcile with the poor forecasting performance of these type of models: if the
variance were persistent, the model should do a much better job at forecasting it. Finally,
in a multivariate context, even fairly general asymmetric GARCH models cannot reproduce
the correlation asymmetry typically encountered in equity returns (Ang and Bekaert (2001),
Ang and Chen (2001)).
Regime-switching volatility models were introduced by Hamilton and Susmel (1994),
Cai (1994), and Gray (1996) as an alternative to the standard GARCH methodology. These
models proved to be quite successful in addressing some of the problems just mentioned.
Diebold (1986) and Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), among others, argued that the persis-
tence in volatility implied by GARCH models may be spurious, and caused by deterministic
structural changes in the stochastic return process. Susmel (1999) showed that the mag-
nitude of rare events such as market crashes can have a substantial impact on parameter
estimates, even though these events themselves may be very short lived. Nelson, Piger, and
Zivot (2001) analyzed the power of various unit root tests when the true process is subject
to regime changes. Their results suggest that processes that are state dependent are well
disguised as processes that possess a unit root when tested. To allow for discrete shifts in
the level and process of conditional volatility, Hamilton and Susmel (1994) and Cai (1994)
extended the ARCH model as to include an endogenous regime switching component, and
showed that the persistence in observed volatility is due to a persistence in regime rather
than to the persistence of the variance within a regime. While the probabilities of staying
in the current state are all above 0.98, the persistence of the variance process within the
regime, as measured by λ, is only 0.48. These lower persistence levels imply that - in the
33
absence of multiple regimes - volatility will typically be underestimated in the high volatility
state, and overestimated in the low volatility states.
Not surprisingly, regime switching volatility models do also better in forecasting
volatility. Dueker (1997) estimates several regime-switching volatility models and concludes
that although they do not oﬀer substantial improvements in terms of likelihood scores, they
manage to outperform the single state models when predicting implied volatilities. Also
Hamilton and Susmel (1994) found that regime-switching ARCH models forecast better
than traditional GARCH models. They argue that this outperformance is explained by the
capacity of state dependent volatility models to track year-long shifts in volatility without
attributing a large degree of persistence to the eﬀects of individual outliers.
Gray (1996) extended the regime-switching ARCH models of Cai (1994) and
Hamilton and Susmel (1994) to the GARCH case. In addition, all parameters in the con-
ditional variance specification were made state dependent, rather than additive or multi-
plicative parameters only. He provides for a recursive estimation procedure that greatly
simplifies estimation of relatively complex models. In what follows, I am going to outline a
simplified version of Gray’s regime-switching GARCH model.
Suppose we have the following model for the return series rt :
rt = µt (St) + εt
εt = σt (St) t, t ∼ N(0, 1)
σ2t (St) = ω (St) + α (St) ε
2
t−1 + β (St)σ
2
t−1
so that both the mean µt and conditional variance σ
2
t are state dependent. Suppose there
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are two regimes only, whose ex-ante probabilities are given by pkt = P (St = k|Ωt−1) , for
k = {1, 2} . The problem with this model is that the current conditional variance is di-
rectly conditional upon the latent regime variable St, and indirectly on all previous states
{St−1, St−2, ...} . This is because the conditional variance at time t depends upon the con-
ditional variance in the previous period, which depends on the state at time t− 1 and the
conditional variance at time t − 2, and so on. Gray (1996) removed this path dependence
by integrating the conditional variances over the regimes at each point in time. To see this,
remember that
σ2t = E
£
r2t |Ωt−1
¤
−E [rt|Ωt−1]2
= p1t
£
µ2t (1) + σ
2
t (1)
¤
+ (1− p1t)
£
µt (2) + σ
2
t (2)
¤
− [p1tµt (1) + (1− p1t)µt (2)]2 .
Now, as σ2t is no longer path-dependent, the regime-dependent conditional variances can be
calculated as
σ2t (k) = ω (k) + α (k) ε
2
t−1 + β (k)σ
2
t−1
σ2t−1 = p1t
£
µ2t (1) + σ
2
t (1)
¤
+ (1− p1t)
£
µt (2) + σ
2
t (2)
¤
− [p1tµt (1) + (1− p1t)µt (2)]2
for k ∈ {1, 2} , where
εt−1 = rt−1 −E [rt−1|Ωt−2]
= rt−1 − [p1tµt (1) + (1− p1t)µt (2)] .
Having removed the path dependence, the estimation procedure outlined in the previous
section can be followed.
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1.3.4 Regime-Switching Models in Finance
In this section, I want to describe some important applications of the regime-
switching methodology in finance. The aim of this section is not to be complete, but
merely to convince the reader of the potential of regime-switching models in many financial
applications.
Several authors have used regime-switching models to study interest rates. The
stochastic behavior of interest rates may be subject to discrete regime shifts because of
changes in business cycle conditions and monetary policy. A good example of this is the
substantial increase in interest rate volatility during the period 1979-1982 when the Federal
Reserve bank targeted non-borrowed reserves rather than interest rates. Not surprisingly,
several studies, including Hamilton (1988), Evans and Lewis (1994), Sola and Driﬃll (1994),
Garcia and Perron (1996), Gray (1996), Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (2001), Bekaert and
Ang (2001), and Edwards and Susmel (2002) have used regime-switching models to examine
interest rates. Gray (1996) estimated a regime-switching GARCH specification on a series
of weekly one-month US treasury bill rates for the period January 1970 through 1994. He
finds both economic and statistical evidence for the existence of two states. State one is
characterized as a period of high variance and high interest rates, while state two is a
low-variance, low-interest rate regime. Moreover, he finds that mean reversion in interest
rates - thought before to operate continuously - occurs only during periods of high interest
rates and high volatility, a result confirmed by Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (2001). The
periods of high interest rates / high volatility are the OPEC oil crisis of 1973-1975, the
1979-1983 period when the FED changed its target from interest rates to nonborrowed
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reserves, and the period immediately after the market crash of 1987. Ang and Bekaert
(2001) show that multivariate regime-switching interest rate models perform much better
than univariate models in terms of regime classification and forecasting: models that include
the short rate of other countries and/or interest rate spreads that are correlated with the
short rate under investigation, forecast and match sample moments much better. They also
find evidence that allowing time variation in the transition probabilities improves further
forecasting performance. Edwards and Susmel (2002) looked at high-frequency interest
rate data for a group of Latin American countries. Consistent with the previous findings
on US data, they find that there are at least two volatility regimes, and that high-volatility
episodes are rather short-lived. Using a bivariate SWARCH model, they find only weak
evidence for interest rate volatility co-movement across countries.
As argued before, univariate regime-switching volatility models have many ad-
vantages over single regime (G)ARCH models. Several authors have extended univariate
regime-switching volatility models to the multivariate case. Ramchand and Susmel (1998)
estimate a bivariate switching ARCH (SWARCH) model to test whether conditional volatil-
ities and correlations between markets are state dependent. The find that correlations
between the US and a set of other world markets are on average 2 to 3.5 times higher
when the US market is in a high variance state as compared to a low variance regime.
Furthermore, they show that Sharpe ratios of international portfolios constructed on the
basis of the SWARCH models are higher than those based on traditional GARCH models.
Edwards and Susmel (2001) study a group a Latin-American equity markets and use a bi-
variate SWARCH model to investigate whether volatility regimes are co-dependent across
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countries. The find strong evidence for volatility co-movement across countries between the
diﬀerent Latin-American countries, suggesting interdependence between markets. However,
they cannot reject that the volatility processes of Latin-American equity returns is inde-
pendent from those from Mexico and Hong-Kong, countries that went through periods of
considerable turmoil. This suggests that there were no contagion eﬀects from the Mexican
and Asian crisis to the ”Mercosur” countries.
Recently, Ang and Bekaert (2002) and Guidolin and Timmermann (2002) have
investigated whether regime switching models are useful as to make better asset allocation
decisions. Guidolin and Timmermann (2002) find that the joint distribution of stocks and
bonds exhibits four regimes: a crash, a bear, bull, and bull-burst regime. Moreover, they
find that the optimal asset allocation varies significantly over regimes. This indicates that
weights on the various asset classes strongly depend on which state the economy is perceived
to be in. Ang and Bekaert (2002) look how the presence of regimes can be incorporated
into a global asset allocation exercise (with 6 equity markets and cash), and in a market
timing setting for US cash, bonds, and equity. They find that regime switching methodology
oﬀers superior (out-of-sample) performance when the investors has to choose between cash,
bonds, and equity. Evidence is weaker though within the global equity market allocation
framework.
1.4 Conclusion
In this introductory chapter, I discussed some of the recent changes in the financial
system, and showed how the three papers in this dissertation may contribute to a better
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understanding of the outstanding issues. In addition, I briefly anticipated the main results
of this dissertation. All three papers in this dissertation apply both conditional volatility
and regime-switching techniques. Therefore, in part two, I gave a short introduction to
both univariate and multivariate GARCH models. Similarly, part three provides for an
introduction to regime-switching models.
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Chapter 2
Bank Characteristics and Cyclical
Variations in Bank Stock Returns
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates whether stock returns of banks with a diﬀerent risk profile
exhibit diﬀerent risk factor sensitivities over the business cycle. While it is widely accepted
that banks act as delegated monitors and manage risk, an important question is to what
extent bank stock returns are sensitive to business cycle fluctuations. Theories of imperfect
capital markets (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997))
argue that asymmetric information and agency costs are typically high during business cy-
cle troughs and low during booms. The banking sector is especially vulnerable to adverse
selection and moral hazard, both caused by asymmetric information. A recession will di-
rectly increase the overall riskiness of the outstanding loans through a reduction in the total
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value of collateral and a lower success rate of financed projects. Indirectly, moral hazard
may increase loan riskiness if the lower firm value caused by worsening economic conditions
leads to excessive risk taking behavior of borrowers (”gambling for resurrection”). Notice
that also banks themselves will be more prone to gambling in an environment in which they
have lower franchise value. These theories generally predict that banking becomes more
risky in business cycle troughs. The aim of this paper is to provide some evidence about
the empirical validity of these theoretical statements. More specifically, we test (1) whether
or not bank stocks are sensitive to changes in the overall credit market conditions, and (2)
whether or not these sensitivities vary asymmetrically over the business cycle.
A second question we want to address is whether the relationship between bank
returns and credit conditions depends upon the risk profile of the bank. We investigate
whether adequate capitalization, functional diversification (universal banking), and geo-
graphical diversification make banks less vulnerable to worsening credit market conditions.
In addition, we test whether the asymmetry in business cycle sensitivity is diﬀerent for
banks with opposite risk profiles. Practically, we subdivide the sample of listed European
banks in subsamples of relatively highly versus relatively poorly capitalized banks, function-
ally diversified versus specialized banks, and geographically diversified versus local banks.
Similar to Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), we compare the sensitivities of the stock
returns of portfolios of banks with diﬀerent risk profiles over the business cycle using a bi-
variate factor model with regime switches in both the factor sensitivities and the conditional
volatility.
A thorough understanding of this issue is of obvious importance for national and
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international bank supervisors and regulators. A deterioration of bank health may be
transmitted to the real economy and may raise questions about the systemic stability of
the financial system. Following the capital account liberalization in various parts of the
world, banks headquartered in industrialized countries are increasingly engaged in inter-
national lending, leaving them vulnerable to financial crises in both the home market and
the borrowing countries. In addition, financial liberalization may have increased risk-taking
behavior by banks through a negative eﬀect on banks’ franchise value (see Keeley (1990),
Hellmann et al. (2000)). These considerations stress the importance of research concerning
the sensitivity of banks to changes in the state of the business cycle. A related question is
whether capital adequacy rules are the most optimal tool to counter adverse economic or
financial shocks. Current eﬀorts at the BIS level are aimed at strengthening the capital po-
sition of internationally operating banks. We investigate whether adequate capitalization is
perceived by the stock market as a structural hedge against negative economic shocks. One
of the pillars of the proposed new prudential strategy of Basel II is to introduce elements of
market discipline in the supervisory process. Hence, it is important to determine whether
bank stock prices are a potentially useful indicator of financial stress. The examination
of the impact of functional diversification of banking institutions on their risk profile may
provide useful information on the desirability of the gradual broadening of banking powers.
In this respect, the European bank sector oﬀers a broad scope for fertile research, since the
Second Banking Directive (1989) has given banks a large degree of freedom to implement
strategies of geographical and functional diversification. For bank managers, it is important
to understand the potential implications of strategic choices for bank riskiness.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theo-
retical framework for the existence of asymmetries in bank stock returns, both across the
business cycle and across the various types of banks. Section 3 introduces the methodology
that allows to incorporate these asymmetries in an empirical model. Section 4 describes the
data, while section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Foundations
The aim of this section is twofold. First, we want to provide a theoretical founda-
tion for the hypothesis that bank stocks may depend asymmetrically on the business cycle.
Second, we provide arguments for the claim that banks with a diﬀerent risk profile may
react diﬀerently to swings in the business cycle. More specifically, we develop hypothe-
ses about the behavior of banks with a diﬀerent degree of capital adequacy (highly versus
poorly capitalized banks), functional specialization (diversified versus specialized banks)
and geographical diversification (local versus global banks).
In their role as financial intermediaries, banks are inherently exposed to changes
in the overall economic conditions. From a theoretical point of view, banks are commonly
characterized as delegated monitors, because they obtain illiquid claims (loans) funded by
short-term deposits with a relatively high degree of liquidity (Diamond, 1984). In their
lending business, banks face problems of asymmetric information, both ex ante (adverse
selection) and ex post (moral hazard). This feature exposes banks to diﬀerent kinds of
pervasive risk, of which market risk, interest rate risk and default risk are the most important
ones. However, these risks are themselves influenced or even determined by business cycle
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conditions. In order to organize the discussion, we assume that banks are influenced by the
business cycle through two main channels. The first is based on the association between
the business cycle and the degree of asymmetric information. The second channel related
to the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy.
In economic downturns, it becomes more diﬃcult for banks to assess the creditwor-
thiness of corporate borrowers. Since adverse economic conditions have a negative impact
on the cash flows of the most vulnerable borrowers, banks may suﬀer losses because some
of their outstanding loans default. At the same time, the assessment of new loan appli-
cants becomes more subject to type I errors because the net present value of new corporate
investment becomes more uncertain. Moreover the net worth of companies and the value
of their collateralizable assets decrease. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) argue that agency
costs are inversely related to the borrower’s net worth and collateral. Since the value of
collateral is likely to be procyclical, asymmetric information will be relatively high in busi-
ness cycle downturns and relatively low in booms. This implies that bank intermediation
becomes riskier during downturns through a reduction in the value of collateral attached to
outstanding loans and an increase in the degree of asymmetric information. These eﬀects
will especially increase the risk of illiquid and poorly capitalized banks with a specializa-
tion in traditional bank intermediation. Another possible asymmetric information eﬀect
is that potential entrants into a banking market are likely to suﬀer an adverse-selection
eﬀect stemming from their inability to determine whether applicant borrowers are new
borrowers seeking financing for their untested projects or are in fact borrowers who have
previously been rejected by an incumbent bank. This would raise the riskiness of enter-
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ing banks, especially in an environment of worsening credit market conditions (Dell’Ariccia
2001, Dell’Ariccia, Friedman and Marquez 1999).
There is evidence of a bank lending channel in most developed economies, although
its importance vis-à-vis other monetary policy transmission channels remains disputed (see,
e.g., Angeloni et al., 2002). Faced with adverse business cycle conditions, banks may elect
to ration credit. This happened in a number of periods, both in the US and in Europe. Peek
and Rosengren (1995) argue that the recession of 1990-1991 in New England was partially
caused by the reluctance of banks to lend. Also in the most recent business cycle downturn
(2001-02), banks have been accused of being excessively restrictive, both in the US and in
Europe (The Economist, 2002). However, banks will react diﬀerently to monetary policy
actions, depending on their financial strength and their access to internally or externally
generated liquidity. Kashyap and Stein (1995) conclude that small banks seem more prone
than large banks to reduce their lending, with the eﬀect greatest for small banks with
relatively low buﬀer stocks of securities. On the other hand, well capitalized (or highly
rated) banks should find it relatively easy to access the interbank or the securities markets
to raise funds in the face of a deposit shock. This implies that a restrictive monetary policy
will have less impact on the loan supply of well capitalized banks. Empirically, Kishan and
Opiela (2000) show that the impact of monetary policy actions is diﬀerent for banks with
diﬀerent sizes and capital ratios.
A shift in the risk profile of banks over the business cycle can also be caused by
changing incentives on the part of banks. Economic downturns may produce the conditions
in which banks have increased incentives to gamble and, hence, increase their riskiness.
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Hellman et al. (2000) show that, even with capital requirements, banks have an incentive to
gamble when their franchise value is harmed. Since this eﬀect will be stronger in economic
downturns, bank riskiness may behave asymmetrically. Repullo (2002) and Schoors and
Vander Vennet (2002) show that a gambling equilibrium may exist when the degree of
asymmetric information increases. However, they also show that this risky behavior is
less likely to occur when capital adequacy rules are binding. Hence, we expect that well
capitalized banks will be less prone to excessive risk taking. These risk incentives may cause
lending cycles and associated swings in the riskiness of banks (see, e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore
1997, Rajan 1994 or Asea and Blomberg 1998).
The conclusion of this selective literature review is that bank riskiness depends
on the business cycle, but potentially in an asymmetric fashion. The central hypothesis
of this paper is that banks with diﬀerent risk strategies will be aﬀected in a structurally
diﬀerent way by swings in credit market conditions. Banks know that shifts in credit market
conditions, i.e. a deterioration of the creditworthiness of their borrowers, may be caused by
reversals of the business cycle. Consequently, they will try to mitigate some of the associated
risk, e.g. by hedging certain positions with credit or other types of derivatives. However,
while the oﬀ balance sheet activities of commercial banks have increased substantially over
the last decade, it is not clear if this trend has produced less risk. Hence, even a careful
hedging strategy may not constitute an eﬀective protection against unanticipated events.
We consider three possible avenues for banks to adjust their risk profile in a more structural
way: functional diversification, geographical diversification, and increased capital adequacy.
We test whether or not the stock returns of these diﬀerent types of banks exhibit a diﬀerent
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sensitivity to changes in credit market conditions over the business cycle using a regime-
switching methodology.
A first option for banks is to diversify their income sources by engaging in diﬀer-
ent types of financial services. Many countries allow universal banking or the formation
of financial conglomerates in which commercial banking, insurance and securities-related
activities can be integrated, although diﬀerent organizational models of universal banking
coexist (Saunders and Walter 1994). Typically, banks have tried to lessen their dependence
on interest income (from loans and securities) and increase the proportion of non-interest
income. The economic rationale refers to standard portfolio theory. If the non-interest in-
come sources are imperfectly correlated with the traditional revenues from intermediation,
the bundled income stream will be more stable. ECB (2000) reports an inverse correlation
between interest income and non-interest income in several EU bank markets, suggesting a
high potential for diversification benefits. The general conclusion of merger studies among
diﬀerent financial services providers is that the combination of banking and other activities,
especially insurance, may have a positive impact on the overall riskiness of the conglomer-
ate (Kwan and Laderman, 1999; Genetay and Molyneux, 1998). DeLong (2001), however,
finds higher abnormal returns for focusing rather than diversifying US bank mergers. For
US banks, Stiroh (2002) finds that interest income and non-interest income have become
more correlated in recent years. In contrast to merger studies and correlation analyses, our
approach allows a direct assessment of the sensitivity diﬀerences to economic shocks for
diversified versus specialized banks.
Based on a diﬀerent argumentation, a number of studies have provided evidence
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that universal banks could be less risky than their specialized peers. The closer ties with
corporate borrowers and repeated lending may give universal banks access to private in-
formation which may improve the eﬀectiveness of their monitoring eﬀorts. The biggest
advantage of universal banks may be in the ex post monitoring of firms facing financial
distress because they can build up renegotiation reputation (Chemmanur and Fulghieri,
1994). If universal banks are better able to deal with financial distress, their cash flows
will be less aﬀected by adverse economic conditions. Specialized banks, on the other hand,
are expected to be more vulnerable to economic fluctuations. Based on a large sample
of European banks, Vander Vennet (2002) finds that the market betas of universal and
specialized banks do not diﬀer significantly in periods of economic expansion. In times of
economic contraction, however, the market beta of universal banks is significantly lower
than that of specialized banks. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that universal
banks are better monitors and, hence, are less sensitive to shifts in the business cycle. The
results are broadly in line with those reported by Dewenter and Hess (1998) for portfolios
of relationship versus transactional banks in eight countries. Hence, our prediction is that
(diversified) universal banks exhibit less sensitivity to shifts in credit market conditions
than their specialized competitors and that universal banks are less vulnerable to adverse
business cycle conditions.
The second option for banks to hedge their exposure to pervasive risks is to diver-
sify geographically. Standard portfolio theory again implies that internationally operating
banks will be less vulnerable to abrupt changes in local business cycle or credit market con-
ditions. The underlying rationale is that a geographic diversification of credit and market
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risk exposures leads to more stable revenues due to the non-perfect correlation of mar-
ket movements and asymmetric business cycles across diﬀerent countries or world regions.
Banks from industrialized countries have indeed expanded their involvement in interna-
tional lending, including loans to emerging markets, often in the form of syndicated lending
(Eichengreen and Mody (1999), see also BIS International Banking Statistics). Part of this
movement may be explained by increased competition in their home markets, leading to
eroding interest margins, and low domestic interest rates. Moreover, Western banks may
also be induced to lend internationally because they enjoy deposit insurance, lender-of-
last-resort services and implicit guarantees, along with the expectation that international
institutions such as the IMF will organize bailouts when the borrowing countries are hit by
adverse macroeconomic events. However, since borrower information in developing coun-
tries is more opaque, the net exposure of internationally operating banks to moral hazard
may actually increase, as was evidenced during some of the financial crises in the 1990s
(Asia, Russia, etc.). Moreover, cross-border entry may be associated with asymmetric in-
formation, increasing the riskiness of the entrants (DellArricia et al. 1999). Finally, the
risk benefits of geographical diversification rely on the assumption of low cross-border cor-
relations. When, on the other hand, adverse credit market conditions prevail across most
regions, be it due to similarities in the causes or due to contagion, banks may experience
little diversification benefits. Hence, the prediction that the stock returns of internationally
diversified banks will be less sensitive to shifts in credit market conditions will probably
only hold in cases of asymmetric regional shocks.
A third option for a bank to signal financial strength is to maintain a relatively high
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level of capital as a protection against possible losses. In all the countries under considera-
tion in this paper, banks are required to maintain minimum capital levels as a proportion
of their risky assets, calculated according to the current BIS standards. However, while
the supervisory authorities impose a risk-based capital ratio of 8%, banks can signal their
creditworthiness by holding levels of equity in excess of the required minimum. The excess
capital serves as an additional buﬀer to cover unexpected future losses, thereby decreasing
the risk of failure. In all standard models of banking, high capital levels are associated with
a lower bankruptcy risk (see Freixas and Rochet, 1999). Hence, the prediction is that banks
with a relatively high degree of capital coverage should be better able to alleviate adverse
changes in the business cycle and, consequently, will be judged by the financial markets to
be less sensitive to shifts in credit market conditions.
Next to this positive risk eﬀect, well capitalized banks may also benefit from the
potentially lower funding costs that this strategy may imply. This element of market disci-
pline is expected to apply especially to the funds obtained in the professional and interbank
markets, where competitive pricing based on perceived riskiness is standard practice. Berger
(1995) documents a positive relationship between capital and earnings for US banks, a find-
ing which he ascribes to the beneficial eﬀect of capitalization on funding costs. Goldberg and
Hudgins (2002) and Park and Peristiani (1998) show that uninsured deposits are exposed
to market discipline. They find that riskier banks attract smaller amounts of uninsured
deposits and pay higher interest rates on this type of funding than less risky competitors.
This beneficial eﬀect on bank profits may strengthen the positive risk eﬀect of higher capital
levels and, hence, aﬀect the valuation of the bank by the stock market.
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From this overview it is clear that banks with diﬀerent risk profiles (functionally
diversified versus specialized, geographically focused versus global and relatively high versus
relatively low capital ratio) should exhibit diﬀerent sensitivities to changes in credit market
conditions over the business cycle. Since listed European banks have implemented diﬀerent
risk strategies, we can use their stock returns to assess the sensitivities to pervasive shifts
in credit market conditions empirically. In the next section we outline the regime-switching
methodology we use for this exercise.
2.3 The model
2.3.1 General Specification
Suppose we compare the return distribution of a portfolio of banks with a par-
ticular risk strategy with that of banks with the opposite strategy. Let r1,t be the return
on a portfolio of banks1 with strategy 1, and r2,t the return on a portfolio of banks with
the opposite strategy. The current returns rt = [r1,t, r2,t]0 contain an expected component
Et−1[rt] and an unexpected component εt = [ε1,t, ε2,t]0. The return innovations deviate from
zero partly because of news and partly because of noise in the market. Suppose that the
information that becomes available to investors at time t is contained in Xt ∈ Rn×1, so that
the time t information set is given by Ωt = [Xt,Xt−1, ...,X0]0.We define news as innovations
in the information set, or εx,t = [Xt −E [Xt|Ωt−1]] . Current returns are then described by
1A number of studies have examined whether the stock market is able to diﬀerentiate among financial
institutions with diﬀerent financial and risk profiles. The evidence suggests that the stock market reacts
eﬃciently to information concerning individual banks and to changes in the regulatory environment (see
Flannery (1998) for the US and Brewer (1999) for Japan). The findings support the idea that stock markets
are able to assess the quality of the bank’s assets.
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the following system:
rt = E [rt|Ωt−1] + εt = E [rt|Ωt−1] + β0 (St) εx,t + ut
where β =
£
β1, β2
¤0
is a n by 2 matrix of parameters that depends on a latent regime
variable St. We suppose that St can take only two values, St = 1 or St = 2. ut repre-
sents noise in the market. The matrix of parameters β governs the relationship between
return innovations and news. Several authors (most recently, Flannery and Protopapadakis
(2002)) have successfully demonstrated the link between return innovations and a large set
of macroeconomic and financial news factors. Most of these studies however do not allow
the relationship between returns and news to change over time. Perez-Quiros and Timmer-
mann (2000, 2001) argue that the relationship between expected returns and information
variables may depend on the state of the business cycle. They test their hypothesis on
the Fama and French size-sorted decile portfolios, and find that asymmetries are especially
strong for small firms. They argue that small firms typically have lower levels of collateral,
which makes them especially vulnerable to tightening credit market conditions, typically
observed in business cycle troughs. In the previous section, we argued that diﬀerent types
of banks are likely to react diﬀerently to changes in the prevailing credit market conditions.
To test these hypotheses, we develop a regime-switching model similar to Perez-Quiros and
Timmermann (2000, 2001) that makes the sensitivity of diﬀerent types of banks to business
cycle news dependent on a latent regime variable St.
Recently, regime-switching volatility models have attracted considerable interest,
for several reasons. First, as argued by, e.g., Diebold (1986) and Lamoureux and Lastrapes
(1990), the near integrated behavior of the conditional variance might be due to the pres-
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ence of structural breaks, which are not accounted for by standard GARCH-models. This
persistence is shown to disappear when regime-switching volatility models, pioneered by
Hamilton and Susmel (1994), Cai (1994), and Gray (1996), are used. Second, as discussed
in Ang and Bekaert (2001), regime-switching volatility models do much better in model-
ing asymmetric correlations - this is the empirical regularity that correlations are larger
when markets move downward than when they move upward - compared to even the fairly
general GARCH models. Other studies have related conditional volatility to innovations
in macroeconomic and financial variables. Stock return volatility is found to be substan-
tially higher in business cycle troughs than in booms (see e.g. Campbell, Kim, and Lettau
(1998)). Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) find that a set of real and monetary variables
significantly drive daily conditional US market volatility. In this paper, as in Perez-Quiros
and Timmermann (2000), we take into account these findings by making the conditional
variance-covariance matrix Ht dependent on the latent regime variable St and on a set of
information variables yt−1,where yt−1is a subset of Ωt−1. To keep the number of parameters
manageable, we start from the relatively simple constant correlation model of Bollerslev
(1990):
ut ∼ i.i.d.N(0,H(St, yt−1))
where
H(yt−1, St) =


h1(yt−1, St) 0
0 h2(yt−1, St)




1 ρ(St)
ρ(St) 1




h1(yt−1, St) 0
0 h2(yt−1, St)


where ρ(St) is the regime dependent correlation coeﬃcient. The univariate conditional
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variance specifications h1and h2 are given by
ln(hz(yt−1, St)) = ω
z(St) +Ψ
z(St)yt−1
where ωz is an intercept, and Ψz is a n× 1 vector of parameters2, for z = {1, 2} .
As argued before, the sensitivity of return innovations and the variance-covariance
matrix to news factors is conditional on a latent regime variable St that can take two values
only, St = 1, or St = 2. This regime variable follows a two-state markov chain with a time
varying transition probability matrix Πt, defined as
Πt =


Pt 1− Pt
1−Qt Qt

 (2.1)
where the transition probabilities are given by
Pt = Pr(St = 1|St−1 = 1, φt−1) = p(φt−1)
Qt = Pr(St = 2|St−1 = 2, φt−1) = q(φt−1) (2.2)
where φt−1is a subset of information variables that belong to the information set Ωt−1.and
influence the probability that there occurs a state switch between time t− 1 and t. Because
the states should more or less correspond with periods of booms and recessions, we let φt−1
contain information about the state of the business cycle. We use a logistic function to
guarantee that Pt and Qt lie between zero and one at any time:
P =
exp(ξp + ζ
0
pφt−1)
1 + exp(ξp + ζ
0
pφt−1)
2Given the relatively weak evidence of ARCH eﬀects in monthly returns, we do not include an ARCH
term.
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Q =
exp(ξq + ζ
0
qφt−1)
1 + exp(ξq + ζ
0
qφt−1)
The assumption that the return process of both bank series is driven by a single latent vari-
able may look restrictive. However, the aim of this latent variable is to separate expansion
from recession states, rather than discovering bank-specific states. Diﬀerences in exposure
over the business cycle between banks will be determined by the bank-specific parameters
within a state.
2.3.2 Testable Restrictions
The specification presented above allows for a large number of interesting tests. We
first investigate whether the news variables have a significant influence on return innovations.
More specifically, we test whether β1 (St = 1) = β1 (St = 2) = 0, whether β2 (St = 1) =
β2 (St = 2) = 0, and whether they are jointly equal to zero. Similarly, the relevance of news
for the conditional variance is investigated by testing, respectively, whether Ψ1 (St = 1) =
Ψ1 (St = 2) = 0, Ψ2 (St = 1) = Ψ2 (St = 2) = 0, or both. Finally, we test whether the
information variables contained in φt significantly drive the transition probabilities Pt and
Qt by testing whether ζp and ζq are significantly diﬀerent from zero.
A second series of tests is designed to investigate whether diﬀerent types of banks
react diﬀerently to information. Suppose that state 1 and 2 broadly correspond to recession
and expansion states, respectively. First of all, the reaction of bank stocks to news may
only be statistically significant in one state, typically in the recession state. Therefore,
the following hypotheses are tested: β1 (St = 1) = β2 (St = 1) , β1 (St = 2) = β2 (St = 2) ,
and both. To test whether the sensitivity of the conditional volatility to news diﬀers sig-
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nificantly between banks across states, we test whether the hypothesis of Ψ1 (St = 1) =
Ψ2 (St = 1) ,Ψ1 (St = 2) = Ψ2 (St = 2) , or both, hold.
Finally, we investigate whether bank stock returns react asymmetrically over the
business cycle. In the mean equation, we reject symmetry for bank z when the null hy-
pothesis βz (St = 1) = βz (St = 2) does not hold. Similarly, the hypothesis that bank 1 (2)
reacts more asymmetrically to business cycle information than bank 2 (1) is investigated
by testing the null that
¯¯
β1 (St = 1)− β1 (St = 2)
¯¯
=
¯¯
β2 (St = 1)− β2 (St = 2)
¯¯
against the alternative hypothesis that the sensitivity diﬀerential is largest for bank type 1
(2). In a similar fashion, we investigate whether the asymmetry of the conditional volatility
is stronger for one type of banks, both with respect to the intercept ω and the sensitivities
Ψ. Table 7 gives an overview of the various likelihood ratio tests calculated for this model.
2.4 Data Description
Our dataset includes a total number of 143 listed European banks3 and covers the
period January 1985-June 2002. This period encompasses markedly diﬀerent states of the
European business cycle and, hence, is particularly well suited to investigate the evolution
of bank risk sensitivities over the business cycle. It contains the economic boom of the
second half of the 1980s, the economic slowdown at the beginning of the 1990s, and the
period of economic growth associated with the EMU-related convergence in the mid-1990s,
3More specifically, the sample includes 7 Austrian, 7 Belgian, 4 Danish, 6 Dutch, 3 Finnish, 6 French,
11 German, 4 Greek, 3 Irish, 24 Italian, 4 Luxemburg, 6 Norwegian, 7 Portugese, 20 Spanish, 6 Swedish, 8
Swiss and 17 UK banks.
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interrupted by a number of financial crises (Mexican, Asian, and Russian crisis and the
near-collapse of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund). Finally, our sample also
includes the period of global economic slowdown starting at the end of 2000 in which a
lot of concerns were raised about the health of certain types of banks. Since most of the
listed banks in Europe are the largest in terms of asset size, they cover the vast majority
of their national banking systems. Consequently, our results reflect pervasive risk eﬀects
across European banking. These large banking institutions are also of particular concern
for national and European regulators and supervisors.
The dependent variables in this study are the excess returns of portfolios of banks
with specific characteristics. For 143 European banks, we download monthly stock returns
(including dividends) from Datastream International. All returns are denominated in Ger-
man marks. Next to the banks listed in June 2002, the sample includes 39 dead banks
to alleviate the problem of survivorship bias.4 We require that the banks display at least
two years of return data in order to ensure that we estimate meaningful risk exposures.
Furthermore, all banks have a balance sheet total of at least 850 million DEM.
2.4.1 Types of banks
All banks in the sample are ranked according to their degree of functional di-
versification, geographical diversification and capital adequacy. Balance sheet and income
statement data are retrieved from Bankscope, a bank database maintained by the London-
based rating agency Fitch/IBCA, on a yearly basis. In order to make a distinction between
4None of the banks included in the sample went bankrupt. After a merger, however, banks often change
names. In that case, the ’old’ stock becomes a dead stock.
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relatively highly and poorly capitalized banks, we make a ranking of banks based on the
ratio ’equity-to-total customer loans’. To distinguish between functionally diversified and
non-diversified banks, we make a ranking of banks based on the ratio ’non-interest income-
to-total income’. Non-interest income includes commissions and fees, e.g., from insurance
underwriting and distribution, investment banking activities and asset management. Since
the Second Banking Directive (1989) allowed banks to engage freely in these types of finan-
cial service activities, a number of European banks have adopted strategies that eventually
led to the creation of financial conglomerates. Others, however, elected to remain (or be-
come) more focused on traditional intermediation. For the 143 European banks in our
sample, there are on average 7 years of balance sheet data available, with a minimum of
two years. As a result, we are not able to make a yearly ranking of banks from 1985 until
2002. Instead, we concentrate on the average ’equity-to-total customer loans’ ratios, respec-
tively ’non-interest income-to-total income’ ratios for which data is available. Banks with
the 30% (15%) highest ratios of ’total equity-to-total customer loans’ are considered to be
relatively well capitalized, whereas the group with the 30% (15%) lowest ratios is considered
to be relatively poorly capitalized5. Diversified (specialized) banks are those with the 30%
(15%) highest (lowest) ratio of ’non-interest income to total income’. Although both ratios
vary over time, the probability that a bank changes from being classified as, for example,
a diversified to a specialized bank is zero. Therefore, it also seems reasonable to take the
average of both ratios.
Finally, we make a distinction between geographically diversified and local banks.
5The capital and non-interest income ratios used to subdivide the sample are calculated based on the
consolidated bank statements. For each bank we calculate the average ratio over the sample period, from
the earliest possible year available in Bankscope to 2001
58
Geographically diversified or global banks are those published in the list of global banks by
the Banker once a year. The Banker makes a ranking of banks based on their percentage
of assets overseas or outside the home country6. For ABN Amro, for example, total assets
overseas means total assets outside the Netherlands. The global banks included in our
analysis have on average 44.4% of their assets outside the home country, with a minimum
of 20%. Banks that are not included in the list of global banks of the Banker are considered
to be local banks.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the diﬀerent portfolios of banks. For
each portfolio (30% and 15% percentiles), we present the average, the standard deviation,
the minimum and the maximum of the ratios ’Equity/ Total Customer Loans’ and ’Non-
interest Income/ Total Income’. The 30% portfolios consist of 43 banks whereas the 15%
portfolios consist of 22 banks. Furthermore, 33 of the 143 European banks are classified as
geographically diversified.
The summary statistics indicate that there is considerable cross-sectional variation
between bank types for both ratios. For the relatively highly and poorly capitalized banks,
the ratio ’Equity-to-Customer Loans’ (30% percentiles) is 24.9% for the highly capitalized
banks compared to 6.4% for the poorly capitalized banks. For the 15% portfolios, the
diﬀerence is even more pronounced. The summary statistics indicate that highly capitalized
banks are also more diversified compared to poorly capitalized banks. The percentage non-
interest income is almost double for the highly capitalized banks. For both the 30% and
the 15% percentiles, the minimum of the ratio ’Equity-to-customer loans’ for the highly
6We do not make a distinction based on the location of the geographical expansion, although this can be
important to gauge the eﬀect of geographically concentrated financial events or crises.
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capitalized banks is much larger compared to the maximum ratio for the poorly capitalized
banks. This shows that the equity ratio is significantly diﬀerent for both types of banks.
A similar observation can be made for the diversified versus specialized banks. The ratio
’Non-interest Income/ Total Income’ for the 30% percentile is 8.8% for the specialized banks,
compared to 27% for the diversified banks. The diﬀerences between the lowest and highest
percentile become even more pronounced when we consider the 15% percentiles. For the
diversified and specialized banks, the ratio ’Equity-to-Customer Loans’ shows that both
groups are equally capitalized. Since the diﬀerence between the diﬀerent subcategories of
banks is most pronounced for the 15% portfolios of banks, we will concentrate on the latter
in the empirical analysis. Finally, we make a distinction between global and local banks.
The results show that the functional diversification of both types of banks is comparable.
The ratio ’Non-interest Income/ Total Income’ is similar, 22% for global banks compared to
20% for local banks. The ratio ’Equity-to-Customer Loans’ is higher for local banks. This
is however due to three local banks that have an equity ratio above 100%.
To investigate whether there is not too a high overlap between the diﬀerent port-
folios, Table 2 presents the percentage of banks in each of the 15% portfolios that are also
included in another portfolio of banks. The first part of table 2 shows that 30% of the
banks that are relatively poorly capitalized are also functionally specialized. For the rela-
tively highly capitalized banks, 20% are diversified, 39% specialized but only 4% are global.
In the group of specialized banks, there are much more relatively poorly capitalized banks
compared to relatively highly capitalized banks. According to our expectations, all of the
specialized banks are local whereas 44% of the diversified banks are global. The last part of
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Table 2 confirms the previous results that a large part of the global banks are diversified. As
a conclusion, this table indicates that there is some overlap between the diﬀerent banking
portfolios, but not to the extent that one is redundant with respect to the others.
Finally, Table 3 shows that none of the portfolios is overly dominated by banks
from one specific country. The highest country percentages are observed for the UK and
Spain, which represent respectively 21.2 percent of the global banks and 26.1 percent of the
relatively highly capitalized banks. Overall, there is no evidence of a substantial country
bias in any of the portfolios.
2.4.2 Bank Stock Returns
In table 4, we investigate whether the diﬀerences in risk profile are reflected in the
(excess) return characteristics. On average, geographically diversified European banks have
produced higher excess returns than local banks (1.13% versus 0.95%), but were also more
volatile (5.97% versus 4.34%). This results in a Sharpe Ratio, measuring the risk-return
trade-oﬀ, that is higher for local than for geographically diversified banks7.
For the other bank types, we first focus on the 30% percentile. Specialized banks
in Europe yield an average return and volatility that is higher compared to diversified banks
(1.08 versus 1.03 and 5.09 versus 4.78). Both types of banks produce similar Sharpe Ratios.
Based on these summary statistics, the return distribution of specialized and diversified
banks seems to be relatively similar. The average return of the relatively poorly capitalized
banks is considerably lower than for the relatively highly capitalized banks, 0.83% versus
7Notice that the higher volatility of geographically diversified banks may to some extent be explained by
the larger number of banks contained in the local banks portfolio.
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1.19%. The diﬀerence in return only partly compensates the diﬀerence in volatility. As
a result, the Sharpe Ratio is higher for well capitalized banks (0.24 versus 0.18). While
return characteristics are similar for the 15% percentile compared to the 30% percentile,
diﬀerences are more pronounced. Therefore, we estimate the models outlined in the previous
section on the 15% percentile portfolio returns8. The last three columns of table 4 report
the Jarque-Bera test for normality, an ARCH test (with four lags) for heteroskedasticity,
and a Q test (also with four lags) for autocorrelation. The Jarque-Bera rejects normality
for all portfolios, mainly because of high excess kurtosis. In addition, the Q and ARCH test
indicate that most series exhibit both (fourth order) autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
Table 5 reports average correlations between the returns on the diﬀerent portfo-
lios. All portfolios are highly correlated with the returns on a portfolio of all banks in
sample. This suggests that all banks, independently of their risk profile, are to a large
extent determined by common risk factors. Correlations are considerably lower between
functionally diversified and specialized banks (66%), and between relatively poorly and well
capitalized banks (72%). Geographically diversified and local banks however appear to be
highly correlated (84%). This may be explained by the observation that the majority of the
geographically diversified banks in our sample are European rather than true global banks.
Finally, Table 6 reports year-by-year average returns and volatility for the diﬀerent
bank portfolios. While both average returns and volatilities exhibit considerable variation
over time, there is similarly strong evidence that the diﬀerent bank types follow the same
cycle. Banks returns are high and relatively stable during prosperous time, but low and
volatility during recession years (e.g. during the periods 1987, 1990-1993, and 2001-2002).
8The empirical findings for the 30% portfolios are very similar and are available from the authors.
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2.4.3 Information Variables
Before estimating the model, we need to define the information variables in the
information set Ωt−1, and determine which instruments drive the factor innovations εx,t,
the expected return µt, the conditional variance-covariance matrix Ht, and the transition
probabilities Pt and Qt.
We relate excess bank stock returns to three instruments that were shown to have
leading indicator properties for the business cycle, and hence for stock returns. The first
variable is the short-term Interest Rate (IR), represented by the change in the one-month
euro (or before the euro, ECU) interest rate. Fama (1981) argues that short-term nominal
interest rates should be negatively related to stock returns. The author first shows that
unobserved negative shocks to real economic activity induce a higher nominal short interest
rate through an increase in the current and expected future inflation rate. Negative news
about future economic activity reduces the demand for real money, which, given nominal
money, has to be accommodated by a rise in the price level. Then he provides evidence that
stock returns are positively related to a number of real variables. The combination of these
two findings results in a negative relationship between nominal short-term interest rates
and stock returns. This negative relation is also the result of the Present Value Models
pioneered by Campbell and Shiller (1988). Recently, Ang and Bekaert (2001) compared
the predictive power of the short rate to those of dividend and earnings yield, and find
that, once corrected for small sample problems, the short-rate is the only robust predictor
of stock returns. Moreover, banks may be especially prone to changes in the short-term
interest rate because of a duration mismatch between their assets and liabilities structure.
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Among others, Flannery and James (1984b) and Aharony et al. (1986) find a negative
relationship between bank returns and unexpected changes in the short-term interest rates.
We also include a measure for the overall liquidity of the economy, i.e. the growth
in the Money Stock (M), here the money aggregate M1 for EMU plus UK. Fama (1981)
argues that it is important to control for money supply when establishing the inflation
- future real economic activity argument. Furthermore, Perez-Quiros and Timmermann
(2001) find that the expected return of small firms reacts significantly positive to growth
rates in the money base, especially so during business cycle downturns. One explanation
for this may be that the central bank mainly expands the monetary base during recessions,
and that small firms’ risk and risk premium are highest in this state. Finally, there is some
evidence that the increases in the economy’s liquidity are partly explained by an increase in
risk aversion, which gives rise to portfolio rebalancing from e.g. stocks and bonds to liquid
assets like bank deposits.
A third information variable we consider is the Term Spread (TS), defined as
the spread between the ten-year ECU benchmark bond rate and the 3-month euro (ECU)
interest rate. This variable is consistently shown to be a leading indicator of real economic
activity, and hence stock prices. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and Mishkin
(1998) show that for the United States the yield spread significantly outperforms other
financial and macroeconomic indicators in forecasting recessions. Bernard and Gerlach
(1996), Estella and Mishkin (1997), and Ahrens (2002) represent similar results for other
countries. Not surprisingly, a large literature Fama and French (1989) has successfully
linked term structure variables to equity returns.
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To extract the unexpected, or ”news”, component out of changes in these three in-
struments, we defineXt = [∆TSt,∆IRt,∆Mt] , and estimate the following Vector-AutoRegressive
(VAR) model of order n :
Xt =
nX
i=1
AiXt−i + εx,t
where n represents the number of autoregressive components, the Ai’s are 3×3 matrices of
parameters, and εx,t a 3×1 vector of time t innovations. The Schwarz information criterion
as well as a likelihood ratio test indicate that a lag of one, n = 1, is suﬃcient.
To determine the expected return component µt = [µ1t, µ2t]
0 , we estimate the
following set of equations:
r1t = µ1t + ε1,t = α
1
0 + α
1
1∆TSt−1 + α
1
2∆IRt−1 + α
1
3∆Mt−1 + ε1,t
r2t = µ2t + ε2,t = α
2
0 + α
2
1∆TSt−1 + α
2
2∆IRt−1 + α
2
3∆Mt−1 + ε2,t
To keep the number of parameters in the regime-switching model manageable, we determine
both the factor innovations and expected returns in a first step estimation.
The conditional variance-covariance matrix depends on a latent state variable St
and on a set of information variables. Previous literature has documented a link between
equity market volatility and the business cycle. Hamilton and Susmel (1994) estimate a
regime-switching ARCH model for monthly US stock returns in which the probability of
switching from a high to a low regime depends on the overall business cycle conditions. More
specifically, the probability of staying in or switching to the high volatility state is higher
during recessions. Errunza and Hogan (1998) investigate whether macroeconomic factors
can predict stock market volatility. Over the period 1959-1993, they find that monetary
instability - proxied by money supply volatility - Granger causes equity volatility in Germany
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and France, while the volatility of industrial production Granger causes equity volatility
in Italy and the Netherlands. However, macroeconomic factors do not improve volatility
forecasts in the U.K., Switzerland, and Belgium. Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) relate
US equity returns and their conditional variances to 17 series of macro announcements.
They find that news about the balance of trade, employment, housing starts, and monetary
aggregates aﬀect volatility, while industrial production does not enter significantly. Finally,
Glosten et al. (1993), Elyasiani and Mansur (1998), and Perez-Quiros and Timmermann
(2000) find that lagged interest rates are important in modeling the conditional volatility
of monthly stock returns. In this paper, we relate the conditional variance to a latent
state variable St, which is supposed to separate recessions from booms, and on the lagged
change in the three month interest rate IRt. Short term interest rates are not only available
at higher frequencies than macroeconomic data, there is also a direct link between bank
performance and interest margins.
Finally, we have to choose the relevant drivers of the transition probabilities. The
states should roughly correspond to business cycle booms and troughs. As many studies
have successfully used the term spread in predicting recessions (see e.g. Ahrens (2002)
and Ang et al.(2002) for recent contributions), we use this variable to model the transition
between states:
Pt =
exp(ζ 01p + ζ
0
2pTSt−1)
1 + exp(ζ 01p + ζ
0
2pTSt−1)
Qt =
exp(ζ 01q + ζ
0
2qTSt−1)
1 + exp(ζ 01q + ζ
0
2qTSt−1)
where TSt−1 is the one-month lagged value of the term spread, defined as the diﬀerence in
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yield between 10-year government bonds and 3-month treasury bills.
2.5 Estimation and Empirical Results
We estimate the expected return µt and the factor innovations εx,t as outlined in
the previous section in a first step regression9, and impose these estimates in the second
step. The model is then given by
ε1,t = r1,t − µ1,t = β10 (St) + β11 (St) ε∆TS,t + β12 (St) ε∆IR,t + β13 (St) ε∆M,t + u1,t
ε2,t = r2,t − µ2,t = β20 (St) + β21 (St) ε∆TS,t + β22 (St) ε∆IR,t + β23 (St) ε∆M,t + u2,t
while the conditional variance-covariance matrix is specified as follows
ut = [u1,t, u2,t]
0 ∼ i.i.d.N(0,H(ε∆IR,t, St))
H(St, IRt−1) =


h1(.)2 ρ(St)h1(.)h2(.)
ρ(St)h1(.)h2(.) h2(.)2


and
ln(h1(St, IRt−1)) = ω1(St) +Ψ1(St)IRt−1
ln(h2(St, IRt−1)) = ω
2(St) +Ψ
2(St)IRt−1
Finally, the time-varying transition probabilities are specified as
Pt = Pr (St = 1|St−1 = 1, TSt−1) =
exp(ζ1p + ζ2pTSt−1)
1 + exp(ζ1p + ζ2pTSt−1)
Qt = Pr (St = 2|St−1 = 2, TSt−1) =
exp(ζ1q + ζ2qTSt−1)
1 + exp(ζ1q + ζ2qTSt−1)
9Detailed results about the first step estimation are not reported, but are available upon request.
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The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood, assuming normally distributed er-
rors. Given the highly nonlinear character of this model, the estimation procedure is started
from 25 diﬀerent starting values to avoid local maxima10.
Panel A, B and C of table 8 present the estimated parameters and standard de-
viations of the mean equation. The dependent variables are unexpected excess portfolio
returns of relatively poorly and relatively well capitalized banks (Panel A), global and local
banks (Panel B), and functionally specialized and diversified banks (Panel C). Panel A, B
and C of Table 9 report the corresponding likelihood ratio tests11. Part 1 of each panel
investigates whether (combinations of) parameters are significantly diﬀerent from zero and
whether the mean and the conditional variance of the two types of banks react diﬀerently to
information. In part 2 of each panel, we not only test for business cycle asymmetry, we also
investigate whether this asymmetry is statistically diﬀerent between banks. Figure 1 plots
the filtered probability of being in state 1 for the diﬀerent combinations of bank types. In
Figure 2, the conditional volatility series are plotted for the diﬀerent types of banks, while
in Figure 3 we investigate to what extent shocks are diﬀerent across bank types.
We first discuss the results of the transition probabilities. Then, we present the
results of the mean equation followed by the variance equation.
10It is common knowledge that it is absolutely crucial to start estimation procedures for non-linear models
from at least 10 diﬀerent starting values. By doing so, one reduces the probability of being stuck in a local
maximum, and hence use the wrong parameter estimates to draw conclusions. In this model, both the
mean and variance equations are nonlinear, while the transition probabilities are allowed to vary over time.
Because of the highly nonlinear character of this model, we increase the number of runs from 10 to 25.
11An overview of the likelihood ratio tests is given in Table 4.
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2.5.1 Transition between States
The parameter estimates for the specification of the transition probabilities are
given in the bottom part of Panels A, B, and C in Table 8. The corresponding Likelihood
Ratio tests are presented in table 9 (part 1 of panels A, B and C). Figure 1 plots the filtered
probabilities of being in state one for each combination of bank types.
The parameter estimates are similar for the diﬀerent bank combinations. Under
the assumption that ζ2p = ζ2q = 0, the estimates for the intercept would imply a constant
probability of staying in state 1 between 0.92 and 0.96, a level of persistence often found
in monthly data12. We do, however, also find evidence for time variation in the transition
probabilities. A likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis of no eﬀect from the term
structure on the transition probabilities at a 5% level for global and local banks, and at a
10% level for relatively poorly and highly capitalized banks, and for functionally diversified
and specialized banks. For all bank combinations, the probability of staying is positively
related to the term structure in state 1, and negatively in state 2. As the term structure
typically becomes steeper in (anticipation of) expansions and flatter (or negative) in re-
cessions, this suggests that state 1 and 2 are boom and recession states respectively. The
classification of states does not seem to depend a lot on the actual choice of bank portfo-
lios. This suggest that the transition probabilities are determined by common rather than
bank-specific factors. In addition, in all cases, the model switches from an expansion to a
contraction state during the recession at the beginning of the 1990s, during the period of
financial crises at the end of the 1990s, and during the global economic slowdown from the
12We could not reject the null hypothesis that the intercepts in the specification for the transition proba-
bilities are equal (ζ1p = ζ1q). Consequently, to save parameters, we assume that ζ1p = ζ1q = ζ1.
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end of 2000 onwards. As can be seen in Table 6, the periods 1990-91 and 2001 are years
characterized by higher volatility and lower mean bank stock returns for all types of banks.
In 1990-91, the average yearly return is close to zero, whereas the volatility is above the
average over the sample period. In 2001, the average yearly return is negative, whereas the
volatility is almost double the average of the volatility over the sample period (7.09% versus
3.95%).
2.5.2 Mean Equation
In the mean equation, we find strong evidence that innovations in the term spread,
the short rate, and the monetary base jointly influence realized bank returns. For each
bank type, a likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis of zero sensitivities (see Part
1 of panel A, B and C in Table 9) The sensitivities to innovations in the term spread are
estimated with a high degree of precision and have the expected positive sign. While for 5
of the 6 bank types the sensitivity is higher in the recession state, suggesting asymmetry,
we can reject the null hypothesis of equal sensitivities across states only in the case of
relatively poorly capitalized banks. We find some evidence that bank types have diﬀerent
exposure to term spread innovations. While relatively poorly and highly capitalized banks
have similar sensitivities to term spread innovations in the expansion state, relatively poorly
capitalized banks have a much larger sensitivity in the recession state13. In addition, we
find some evidence that the size of the asymmetry is larger for relatively poorly capitalized
13More specifically, a likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that within the recession state rela-
tively poorly and highly capitalized banks have equal sensitivities to innovations in the term spread (at a
10% level).
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banks14. This evidence corroborates the hypothesis that well capitalized banks are less
vulnerable to economic fluctuations and are perceived by the stock market to be less risky.
Sensitivities to innovations in the short rate have the expected negative sign, but are often
quite imprecisely estimated. Interestingly, while none of the interest rate sensitivities turns
out to be diﬀerent from zero in the expansion state, in 4 of the 6 cases we find a significant
sensitivity in the recession state. Asymmetry is not only economically but also statistically
significant for the relatively poorly capitalized banks, geographically diversified banks, and
local banks. However, we do not find evidence that interest rate sensitivities are diﬀerent
between bank types. A somehow similar result is found for innovations in the money base.
Mostly, estimates have the expected negative sign, but are (marginally) significant in the
recession state only. In all cases, sensitivities are (in absolute values) much larger in the
recession state, even though this asymmetry is only statistically significant for the relatively
poorly capitalized and local banks. In addition, we also find that the asymmetry is larger
for relatively poorly capitalized banks than for banks with a higher capital buﬀer.
To further investigate how diﬀerent types of banks react to changes in the prevail-
ing credit market conditions, we compare the total shocks spillovers between diﬀerent types
of banks. The total shocks are calculated as follows:
Λ1t = β˜
1
0 + β˜
1
1ε∆TS,t + β˜
1
2ε∆IR,t + β˜
1
3ε∆M,t
Λ2t = β˜
2
0 + β˜
2
1ε∆TS,t + β˜
2
2ε∆IR,t + β˜
2
3ε∆M,t
where Λ1t and Λ
2
t represent the total shocks for bank type 1 and 2 respectively, and β˜ the
probability-weighted sensitivities. Because we are mainly interested in how banks with an
14We reject the null hypothesis that the diﬀerence in term spread sensitivity across states is equal across
banks at a 10% level.
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opposite strategy react diﬀerently to information over the business cycle, Figure 3 plots
the total shock diﬀerence, calculated as Λ2t -Λ
1
t . Panel A of Figure 3 plots the diﬀerence in
shocks between relatively poorly and highly capitalized banks. While total shocks appear
to very similar during most of the expansion period (diﬀerence close to zero), relatively
poorly capitalized banks react much stronger to news in business cycle downturns. More
specifically, relatively poorly capitalized banks perform worse compared to their better cap-
italized peers during the years 1997, 90-91, and 2001. The negative shock diﬀerences over
the period 1997-2000, a period of strong equity market appreciation, are explained by the
better performance of relatively well capitalized banks during this period. Panel B of Figure
3 plots the diﬀerence in shocks between geographically diversified and local banks. Over-
all, shock diﬀerences are relatively small, and are situated mostly within the [-0.5% 0.5%]
interval. Geographically diversified banks tend to experience larger shocks during business
cycle troughs, while the opposite occurs during expansions. This suggests that geographical
expansion does not provide diversification benefits when they matter most, i.e. during pe-
riods of adverse economic performance. Shock diﬀerentials are considerably higher between
functionally diversified and specialized banks. During recession periods, specialized banks
receive considerably larger shocks than diversified banks. This suggests that specialized
banks especially underperform diversified banks during business cycle troughs.
Finally, Table 10 reports a number of specification tests. We test whether there
is evidence for fourth-order autocorrelation in the error (Mean) and squared error terms
(Variance), as well as for skewness and excess kurtosis. We also calculate the Jarque-Bera
test for normality and the R-squared measure for overall fit. We do not find evidence against
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the specification for both the mean and the variance. In addition, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of zero skewness and excess kurtosis. This is confirmed by the Jarque-bera
test, even though normality is sometimes rejected at a 10% level. Finally, the R-squares
range from 5.89% for the relatively highly capitalized banks to 16.46% for the geographically
diversified banks.
2.5.3 Variance Equation
The level of volatility across states, time, and bank groupings, depends both on the
time variation in the latent regime variable and on the actual estimates of the parameters in
the conditional volatility specification. For all bank types, the intercepts are significant at
the 1% level. In addition, there is clear evidence of volatility asymmetry, since the intercept
is considerably larger in the recession state in all specifications of the variance equation. As
can be seen in part 2 of Table 9, this asymmetry is not only economically important, but also
statistically significant (at a 1% level). Overall, the parameter estimates in the recession
state imply a level of conditional volatility that is between 6 and 9 times higher than in
the expansion state. In all specifications, the estimates for the conditional correlations are
higher in the recession state than in the expansion state, even though we can only reject
the hypothesis of equal correlations in the case of global and local banks (see part 1 of
panel A in table 9). We find that, except for diversified banks, the conditional volatility
of the return series is significantly related to lagged changes in the short rate15. Moreover,
in all specifications, interest rate sensitivities are considerably higher in the recession state
(table 8). However, only for the returns of global, local, and specialized banks, we reject the
15Notice that in most cases interest rate sensitivities are only significant at a 10% level.
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hypothesis that the sensitivities to lagged changes in the short rate are equal across states.
One of the advantages of the bivariate specification is that we can test whether banks with
an opposite strategy react diﬀerently to information across states. In Part 1 of Panels A, B
and C (Table 9), we test whether the parameter estimates are statistically diﬀerent between
bank types, both within a particular state, or jointly across states. The intercepts in the
volatility specification for the relatively poorly and highly capitalized banks are statistically
diﬀerent in the recession state, but not in the expansion state. However, we do not find that
the sensitivities of conditional variance to lagged changes in the short rate diﬀer between
these two types of banks. Panel A of Figure 2 plots the estimated conditional variances.
While both bank types exhibit a comparable level of volatility during the expansion state,
relatively well capitalized banks show a higher volatility intercept and appear to have higher
levels of risk during recessions. This suggests that banks with a higher capital buﬀer not
necessarily have a lower level of residual risk (not explained by the information variables)
relative to their relatively less capitalized peers. A similar result is obtained for global and
local banks (Panel B of Table 9, Panel B of Figure 2). Local banks have a lower volatility
intercept in both states, even though this diﬀerence is only statistically significant in the
recession state. This may to some extent be explained by the smaller number of banks in
the global banks portfolio. In addition, since geographically diversified banks are active in
diﬀerent markets, the frequency of news is higher, and this may have an impact on their
total risk. Finally, the series of crises in the second part of the 1990s were global in nature,
as well as the economic slowdown that started in 2000. While local banks may have been
(temporarily) shielded, global banks were clearly exposed to those events. The conclusion
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is that investors do not perceive local banks to be more risky than global banks16. Apart
from diﬀerences in the intercept, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal interest
rate sensitivity in the recession state. Since the interest rate sensitivity is larger for global
banks, these results indicate that banks that diversify their activities geographically are
not necessarily rewarded with lower levels of stock volatility. For the case of functional
diversification, we do find evidence that diversification of revenue sources is eﬀective in
lowering overall risk (see Panel C of Table 9, Panel C of Figure 2). The volatility intercept
is higher for specialized banks, both in the expansion and in the recession state. Moreover,
since we can reject the null of equal intercepts in both states, the diﬀerence appears not
only economically, but also statistically relevant. In addition, there is some evidence that
the specialized banks are more sensitive to lagged changes in the short rate, even though
only while being in the recession state.
2.6 Conclusion
This study presents strong evidence that bank stock returns are sensitive to busi-
ness cycle fluctuations. Furthermore, these sensitivities seem to vary asymmetrically over
the business cycle. First, we find two states in the return-generating process of bank stock
returns: a low volatility / high mean state (state 1), and a high volatility / low mean state
(state 2) . The classification of states appears to be very similar across the various bank
types. The high volatility / low mean state is observed around the 1987 stock market crisis,
during the recession at the beginning of the 1990s, during the series of financial crises at the
16Even the local banks in the sample are quite large and operate nationwide networks within their home
country. Apparently, diversification across sectors and regions within a country provides diversification
benefits that cannot be improved by expanding abroad (see Danthine et al. 1999).
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end of the 1990s, and in the period of global economic slowdown starting at the end of 2000.
The link between the business cycle and the classification of states is further confirmed by
the estimation results for the transition probability specification: the probability of staying
is positively related to the term spread in state 1 and negatively in state 2, suggesting
that state 1 and 2 are expansion and recession states, respectively. Second, we find strong
evidence that innovations in the short rate, term spread, and money base jointly determine
observed bank stock returns. The sharpest estimates are obtained for the sensitivities to
the term spread. In economic terms, the sensitivities of most bank stock return series are
substantially larger in the recession state. Because of relatively large standard errors, the
statistical evidence for asymmetry is weaker. Innovations in the short rate and money base
have a statistically relevant influence in the recession state only, but often only at a 10%
level. Third, there is strong evidence for asymmetry in the conditional variance of all bank
returns. The parameter estimates in the recession state imply a level of volatility that is
between 6 and 9 times higher than in the expansion state. The conditional variance of most
series seems to be significantly related to lagged changes in the short-term interest rate.
Making a distinction between groups of banks with diﬀerent risk profiles, it seems
that the asymmetric behavior of bank stock returns is more pronounced for certain types
of banks. The sensitivities of stock returns of relatively poorly capitalized and local banks
is larger in the recession state. Symmetry is rejected for all three information variables
for the relatively poorly capitalized banks, and for two of the instruments in the case of
local banks. For the other bank types, there is no evidence of asymmetry in the mean
equation. Furthermore, the conditional variance of bank stock returns of relatively poorly
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capitalized banks, geographically diversified banks, and local banks is significantly larger in
the recession state.
In the expansion and recession state, the diﬀerence between bank stock sensitivi-
ties for groups of banks with opposite strategies is relatively weak. With only one exception,
sensitivities are not diﬀerent in the expansion state. In the recession state, however, we find
some evidence that sensitivities are diﬀerent for relatively poorly versus highly capitalized
banks and functionally diversified versus specialized banks. Plotting the diﬀerence in shock
size between banks with apposite strategies shows that relatively poorly capitalized and spe-
cialized banks are harder hit during business cycle downturns than their better capitalized
and functionally diversified peers. Maintaining relatively high capital levels and functional
diversification are therefore identified as useful strategies for banks to decrease their overall
risk profile.
Although, the diﬀerence between bank stock sensitivities for groups of banks with
opposite strategies is relatively weak, the behavior of their conditional volatility can be
substantially diﬀerent. First, while relatively poorly and highly capitalized banks have
similar levels of volatility in the expansion state, the level of residual volatility in the
recession state is higher for the better capitalized banks. This is only partly compensated
by the higher sensitivity of the relatively poorly capitalized banks to lagged changes in the
short rate. Second, geographically diversified banks exhibit higher levels of volatility both in
expansions and recessions. This contradicts the hypothesis that diversification across regions
reduces overall risk. The fact that a series of financial crises over the sample period were
global in nature may constitute a partial explanation for the lack of diversification benefits
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from geographical bank expansion. Third, in accordance with ex ante expectations, we find
evidence that functionally diversified banks have lower levels of volatility than specialized
banks. This finding oﬀers support to the claim that the formation of financial conglomerates
may be beneficial for the stability of the banking system.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Balance Sheet Variables for Portfolios of Banks
Mean stdev min max
15% ratios (22 banks)
Rel. High Cap. TECL 34.2 28.2 16.2 119.4
NIITI 22.8 16.7 1.6 73.0
Rel. Poor Cap. TECL 5.7 1.1 2.2 6.8
NIITI 13.3 7.6 0.4 32.5
Funct. Divers. TECL 10.6 4.7 5.9 27.4
NIITI 31.7 9.4 23.0 53.6
Funct. Special. TECL 11.5 11.3 2.2 53.1
NIITI 5.4 3.5 0.4 10.0
30% ratios (43 banks)
Rel. High Cap. TECL 24.9 22.8 13.0 119.4
NIITI 20.3 13.4 1.3 73.0
Rel. Poor Cap. TECL 6.4 1.2 2.2 7.9
NIITI 14.7 7.5 0.4 32.5
Funct. Diver. TECL 11.9 6.6 5.9 45.4
NIITI 27.0 8.5 20.5 53.6
Funct. Special. TECL 10.4 8.7 2.2 53.1
NIITI 8.8 4.5 0.4 14.6
Geogr. Divers. (33 banks) versus Geogr. Special. (110 banks)
Geogr. Divers. TECL 10.2 6.1 5.0 40.4
NIITI 22.1 9.9 11.4 53.6
Geogr. Special. TECL 16.3 19.4 2.2 119.4
NIITI 19.7 15.0 0.4 86.2
Note: A distinction is made between local and geographically diversified banks, spe-
cialized and diversified banks, and relatively poorly and highly capitalized banks. Ge-
ographically diversified banks are those published in The Banker’s list of global banks.
The division between relatively highly and lowly capitalized banks is based on the ratio
”Total Equity to Customer Loans (TECL)”. Similarly, specialized and diversified banks
are separated by the ratio ”Non-Interest Income over Total income (NIITI)”. This table
reports averages of both ratios for the lowest and highest 30% and 15% percentiles. The
balance sheet data used to calculate these ratios is taken from Bankscope.
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Table 2: Percentage of Banks of one type also included in other types
Specialized Diversified Global Local
Rel. poor. Cap. 30.4% 8.7% 17.4% 82.6%
Rel. high. Cap. 39.1% 21.7% 4.3% 95.7%
Rel. poor. Cap. Rel. high. Cap. Global Local
Funct. Special. 34.8% 17.4% 0.0% 100%
Funct. Divers.. 8.7% 4.3% 43.5% 56.5%
Rel. poor. Cap. Rel. high. Cap. Specialized Diversified
Geogr. Divers. 15.2% 3.0% 0.0% 33.3%
Note: This table reports how many of the banks that are allocate to one bank type
(relatively highly / lowly capitalized, functionally diversified or sepcialized, or global /
local banks) are also part of the portfolio of banks of another type.
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Table 3: Geographical Representation of Banks in diﬀerent portfolios
GLOBAL LOCAL SPECIAL. DIVERS. LOW CAP. HIGH CAP.
Austria 9.1% 3.6% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% -
Belgium 15.2% 1.8% 4.3% 8.7% 8.7% -
Denmark 3.0% 2.7% 4.3% - - 4.3%
Finland - 2.7% - 8.7% - 4.3%
France 6.1% 3.6% - 8.7% 8.7% 4.3%
Germany 9.1% 7.3% 13.0% 4.3% 17.4% 4.3%
Greece - 3.6% 17.4% - 4.3% 13.0%
Ireland 6.1% 0.9% 8.7% - - -
Italy 9.1% 19.1% 17.4% 17.4% 17.4% 8.7%
Luxembourg - 3.6% 4.3% - - 13.0%
Netherlands 3.0% 4.5% - - - 8.7%
Norway - 5.5% 8.7% - 8.7% -
Portugal - 6.4% - 17.4% - 8.7%
Spain 9.1% 15.5% - - - 26.1%
Sweden - 5.5% 8.7% 4.3% 4.3% -
Switzerland 9.1% 4.5% - 8.7% 8.7% 4.3%
UK 21.2% 9.1% 8.7% 17.4% 17.4% -
Note: This table reports the percentage each country represents in the respective port-
folios. GLOBAL refers to the portfolio of geographically diversified banks, SPECIAL.
and DIVERS. to the functionally specialized and diversified banks, and LOW CAP. and
HIGH CAP. to the relatively poor and well capitalized banks.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Portfolio Returns
Mean Volatility Sharpe Jarque- ARCH(4) Q(4)-Test
Ratio Bera
All European Banks 0.978 4.543 0.215 91.7*** 5.37 10.19**
Geogr. Divers. Banks 1.126 5.969 0.189 167.9*** 12.36** 7.91*
Local Banks 0.954 4.338 0.220 72.1*** 3.46 12.93**
30% indices
Funct. Special. Banks 1.082 5.091 0.212 52.2*** 9.24* 8.20*
Funct. Divers. Banks 1.028 4.779 0.215 92.9*** 3.10 6.99
Rel. Poor Capital 0.833 4.672 0.178 69.3*** 9.73** 6.32
Rel. High Capital 1.191 5.078 0.235 47.5*** 12.29** 17.71***
15% indices
Funct. Special. Banks 1.192 6.284 0.190 38.9*** 9.67** 9.31**
Funct. Divers. Banks 0.972 4.845 0.201 68.1*** 3.24 6.88
Rel. Poor Capital 0.894 5.086 0.176 26.5*** 14.71*** 3.34
Rel. High Capital 1.393 5.988 0.233 140.0*** 15.08*** 25.62**
Note: This table reports summary statistics of portfolio excess returns of European
banks, both for the total sample, and for the diﬀerent portfolios of banks. We calcu-
lated the mean, volatility (standard deviation), Sharpe Ratio, the Jarque-Bera test for
normality, an ARCH(4) test for heteroskedasticity, and a Q(4) test for autocorrelation.
All returns are monthly, total returns obtained from Datastream International. All re-
turns are denominated in deutschemarks. ∗∗∗ indicates that the parameter is significant
at a 1% level, ∗∗ at a 5% level and ∗ at a 10% level.
Table 5: Correlation Matrix of Portfolio Returns
EU GLOBAL LOCAL SPECIAL. DIVERS. LOW CAP. HIGH CAP.
EU 1.00
GLOBAL 0.93 1.00
LOCAL 0.98 0.84 1.00
SPECIAL. 0.81 0.68 0.84 1.00
DIVERS. 0.92 0.93 0.86 0.66 1.00
LOW CAP. 0.89 0.85 0.87 0.83 0.82 1.00
HIGH CAP. 0.81 0.67 0.84 0.82 0.66 0.72 1.00
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Table 6: Mean Return and Variance per Year
Panel A: Mean Return per Year
EU GLOBAL LOCAL SPECIAL. DIVERS. LOW CAP. HIGH CAP.
1985 3.47 3.29 3.65 3.56 3.73 3.45 3.28
1986 1.48 1.23 1.77 1.87 0.91 0.42 4.74
1987 -1.12 -1.59 -0.90 -1.42 -1.22 -1.37 -2.39
1988 1.26 1.78 1.05 1.04 1.26 0.90 1.37
1989 1.45 1.81 1.31 2.85 2.09 2.25 2.47
1990 -0.42 -1.60 0.01 4.05 -1.67 0.58 2.37
1991 -0.56 0.61 -0.97 -0.91 -0.23 -0.33 -0.71
1992 -1.21 0.30 -1.73 -1.73 -0.52 -1.33 -0.72
1993 2.83 2.78 2.85 2.42 2.72 2.38 2.58
1994 -0.74 -1.28 -0.55 -0.51 -0.70 -0.60 -0.79
1995 0.44 0.92 0.29 -0.31 0.34 -0.35 0.31
1996 1.77 1.32 1.91 2.28 1.62 1.59 2.27
1997 4.12 4.66 3.96 4.21 4.57 4.35 4.92
1998 2.92 3.23 2.83 4.09 2.11 1.93 5.72
1999 1.40 1.94 1.25 1.21 2.17 2.31 0.84
2000 0.68 0.84 0.64 -1.13 0.90 -0.08 0.54
2001 -0.77 -0.29 -0.90 -1.19 -0.76 -0.02 -1.83
2002 -0.97 -1.29 -0.88 -1.14 -1.55 -1.48 -1.70
Note: Panel A and B of this table report respectively the average return and standard
deviation of stock returns on the diﬀerent bank stock portfolios over the diﬀerent years.
All returns are in percentages, and are calculated as (indexi,t+12− indexi,t)/indexi,t,
where indexi,t represents the stock index calculated on the basis of the portfolio returns
of bank grouping i. GLOBAL refers to the portfolio of geographically diversified banks,
SPECIAL. and DIVERS. to the functionally specialized and diversified banks, and LOW
CAP. and HIGH CAP. to the relatively poor and well capitalized banks.
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Panel B: Standard Deviation per Year
EU GLOBAL LOCAL SPECIAL. DIVERS. LOW CAP. HIGH CAP.
1985 2.76 3.12 2.87 4.18 3.18 2.95 3.76
1986 5.02 5.57 5.21 7.69 5.10 5.58 6.17
1987 5.55 5.54 5.78 7.18 4.89 5.12 8.37
1988 2.42 3.14 2.54 3.75 2.36 3.26 3.43
1989 3.16 4.02 3.00 4.16 4.27 3.70 2.97
1990 5.85 6.62 5.72 10.29 5.38 7.78 10.13
1991 4.86 6.31 4.37 7.81 4.90 5.52 6.40
1992 3.55 5.14 3.56 3.95 3.73 3.19 4.42
1993 3.28 3.33 3.34 3.52 3.34 3.60 3.10
1994 2.75 3.08 2.84 4.59 3.27 2.87 3.77
1995 3.18 4.10 3.01 3.90 2.92 3.39 3.37
1996 1.76 2.52 1.67 3.51 2.09 4.92 2.58
1997 4.47 6.44 3.97 7.76 5.53 5.62 6.32
1998 8.80 12.79 7.87 10.54 9.14 8.87 9.97
1999 2.04 4.59 1.63 3.86 3.13 3.09 3.59
2000 1.78 4.98 1.17 2.80 2.96 3.86 3.67
2001 6.90 10.02 6.12 8.00 7.47 6.79 7.76
2002 6.11 10.45 5.11 6.87 7.99 7.26 5.31
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Table 7: Overview of the different Likelihood Ratio Tests
Part 1: Zero and Equality Restrictions
Sensitivities, Zero constraints JOINT Type 1 Type 2
Mean Equation
All sensitivities = 0 β1 (z) = β2 (z) = 0 β1 (z) = 0 β2 (z) = 0
Term Spread β11 (z) = β
2
1 (z) = 0 β
1
1 (z) = 0 β
2
1 (z) = 0
Short Rate β12 (z) = β
2
2 (z) = 0 β
1
2 (z) = 0 β
2
2 (z) = 0
Money Base (M3) β13 (z) = β
2
3 (z) = 0 β
1
3 (z) = 0 β
2
3 (z) = 0
Variance Equation
Interest Rate Effect Ψ1 (z) = Ψ2 (z) = 0 Ψ1 (z) = 0 Ψ2 (z) = 0
Leading Indicator
Term Spread ζ2p = ζ2q = 0 ζ2p = 0 ζ2q = 0
Sensitivities, Equality Constraints JOINT STATE 1 STATE 2
Mean Equation
All Sensitivities Equal β1(z) = β2(z) β1 (1) = β2 (1) β1 (2) = β2 (2)
Term Structure β11(z) = β
2
1(z) β
1
1(1) = β
2
1(1) β
1
1(2) = β
2
1(2)
Return 3 Month Interest Rate β12(z) = β
2
2(z) β
1
2(1) = β
2
2(1) β
1
2(2) = β
2
2(2)
Change Monetary Base (M3) β13(z) = β
2
3(z) β
1
3(1) = β
2
3(1) β
1
3(2) = β
2
3(2)
Variance Equation
Equal Intercepts, across states ω1(z) = ω2(z) ω1(1) = ω2(1) ω1(2) = ω2(2)
Equal IR Sensitiv., across states Ψ1 (z) = Ψ2 (z) Ψ1 (1) = Ψ2 (1) Ψ1 (2) = Ψ2 (2)
Joint
ω1(z) = ω2(z)
Ψ1 (z) = Ψ2 (z)
ω1(1) = ω2(1)
Ψ1 (1) = Ψ2 (1)
ω1(2) = ω2(2)
Ψ1 (2) = Ψ2 (2)
Equal Correlation ρ(1) = ρ(2)
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Table 8: Estimation Results for European Banks
Panel A: Relatively Poorly versus Relatively Well Capitalized Banks
LOW CAPITAL HIGH CAPITAL
Estim. s.e. Estim. s.e.
Mean Equation
Constant, state 1 0.002 0.003 -0.007** 0.003
Constant, state 2 -0.001 0.008 0.01 0.01
Term Spread, State 1 0.69*** 0.18 0.77*** 0.18
Term Spread, State 2 1.21** 0.50 0.84* 0.46
Short Rate, State 1 -1.47 5.52 -0.44 0.58
Short Rate, State 2 -14.91** 6.50 -18.93 15.19
Money Base, state 1 3.56 9.05 -0.06 8.82
Money Base, state 2 -16.70** 7.81 -3.54 6.07
Variance Equation
Constant, state 1 -7.04*** 0.18 -7.12*** 0.24
Constant, state 2 -5.49*** 0.20 -4.98*** 0.26
Short Rate, State 1 64.84* 36.01 54.87* 31.76
Short Rate, State 2 102.10* 55.73 88.25 72.55
Correlation, State 1 0.78*** 0.12
Correlation, State 2 0.83*** 0.15
Transition Probability
Intercept 2.84 0.45
Term Spread, state 1 0.39 0.28
Term Spread, state 2 -0.84** 0.32
Note: Panel A presents the results of the regime switching model for the 15% poorly versus 15%
highly capitalized European banks. The dependent variables are the unexpected excess returns
for both types of banks. The parameter estimations (Estim.) and the standard deviations (s.e.)
in both states of the mean equations are presented in the upper part of the table. The middle
part gives the results of the variance equation and the correlation (ρ) in both states. The
lower part of the table presents the results of the transition probability. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate
significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Panel B: Global versus Local Banks
GLOBAL LOCAL
Estim. s.e. Estim. s.e.
MEAN EQUATION
Constant, state 1 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005
Constant, state 2 -0.004 0.01 -0.01* 0.01
Term Spread, State 1 0.13*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03
Term Spread, State 2 0.14* 0.08 0.10* 0.06
Short Rate, State 1 -0.42 1.04 -0.28 0.92
Short Rate, State 2 -3.42* 1.76 -2.75* 1.48
Money Base, state 1 0.66 1.58 0.40 1.1554
Money Base, state 2 -3.87 3.74 -3.04* 1.69
VARIANCE EQUATION
Constant, state 1 -6.82*** 0.25 -7.01*** 0.22
Constant, state 2 -4.60*** 0.29 -5.55*** 0.29
Short Rate, State 1 71.12 73.99 14.15 30.49
Short Rate, State 2 167.32** 68.86 295.60*** 52.75
Correlation, State 1 0.77*** 0.09
Correlation, State 2 0.95*** 0.15
TRANSITION PROBABILITY
Intercept 3.11*** 1.39
Term Spread, state 1 0.57* 0.32
Term Spread, state 2 -2.78* 1.56
Note: Panel B presents the results of the regime switching model for the global versus local
European banks. The dependent variables are the unexpected excess returns for both types of
banks. The parameter estimations (Estim.) and the standard deviations (s.e.) in both states
of the mean equations are presented in the upper part of the table. The middle part gives the
results of the variance equation and the correlation (ρ) in both states. The lower part of the
table presents the results of the transition probability ∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate significance at a 1%,
5% and 10% level respectively.
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Panel C: Specialized versus Diversified Banks
SPECIALIZED DIVERSIFIED
Estim. s.e. Estim. s.e.
Mean Equation
Constant, state 1 0.02* 0.01 -0.001 0.003
Constant, state 2 -0.02 0.03 -0.002 0.02
Term Spread, State 1 0.84** 0.35 0.91*** 0.24
Term Spread, State 2 1.22* 0.70 -0.37 0.92
Short Rate, State 1 -3.65 5.98 -4.38 5.58
Short Rate, State 2 -6.13*** 1.47 -15.85 14.42
Money Base, state 1 -1.32 1.78 1.06 0.93
Money Base, state 2 -5.67* 2.97 -0.79 1.20
Variance Equation
Constant, state 1 -6.18*** 0.28 -7.03*** 0.27
Constant, state 2 -4.35*** 0.37 -4.91*** 0.56
Short Rate, State 1 12.90 59.53 8.77 38.45
Short Rate, State 2 195.16** 90.32 70.92 62.95
Correlation, State 1 0.68*** 0.10
Correlation, State 2 0.83** 0.32
Transition Probability
Intercept 2.43* 1.41
Term Spread, state 1 0.01 0.76
Term Spread, state 2 -1.01** 0.47
Note: Panel C presents the results of the regime switching model for the 15% most specialized
and diversified European banks. The dependent variables are the unexpected excess returns
for both types of banks. The parameter estimations (Estim.) and the standard deviations
(s.e.) in both states of the mean equations are presented in the upper part of the table. The
middle part gives the results of the variance equation and the correlation (ρ) in both states.
The lower part of the table presents the results of the transition probability. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,∗ indicate
significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 9: Likelihood Ratio Tests for European Banks
Panel A: Relatively Poorly versus Highly Capitalized
Part 1: Zero and Equality Restrictions
Sensitivities, Zero constraints JOINT LOW CAPITAL HIGH CAPITAL
Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob.
Mean Equation
All sensitivities = 0 36.78 [0.00] 28.79 [0.00] 19.35 [0.004]
Term Spread 26.95 [0.00] 22.99 [0.00] 14.49 [0.00]
Short Rate 3.09 [0.54] 2.99 [0.23] 1.39 [0.50]
Money Base (M3) 6.05 [0.20] 4.68 [0.10] 0.02 [0.99]
Variance Equation
Interest Rate Eﬀect 8.93 [0.06] 7.31 [0.03] 5.49 [0.06]
Leading Indicator
Term Spread 5.67 [0.06]
Sensitivities, Equality Constraints JOINT STATE 1 STATE 2
Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob.
Mean Equation
All Sensitivities Equal 23.72 [0.02]
Term Spread 4.27 [0.12] 1.18 [0.28] 3.02 [0.08]
Short Rate 0.96 [0.62] 0.76 [0.39] 0.64 [0.42]
Money Base (M3) 3.11 [0.21] 0.17 [0.68] 2.91 [0.09]
Variance Equation
Equal Intercepts, across states 5.01 [0.08] 0.33 [0.56] 4.41 [0.04]
Equal IR Sensitiv., across states 1.19 [0.55] 0.04 [0.83] 0.63 [0.43]
Joint 6.96 [0.14] 0.77 [0.68] 4.82 [0.09]
Equal Correlation 0.58 [0.45]
Part 2: Test for Asymmetry
Low vs. High Low Capital High Capital
Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob.
Mean Equation
Business Cycle Asymmetry 8.77 [0.07] 13.55 [0.01] 4.29 [0.37]
Intercept 0.18 [0.67] 0.11 [0.74] 1.66 [0.20]
Term Spread 2.90 [0.09] 6.75 [0.01] 1.62 [0.20]
Short Rate 0.78 [0.38] 3.18 [0.08] 0.90 [0.34]
Money Base (M3) 3.26 [0.07] 3.71 [0.05] 0.83 [0.36]
Variance Equation
Equal Intercepts 3.65 [0.06] 21.51 [0.00] 19.65 [0.00]
Equal IR Sensitiv. 0.58 [0.45] 0.60 [0.44] 0.61 [0.44]
Joint 3.66 [0.16] 22.31 [0.00] 20.98 [0.00]
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Panel B: Global versus Local European Banks
Part 1: Zero and Equality Restrictions
Sensitivities, Zero constraints JOINT GLOBAL LOCAL
Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob.
Mean Equation
All sensitivities = 0 34.07 [0.00] 17.00 [0.01] 25.07 [0.00]
Term Spread 17.76 [0.00] 9.76 [0.01] 11.91 [0.00]
Short Rate 8.59 [0.07] 4.75 [0.09] 5.15 [0.08]
Money Base (M3) 7.28 [0.12] 3.77 [0.15] 4.10 [0.13]
Variance Equation
Interest Rate Eﬀect 8.91 [0.06] 6.11 [0.05] 5.83 [0.05]
Leading Indicator
Term Spread 6.90 [0.03]
Sensitivities, Equality Constraints JOINT STATE 1 STATE 2
Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob.
Mean Equation
All Sensitivities Equal 18.87 [0.09]
Term Spread 4.71 [0.10] 3.88 [0.05] 1.41 [0.24]
Short Rate 3.50 [0.17] 0.60 [0.44] 2.39 [0.12]
Money Base (M3) 2.98 [0.23] 0.95 [0.33] 1.12 [0.29]
Variance Equation
Equal Intercepts, across states 8.02 [0.02] 2.03 [0.16] 6.97 [0.01]
Equal IR Sensitiv., across states 9.37 [0.01] 2.41 [0.12] 5.64 [0.02]
Joint 13.72 [0.01] 3.42 [0.18] 8.59 [0.01]
Equal Correlation 5.61 [0.02]
Part 2: Test for Asymmetry
Global. vs. Local Global Local
Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob.
Mean Equation
Business Cycle Asymmetry 6.00 [0.20] 6.99 [0.14] 8.21 [0.08]
Intercept 1.71 [0.19] 1.11 [0.29] 1.94 [0.16]
Term Spread 1.39 [0.24] 0.98 [0.32] 1.19 [0.28]
Short Rate 2.45 [0.12] 3.76 [0.05] 3.41 [0.07]
Money Base (M3) 0.99 [0.32] 2.34 [0.13] 3.39 [0.07]
Variance Equation
Equal Intercepts 5.09 [0.02] 12.19 [0.00] 15.55 [0.00]
Equal Interest Rate Sensitiv. 4.75 [0.03] 3.89 [0.05] 7.62 [0.01]
Joint 6.72 [0.04] 17.99 [0.00] 25.90 [0.00]
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Panel C: Functionally Specialized versus Diversified Banks
Part 1: Zero and Equality Restrictions
Sensitivities, Zero constraints JOINT SPECIALIZED DIVERSIFIED
Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob.
Mean Equation
All sensitivities = 0 45.39 [0.00] 15.38 [0.02] 14.98 [0.02]
Term Spread 15.81 [0.00] 10.64 [0.01] 12.31 [0.00]
Short Rate 4.99 [0.29] 1.25 [0.54] 2.56 0.28
Money Base (M3) 6.51 [0.16] 4.90 [0.09] 1.90 [0.39]
Variance Equation
Interest Rate Eﬀect 4.04 [0.40] 5.51 [0.06] 0.49 [0.78]
Leading Indicator
Term Spread 5.15 [0.08]
Sensitivities, Equality Constraints JOINT STATE 1 STATE 2
Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob.
Mean Equation
All Sensitivities Equal 12.08 [0.06]
Term Spread 4.17 [0.13] 0.96 [0.33] 2.81 [0.09]
Short Rate 1.81 [0.18] 0.09 [0.77] 1.72 [0.19]
Money Base (M3) 3.81 [0.15] 0.79 [0.38] 3.19 [0.07]
Variance Equation
Equal Intercepts, across states 6.09 [0.05] 2.92 [0.09] 3.88 [0.05]
Equal IR Sensitiv., across states 5.11 [0.08] 0.41 [0.52] 4.61 [0.03]
Joint
Equal Correlation 1.09 [0.30]
Part 2: Test for Asymmetry
DIV. vs. SPEC. SPECIALIZED DIVERSIFIED
Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob. Estim. Prob.
Mean Equation
Business Cycle Asymmetry 8.37 [0.08] 10.18 [0.04] 2.39 [0.67]
Intercept 3.30 [0.07] 7.49 [0.01] 0.79 [0.37]
Term Spread 0.50 [0.48] 0.30 [0.58] 2.06 [0.15]
Short Rate 5.60 [0.02] 3.59 [0.06] 3.90 [0.05]
Money Base (M3) 0.66 [0.42] 0.79 [0.37] 0.27 [0.60]
Variance Equation
Equal Intercepts 0.97 [0.33] 33.83 [0.00] 40.98 [0.00]
Equal IR Sensit. 1.69 [0.19] 3.53 [0.06] 0.48 [0.49]
Joint 2.89 [0.09] 34.53 [0.00] 6.28 [0.00]
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Table 10: Specification Tests
Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis Joint Jarque-Bera R2
Rel. Poorly Capit. Banks 0.44 4.22 0.03 2.24 19.04 4.20 10.67%
[0.98] [0.38] [0.87] 0.14 0.16 [0.12]
Rel. Highly Capit. Banks 0.51 3.77 0.01 0.003 21.01 5.31 5.89%
[0.97] [0.44] [0.93] 0.96 0.10 [0.07]
Global Banks 0.69 2.64 0.38 0.70 17.52 5.82 16.46%
[0.95] [0.62] [0.54] [0.40] [0.23] [0.06]
Local Banks 0.91 4.07 0.51 2.02 18.16 3.91 15.39%
[0.92] [0.40] [0.47] [0.16] [0.20] [0.14]
Specialized Banks 7.18 3.77 1.29 1.55 18.82 3.00 6.93%
[0.13] [0.44] [0.86] 0.21 [0.17] [0.23]
Funct. Diversified Banks 6.89 3.29 0.89 2.55 19.89 5.02 8.50%
[0.14] [0.51] [0.93] [0.11] [0.13] [0.08]
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Figure 1 : Probability of being in state 1
Relatively Highly versus Poorly Capitalized Banks
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Figure 2 : Individual Conditional Standard Deviations
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Figure 3 : Diﬀerences in Shocks
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Chapter 3
Volatility Spillover Eﬀects in
European Equity Markets:
Evidence from a Regime Switching
Model
3.1 Introduction
During the last two decades, Western Europe has gone through a period of extra-
ordinary economic and monetary integration culminating in the introduction of the euro in
January 1999. In addition, significant progress was made in strengthening and deepening
the various European capital markets1. In this paper, I investigate whether the eﬀorts for
1Various EU directives, including the second banking directive (1989), the capital adequacy directive
(1993), and the investment services directive (1993) have played a crucial role in opening and deepening
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more economic, monetary, and financial integration in Europe have fundamentally altered
the intensity of shock spillovers from the US and aggregate European market to 13 European
stock markets. A good understanding of the origins and transmission intensity of shocks is
necessary for many financial decisions, including optimal asset allocation, the construction
of global hedging strategies, as well as the development of various regulatory requirements,
like capital requirements or capital controls. Apart from the focus on Europe, this paper
distinguishes itself from other papers by extending the standard shock spillover model of
Bekaert and Harvey (1997), Ng (2000), Fratzscher (2001), and Bekaert et al. (2002c) to
account for regime switches in the shock spillover intensity and variance parameters2. There
are several reasons why allowing for regime switches in these parameters may be important.
First, Diebold (1986) and Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) have argued that the
near integrated behavior of the conditional variance might be due to the presence of struc-
tural breaks, which are not accounted for by standard GARCH-models. Hamilton and Sus-
mel (1994) and Cai (1994) were the first to allow for regime switches in the ARCH process;
Gray (1996) extended their methodology to regime-switching GARCH-models. Using this
methodology, several studies have found the persistence in second moments to decrease
significantly when diﬀerent regimes are allowed for. The consequence of the spurious per-
sistence in GARCH models is that volatility is underestimated in the high volatility state,
and overestimated in the low volatility state.
Second, there is considerable evidence that correlations are asymmetric: correla-
European financial markets.
2Others who have studied information sharing between equity markets include Hamao et al. (1990), King
and Wadhwani (1990), Koch and Koch (1991), King et al. (1994), Lin et al. (1994), Booth and Koutmos
(1995), Karolyi (1995), Longin and Solnik (1995), Karolyi and Stulz (1996), Koutmos (1996), Booth et al.
(1997), Fleming et al. (1998), Kanas (1998), Kroner and Ng (1998), and Ramchand and Susmel (1998).
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tions are larger when markets move downwards than when they move upwards. This is
especially true for extreme downside moves. For a discussion, see e.g. Ang and Bekaert
(2002b), Longin and Solnik (2001), and Ang and Chen (2002). In addition, this corre-
lation asymmetry cannot be reproduced by a large set of volatility models, even not by
fairly general asymmetric GARCH models. Ang and Bekaert (2002b) showed however that
regime-switching models are able to reproduce the exceedance correlations reported in Lon-
gin and Solnik (2001). Therefore, these models appear to be especially appropriate in
modelling shock spillovers.
Third, the regime-switching model allows to introduce time variation in the shock
spillover parameters without having to specify ex-ante its underlying sources. In Europe,
many structural changes occurred that may have aﬀected the correlation structure of Eu-
ropean capital markets. First, the economic convergence process - boosted by the Single
European Act (1986) - made cash flow expectations converge across the EU countries (see
e.g. Artis, Krolzig, and Toro, 1999). Similarly, the monetary integration has brought infla-
tion and interest rates across countries closer together. The convergence of cash flows at the
one hand and real rates at the other hand should have lead to a more homogeneous valuation
of equities and - ceteris paribus - to an increase in correlations between markets. Second,
as part of the broader process towards more economic and monetary integration, the EU
also gradually lifted barriers to free capital mobility. See Licht (1998) for an overview of the
recent eﬀorts for regulatory harmonization of EU stock markets. Third, the introduction
of the euro directly eliminated a direct barrier to pan-European investment, as the EU
matching rule, requiring that liabilities in foreign currency be matched for a large percent-
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age by assets in the same currency, can no longer prevent insurance companies, pension
funds, and other financial institutions with liabilities denominated in euros from investing
in any other country within EMU. In fact, investors may however already have changed
their portfolio strategies before, in an anticipation of the lower currency hedging costs to
come. Danthine et al. (2000) reported that the share of foreign equity holdings of German
investment funds as a percentage of total assets between has increased from 4% in 1990
to more than 20% in 1998. Hardouvelis et al. (2002) compare the evolution of foreign
equity holdings of pension funds and life insurance (as a percentage of total assets) between
EMU and non-EMU countries, and find the increase to be much larger for EMU than for
non-EMU countries. They interpret this as evidence for an increase in integration due to
the process towards EMU. Fourth, there is some evidence that equity market development
and integration have increased within Europe (see e.g. Hardouvelis et al. (2002)). Several
authors found a positive link between the degree of integration and conditional correlations.
Bekaert and Harvey (1997) for instance found that the correlations between 20 emerging
equity markets and world market returns were often positively related with liberalization
policies. Ng (2000) shows that shock spillover intensity from Japan and the US to Pacific
Basin markets increased after important liberalization events, while Fratzscher (2000) of-
fers evidence that the reduction in intra-European exchange rate volatility and the process
towards European monetary integration increased regional market integration. What most
of these studies have in common is that they use dummy variables to quantify the eﬀect of
important ”events” (in case of EMU: acceptance of relevant directives, Single European Act,
Treaty of Maastricht, oﬃcial announcement of the participants to the third stage of EMU,
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etc.) on asset prices. These events may however have been long anticipated, or may not
be credible, or may just need time to become eﬀective. Bekaert et al. (2002b) for instance
look for a common, endogenous break in a large number of financial and macroeconomic
time series to determine the moment when an equity market becomes most likely integrated
with world capital markets. They find that the ”true” integration dates occur usually later
than oﬃcial liberalization dates. Clearly, this makes the use of dummy variables based
on the oﬃcial dates of certain important events flawed. Regime switching models do not
have this disadvantage, as they allow the data to switch endogenously from one state to
another. Therefore, I propose a model that allows for regime switches in the shock spillover
parameters.
The model presented below allows for shock spillovers from the aggregate European
market, the regional market, and from the US market, a proxy for the world market. The
time-variation in the sensitivities to EU and US shocks is driven by a latent regime variable.
Three diﬀerent regime dependent shock spillover models are estimated, each with a diﬀerent
interaction between the latent variables governing the EU and US shock spillover intensity. I
find that regime switches in the spillover parameters are both statistically and economically
important. For nearly all countries, both EU and US spillover intensities have increased
significantly over the last two decades. The increase for EU shock spillover intensity is
larger though, and is situated mainly in the second part of the 1980s and the first part
of the 1990s. Surprisingly, after the introduction of the euro in 1999, in many countries,
sensitivities to EU and US shocks dropped considerably. On average, EU shocks explain
about 15 percent of local variance, compared to 20 percent for US shocks. While the US
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is still the dominating market, the importance of EU shocks has increased proportionally
more, hereby narrowing the gap with the US. To better understand the time-variation in
the shock spillover intensity, I relate the latent regime variables to a large set of relevant
economic/financial instruments. The results suggest that countries with an open economy,
low inflation, and well developed financial markets share more information with the EU
market. There is also some evidence that shock spillover intensity is related to the state
of the business cycle. Finally, a test for market contagion is developed, similar to the one
proposed by Bekaert et al (2002c). I find evidence for contagion eﬀects from the US to the
local European equity markets in times of high world market volatility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data
and oﬀers some descriptive statistics. Section 3 develops the regime dependent volatility
spillover model, while section 4 reports the empirical results. The final section provides a
summary and conclusions.
3.2 Data Description
I composed weekly total (dividend-adjusted) continuously compounded stock re-
turns from 8 EMU countries3 (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Spain), three European Union (EU) countries that do not participate
in EMU (Denmark, Sweden, and the UK), two countries from outside the EU (Norway, and
Switzerland), and two regional markets (the aggregate European market, and the US). I
take such a broad sample in order to compare shock spillover intensity between EMU, EU,
3The other four EMU countries, Finland, Greece, and Portugal have been left out due to limited data
coverage. Luxemburg was left out because of its very tiny market capitalization.
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and non-EU countries. The data are sampled weekly and cover the period January 1980 till
August 2001, for a total of 1130 observations. For Spain and Sweden, the sample period is
somewhat shorter due to data availability. I use the equity indices provided by Datastream4,
as they capture a larger share of the market and tend to be more homogeneous than other
indices, like those of MSCI. All returns are denominated in Deutschmark5.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics on the weekly returns of the 13 markets
under investigation, as well as for the US and EU aggregate market. There is considerable
cross-sectional variation both in mean returns and standard deviations. The mean returns
range from 0.235 percent for Austria to 0.34 percent for Ireland, while the returns in the
Italian, Norwegian, and Swedish stock markets are the most volatile. The Jarque-Bera test
rejects normality of the returns for all countries. This is caused mainly by the excess kurto-
sis, indicating that short-term returns are characterized more by fat tails than by asymmetry
(skewness). The ARCH test reveals that most returns exhibit conditional heteroskedastic-
ity, while the Ljung—Box test (of fourth order) indicates significant autocorrelation in most
markets.
In table 2, similar to Ng (2000), I investigate whether return correlations depend
asymmetrically on returns and on return volatilities in the EU and US respectively. Columns
2 to 7 look at return correlations when the returns in the EU and US are low, moderate, or
high. I allocate returns to the low/high return group when they are more than minus/plus
one standard deviation away from the mean. The results clearly show that return corre-
lations are highest when returns in the aggregate EU and US markets are low, indicating
4The regional European market index used here is the Datastream EU-15 index.
5As from January 1999, for EMU countries, the fixed euro-deutschmark exchange rate is used to translate
euro returns into deutschmark returns. Returns for non-EMU countries are first translated into euros, and
then into deutschmarks.
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a strong asymmetry. In column 8 to 11, I investigate whether correlations depend on the
volatility state in the EU and US. I split up the sample in two: a high and a low volatility
state. I proxy for volatility by calculating squared returns. Volatility is defined to be high
when squared returns are more than one standard deviation away from their mean. From
the results, it is clear that correlations are significantly higher when the EU or the US
market are more volatile.
Figure 1 plots the average 52-week moving correlation of all the individual countries
with the aggregate European and US market. The estimated conditional correlations exhibit
considerable variation through time, suggesting that correlations are not constant through
time. The correlation with the aggregate European market is larger than with the US
market. Notice also that while correlations increased in the run-up to the introduction of
the euro, they decreased considerably after 1999.
3.3 The Model
The aim of this paper is to investigate the origins of time variation in correlations
between 13 European equity markets and the US and EU. I allow for three sources of
unexpected returns, being (1) a purely domestic shock, (2) a regional European shock, and
(3) a global shock from the US. The model I propose is an extension of Bekaert and Harvey
(1997), in a sense that I distinguish between two regional sources of shocks instead of one
world shock, and of Ng (2000), Fratzscher(2001), and Bekaert et al. (2002c), as I allow for
regime switches in the spillover parameters. The remainder of this section is organized as
follows. In section 3.3.1, I describe a bivariate model for the US and European returns.
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The estimated innovations for the US and Europe are then used as inputs for the univariate
volatility spillover model, which is described in section 3.3.2. In section 3.3.3, I discuss the
estimation procedure as well as some specification tests.
3.3.1 A Bivariate model for the US and Europe
Standard model without Regime Switches
The joint process for European and US returns is governed by the following set of
equations:
rt = µt−1 + εt
µt−1 = k0 +Krt−1
εt|Ωt−1 v N (0,Ht) (3.1)
where rt = [reu,t, rus,t]
0
represents the return of respectively the aggregate European and
US market at time t, εt = [εeu,t, εus,t]
0
is a vector of innovations, k0 = [keu, kus]
0
, and
K = [keueu, k
us
eu; k
eu
us, k
us
us] a two by two matrix of parameters linking lagged returns in the US
and Europe to expected returns. Other studies have used more sophisticated information
variables, like dividend yields, changes in the term structure, default spreads, and short term
interest rates. I limit myself to lagged returns, as predictability of the other information
variables is very low in weekly data, and because I want to focus on volatility spillovers
rather than on spillovers in mean returns6. I provide four diﬀerent (bivariate) specifications
for the conditional variance-covariance matrix Ht: a constant correlation model, a bivariate
6As a robustness check, I will test whether the model’s residuals are orthogonal to a set of information
variables.
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BEKK model, a regime-switching normal model, and a regime-switching GARCH model.
Where appropriate, I will test whether there is evidence of asymmetry in the volatility
equation.
Constant Correlation Model The constant correlation model was first proposed by
Bollerslev (1990) and is the most restrictive of the models that is used here. It can be
represented in the following way:
Ht = ztΓzt (3.2)
zt =


heu,t 0
0 hus,t


Γ =


1 ρ
ρ 1


where ρ represents the correlation coeﬃcient. I model the conditional variance hi,t , where
i = {eu, us}, as a simple GARCH(1,1)-model extended to allow for asymmetry (see Glosten
et al.(1993)).
h2i,t = ψi,o + ψi,1ε
2
i,t−1 + ψi,2h
2
i,t−1 + ψi,3 (max {−εi,t−1, 0})2 (3.3)
Negative shocks increase volatility if ψi,3 > 0.
Asymmetric BEKK Model I use the asymmetric version of the BEKK model of Baba
et al. (1989), Engle and Kroner (1995), and Kroner and Ng (1998), which is given by
Ht = C
0C+A0εt−1ε0t−1A+B0Ht−1B+D0ηt−1η0t−1D (3.4)
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where
ηt−1 = εt−1 ¯ 1{εt−1 < 0} (3.5)
The symbol ¯ is a Hadamard product representing an element by element multiplication,
and 1{εt−1 < 0} is a vector of individual indicator functions for the sign of the errors εeu,t
and εus,t. Matrix C is a 2 by 2 lower triangular matrix of coeﬃcients, while A, B,and D
are 2 by 2 matrices of coeﬃcients. The advantage of this model is that Ht is guaranteed to
be positive definite.
Model with Regime-Switches
I propose two models that make both the conditional expected return and the
conditional variance regime-dependent: a regime-switching bivariate normal model, and a
regime-switching GARCH model.
Regime Switching Bivariate Normal This model allows the returns rt to be drawn
from two diﬀerent bivariate normal distributions. Which distribution is used at what time,
depends on the regime the process is in. I distinguish between two diﬀerent states, St = 1
and St = 2, and two bivariate normal distributions:
rt|Ωt−1 =



N(µt−1 (St = 1) ,H (St = 1))
N(µt−1 (St = 2) ,H (St = 2))
(3.6)
Both the conditional mean return µt−1 and the variance H are made regime dependent. To
facilitate estimation, in the conditional mean specification, only the intercept k0 is allowed
to depend upon the latent regime variable St. The regimes follow a two-state Markov chain
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with transition matrix:
Π =


P 1− P
1−Q Q

 (3.7)
where the transition probabilities are given by P = prob(St = 1|St−1 = 1;Ωt−1), and
Q = prob(St = 2|St−1 = 2;Ωt−1).
A regime-switching GARCH Model In the regime-switching bivariate normal model,
volatility is restricted to be constant within a regime. The (generalized) regime-switching
volatility models of Hamilton and Susmel (1994), Cai (1994), and Gray (1996) combine
the advantages of a regime-switching model with the volatility persistence associated with
GARCH eﬀects. I allow the regime-dependent conditional volatility within a regime to
follow an asymmetric GARCH(1,1) model:
rt|Ωt−1 =



N(µt−1 (St = 1) ,Ht (St = 1))
N(µt−1 (St = 2) ,Ht (St = 2))
(3.8)
and
H (St = i) = C (St = i)
0C (St = i)+Aεt−1ε0t−1A+B0Ht−1B+D0ηt−1η0t−1D (3.9)
for i = 1, 2. The regime variable St follows the same two-state markov chain with transition
probability Π as in equation (3.7). As even for two regimes this model requires a lot of
parameters to be estimated, I restrict the matrices A, B, and D to be diagonal and regime
independent, while only the intercept k0 is allowed to switch in the mean equation. In
addition, both the mean and volatility are forced to switch jointly. As in Gray (1996), εt−1,
Ht−1, and ηt−1were made regime independent by averaging over the ex-ante probabilities.
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For instance, Ht−1 is calculated as follows:
Ht−1 = p1,t−1Ht−1(S1) + (1− p1,t−1)Ht−1(S2) (3.10)
where p1,t−1 = prob (St−1 = 1|Ωt−2) .
3.3.2 Univariate spillover model
Similar in spirit to Bekaert and Harvey (1997), Ng (2000), and Fratzscher (2001),
local unexpected returns are - apart from by a purely local component - allowed to be
driven by innovations in US and European returns. I orthogonalize the innovations from
the aggregate European market and the US, the residuals εˆeu,t and εˆus,t from the first step,
assuming that the European return shock is driven by a purely idiosyncratic shock and by
the US return shock. The orthogonalization process is outlined in appendix 1. I denote the
orthogonalized European and US innovations by eˆeu,t and eˆus,t and their variances by σ2eu,t
and σ2us,t. This section outlines several univariate volatility spillover models that take the
orthogonalized EU and US innovations as given. In a first section, I describe the volatility
spillover model that is standard in the literature. Consequently, a model is developed that
allows for regime switches in the spillover parameters. Three diﬀerent assumptions are made
regarding the interaction between the switches in spillover intensity from the EU and US
respectively.
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A simple model without regime shifts
The univariate constant shock spillover model for country i is represented by the
following set of equations:
ri,t = µi,t−1 + εi,t
εi,t = ei,t + γ
eu
i eˆeu,t + γ
us
i eˆus,t
ei,t|Ωt−1 v N(0, σ2i,t) (3.11)
where ei,t is a purely idiosyncratic shock which is assumed to follow a conditional normal
distribution with mean zero and variance σ2i,t. For simplicity, the expected return µi,t−1 is
a function of lagged EU, US, and local returns only. The parameters γeui and γ
us
i govern
the (constant) spillover eﬀects from respectively European and US shocks on local return
innovations. The conditional variance σ2i,t is modeled as a simple asymmetric GARCH(1,1)
process.
σ2i,t = ψi,o + ψi,1e
2
i,t−1 + ψi,2σ
2
i,t−1 + ψi,3 (max {−ei,t−1, 0})2 (3.12)
Model with regime shifts in the spillover parameters
Shock spillover intensity is however likely to change through time. Possible reasons
for these shifts include the abolition of various barriers to international investment, changes
in the economic and/or monetary environment, as well as possible contagion eﬀects in times
of financial crises. In the model I propose here, I do not specify ex-ante the time-varying
character of shock spillover intensity, but let it depend on a latent regime variable. I first
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rewrite equation (3.11) to include the possibility of switching between states:
ri,t = µi,t−1 + εi,t
εi,t = ei,t + γ
eu
i (S
eu
i,t )eˆeu,t + γ
us
i (S
us
i,t )eˆus,t
ei,t|Ωt−1 v N(0, σ2i,t) (3.13)
where Szi = {1, 2}, z ∈ {eu, us}. To keep the analysis tractable, I limit the number of states
to two. The spillover parameters are then given by
γeui,t =



γeui,t,1 if S
eu
i,t = 1
γeui,t,2 if S
eu
i,t = 2
and
γusi,t =



γusi,t,1 if S
us
i,t = 1
γusi,t,2 if S
us
i,t = 2
Following Hamilton (1988, 1989, 1990), Szi evolves according to a first-order Markov chain.
The conditional probabilities of remaining in/switching from state are then defined as:
P (Szi,t = 1|Szi,t−1 = 1) = P zi
P (Szi,t = 2|Szi,t−1 = 1) = 1− P zi
P (Szi,t = 2|Szi,t−1 = 2) = Qzi
P (Szi,t = 1|Szi,t−1 = 2) = 1−Qzi
Similar to Hamilton and Lin (1996), and Susmel (1998), I distinguish between three possible
variations of Seui and S
us
i .
Common States In this case, the forces which govern shock spillover intensity from the
US and regional European market are the same. Consequently, the latent variables Seui and
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Susi are identical, or S
eu
i,t=S
us
i,t = Si,t. This assumption yields the following simple transition
matrix Π :
Πi =


Pi 1− Pi
1−Qi Qi


where Pi = P (Si,t = 1|Si,t−1 = 1), and Qi = P (Si,t = 2|Si,t−1 = 2).
Independent States Shifts in shock spillover intensity from the US and regional Euro-
pean markets may be completely unrelated. For instance, shock spillovers from the regional
European market may have shifted to a higher state with the evolution towards an Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU), while shock spillovers from the US may be determined
by the state of the US business cycle. The combination of Seui,t and S
us
i,t yields a new latent
variable Si,t:
Si,t = 1 if Seui,t = 1 and S
us
i,t = 1
Si,t = 2 if Seui,t = 2 and S
us
i,t = 1
Si,t = 3 if Seui,t = 1 and S
us
i,t = 2
Si,t = 4 if Seui,t = 2 and S
us
i,t = 2
The assumption of independence between states significantly simplifies the transition matrix
Πi, which is now the product of the probabilities that drive Seui,t and S
us
i,t (for a formal
112
derivation, see appendix 2):
Πi =


P eui P
us
i (1− P eui )Pusi P eui (1− Pusi ) (1− P eui )(1− Pusi )
(1−Qeui )Pusi Qeui Pusi (1−Qeui )(1− Pusi ) Qeui (1− Pusi )
P eui (1−Qusi ) (1− P eui )(1−Qusi ) P eui Qusi (1− P eui )Qusi )
(1−Qeui )(1−Qusi ) Qeui (1−Qusi ) (1−Qeui )Qusi Qeui Qusi


(3.14)
General case Instead of imposing a structure on the transition matrix, I can let the
data speak for itself. Define the transition probabilities as pjj0 = P (St = j0|St−1 = j), for
j, j0 = 1, ..., 4 and the associated switching probability matrix Πi as7:
Πi =


p11 p12 p13 p14
p21 p22 p23 p24
p31 p32 p33 p34
p41 p42 p43 p44


(3.15)
The only constraints I have to impose is that the rows sum to one, or
P4
j0=1 pjj0 = 1, for j =
1, ..., 4, and that all pjj0 > 0. This general specification nests the case of independent states,
which allows me to test whether the added flexibility of the general model is statistically
significant using a standard likelihood ratio test.
Variance Ratios and Conditional Correlations
In this section, I decompose total local volatility hi,t into three components: (1)
a component related to European conditional volatility, (2) a component related to US
7For notational clarity, the country specific subscript i has been omitted from the transition probabilities
pjj0
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conditional volatility, and (3) purely local volatility. Recall the expression for shocks to
local equity returns:
εi,t = ei,t + γ
eu
i (S
eu
i,t )eˆeu,t + γ
us
i (S
us
i,t )eˆus,t
Assume now that the purely local shocks ei,t are uncorrelated across countries, E [ei,tej,t] =
0,∀i 6= j , and uncorrelated with the European and US benchmark index: E [ei,teˆeu,t] = 0 ,
E [ei,teˆus,t] = 0,∀i. Moreover, eˆeu,t and eˆus,t are orthogonalized in the first step. We obtain
regime-independent shock spillover intensities by integrating over the states:
γ˜eui = p1,tγ
eu
i (S
eu
i,t = 1) + (1− p1,t) γeui (Seui,t = 2) (3.16)
γ˜usi = p1,tγ
us
i (S
us
i,t = 1) + (1− p1,t) γusi (Susi,t = 2) (3.17)
This implies that:
E[ε2i,t|Ωt−1] = hi,t = σ2i,t + (γ˜eui )2 σ2eu,t + (γ˜usi )2 σ2us,t (3.18)
E[εi,teˆeu,t|Ωt−1] = hi,eu,t = (γ˜eui )σ2eu,t (3.19)
E[εi,teˆus,t|Ωt−1] = hi,us,t = (γ˜usi )σ2us,t (3.20)
Out of this follows that
ρeui,t = (γ˜
eu
i )
σeu,tp
hi,t
(3.21)
ρusi,t = (γ˜
us
i )
σus,tp
hi,t
(3.22)
Equation (3.18) shows that the conditional volatility in market i is positively related to
the conditional variance in the European and US market, as well as to the shock spillover
intensity. Similarly, according to equations (3.21) and (3.22), the conditional correlations of
local returns with US and European returns will depend upon the regime dependent shock
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spillover intensity, and the ratio of the volatility of the foreign market returns (US or EU)
and the local returns. According to this model, correlations between local returns and EU
and US returns will generally be high when the shock spillover parameters γeui,t and γ
us
i,t are
high, or/and when European and US volatility is high relative to local volatility.
Finally, I also investigate the (relative) proportion of conditional variance that is
explained by European and US market shocks. This ratio indicates what percentage of local
shocks can be explained by EU and US shocks respectively. These ratios are computed as
follows:
V Reui,t =
³
γeui (S
eu
i,t )
´2
σ2eu,t
hi,t
=
¡
ρeui,t
¢2 (3.23)
V Rusi,t =
³
γusi (S
us
i,t )
´2
σ2us,t
hi,t
=
¡
ρusi,t
¢2 (3.24)
3.3.3 Estimation and Specification Tests
Estimation
The natural procedure would be to estimate return models for the domestic coun-
try, the US, and Europe jointly. However, given the large number of parameters that would
have to be estimated in this trivariate system, I follow a two-step procedure similar to the
one followed by Bekaert and Harvey (1997) and Ng (2000). First, a bivariate model is
estimated for the US and European returns. I estimate the diﬀerent models outlined in
section 3.3.1 and choose the best model based on the specification tests outlined below. I
can however not use the European index as such, as shock spillovers from Europe to the
individual countries may be spuriously high because the European index consists partly of
the country under analysis. The bias may be especially high for the larger stock markets,
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like Germany, France, and especially the UK. Therefore, the EU and US innovations im-
posed on the diﬀerent spillover models in the second step are diﬀerent for each country, in a
sense that the market-weighted EU index used consists of all country index returns except
of the country under investigation.
In appendix 3, I show what conditions are needed to make this two-step procedure
internally consistent in the general case of regime-switching both in the first and second step.
In both steps, I estimate the parameters by maximum likelihood, assuming a conditional
normally distributed error term. I use the non-linear optimization algorithm of Broyden,
Fletcher, Goldfarb, and Shanno (BFGS) to optimize the loglikelihood function. To avoid
local maxima, all estimations are started at least from 10 diﬀerent starting values. In order
to avoid problems due to non-normality in excess returns, I provide Quasi-ML estimates
(QML), as proposed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992).
Specification Tests
I use three tests to distinguish between the diﬀerent models. First, if the model
is correctly specified, the standardized residuals should be standard normally distributed.
The latter hypothesis is tested using a GMM procedure. A second statistic investigates how
well the regime-switching models can distinguish between regimes.
3.3.2.1. Test on Standardized Residuals
Bivariate Model To check whether the models are correctly specified, as well
as to choose the best performing model, I follow a procedure similar to the one proposed
by Richardson and Smith (1993), and used by Bekaert and Harvey (1997), Bekaert and Wu
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(2000), and Ng (2000) among others. I calculate standardized residuals, zˆt = Cˆ
0−1
t εˆt, where
Ct is obtained through a Choleski decomposition ofHt. These standardized residuals should
follow a multivariate standard normal distribution conditional on time t− 1 information if
the model is correctly specified. I then have the following orthogonality conditions to test:
(a) E[ zˆi,t zˆi,t−j ] = 0, for i = EU,US
(b) E[ (zˆ2i,t − 1)( zˆ2i,t−j − 1)] = 0, for i = EU,US
(c) E[ (zˆeu,t zˆus,t)(zˆeu,t−j zˆus,t−j)] = 0
(d) E[ zˆ3i,t] = 0 for i = EU,US
(e) E[ zˆ2eu,tzˆus,t] = 0
(f) E[ zˆeu,tzˆ2us,t] = 0
(g) E[ zˆ4i,t − 3] = 0 for i = EU,US
(h)E[ (zˆ2eu,t−1)(zˆ2us,t−1)] = 0
j = 1, ..., τ . All moment restrictions are obtained using the generalized method of moments
(Hansen (1982)). Conditions (a), (b), and (c) test whether there is any serial correlation
left in {zˆi,t}, {zˆ2i,t−1}, and {zˆeu,tzˆus,t}. For four lags (τ = 4), this yields three tests that are
asymptotically distributed as a χ2 distribution with four degrees of freedom. I also perform
a joint test, which has 12 degrees of freedom. Conditions (d)-(h) test whether zˆt follows a
bivariate standard normal distribution. Equations (d) and (g) test whether the skewness
and kurtosis are significantly diﬀerent from those implied by a standard normal distrution.
Both are asymptotically χ2(1) distributed. Equations (e) and (f) test for cross-skewness;
while equation (h) investigates whether there is any cross-kurtosis left in the residuals.
These tests follow a χ2 distribution with respectively two and one degrees of freedom. I
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also perform a joint test, which follows a χ2 distribution with 7 degrees of freedom.
Univariate Model To check whether the models are correctly specified for coun-
try i, I investigate whether the standardized residuals zˆi,t = eˆi,t/σˆi,t violate the following
orthogonality conditions, as implied by a standard normal distribution:
(a) E[ zˆi,t] = 0
(b) E[ zˆi,t, zˆi,t−j ] = 0
(c) E[ zˆ2i,t − 1] = 0
(d) E[( zˆ2i,t − 1)( zˆ2i,t−j − 1)] = 0
(e) E[ zˆ3i,t] = 0
(f)E[ zˆ4i,t−3] = 0
j = 1, ..., τ . All moment restrictions are tested using the generalized method of moments. A
test on the correct specification of the conditional mean is implicit in (b), which provides us
for τ = 4 with a χ2-statistic with four degrees of freedom. A similar test is conducted on the
conditional variance, using moment condition (d). The distributional assumptions of the
model are tested by examining conditions (a), (c), (e), and (f). This results in a χ2-statistic
with four degrees of freedom. Finally, I jointly test all restrictions, which implies (again,
for τ = 4) a test with 12 degrees of freedom.
Notice that test statistics derived from this GMM procedure follow a χ2 distri-
bution asymptotically only. However, Bekaert and Harvey (1997) - in a similar setting
- performed a Monte Carlo analysis to derive the small-sample distribution of this test
statistic, and found that it is fairly close to a χ2 distribution.
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3.3.2.2. Regime Classification
Ang and Bekaert (2002a) developed a summary statistic which captures the quality of a
model’s regime qualification performance. They argue that a good regime-switching model
should be able to clasify regimes sharply. This is the case when the (ex-post) regime prob-
abilities pj,t = P (Si,t = j|Ωt) is close to either one or zero. Inferior models however will
exhibit pj values closer to 1/k, where k is the number of states. For k = 2, the regime
classification measure (RCM1 ) is given by
RCM1 = 400× 1
T
TX
t=1
pt (1− pt) (3.25)
where the constant serves to normalize the statistic to be between 0 and 100. A perfect
model will be associated with a RCM1 close to zero, while a model that cannot distinguish
between regimes at all will produce a RCM1 close to 100. Ang and Bekaert (2002a)’s
generalization of this formula to the multiple state case has many undesirable features8. I
therefore propose the following adapted measure, denoted by RCM2:
RCM2 = 100× (1− k
k − 1
1
T
TX
t=1
kX
i=1
µ
pi,t −
1
k
¶2
) (3.26)
RCM2 lies between 0 and 100, where the latter means that the model cannot distinguish
between the regimes. However, contrary to the multi-state RCM proposed by Ang and
Bekaert (2002a), this measure does only produce low values when the model consistently
attaches a high probability to one state only. This RCM2 also satisfies other ordering
requirements: RCM2 for instance prefers a model that is able to eliminate 2 states relative
8More specifically, their measure produces small RCM ’s as soon as one state has a very low probability,
even if the model cannot distinguish between the other states.
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to one state only. In addition, in the two state case, it is easy to show that RCM2 is
identical to RCM1. Table 3 reports the RCM2 for diﬀerent number of states and for
diﬀerent probability structures.
3.4 Empirical Results
This section summarizes the main empirical results of the paper. Section 4.4.1.
discusses the estimation results for the diﬀerent bivariate models for the US and European
returns. Based on various specification tests, I choose the best performing model. The
EU and US innovations are then estimated using the best model and a European index
that excludes the country under investigation. Section 4.4.2. reports the results from
four volatility spillover models: a constant volatility spillover model, and three models
exhibiting regime switches in the spillover parameters. Given the highly nonlinear nature
of these models, all estimations have been started from at least 10 starting values in order
to (nearly) guarantee global maxima. In section 4.4.3., shock spillover intensity is related
to a large set of economic variables. Finally, in section 4.4.4., I test for contagion eﬀects.
3.4.1 Bivariate Model for Europe and US
The aim of this paper is to investigate how shocks from the aggregate European
and US market are transmitted to the individual European equity markets. Therefore, it is
important to use the best possible model specification for the EU and US returns. I compare
four diﬀerent bivariate models: (1) a constant correlation model, (2) a BEKK model, (3)
a regime-switching normal model, and (4) a regime-switching GARCH model. Table 4
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presents the specification tests as outlined in section 3.3.3. The univariate specification
tests of Panel A show no evidence against any of the variance specifications, and neither
against the specification for the US mean equation. There is however evidence against zero
autocorrelations in {zeu,t} and {zeu,tzus,t} in most cases. The test statistics for the joint test
are all far above their critical values. Notice however that the test statistics for both regime-
switching models are slightly lower (about 52 versus about 66). The last column of table
A reports a Wald test for asymmetry in the variance specifications of models (1), (2), and
(4). The results suggest that there are strong asymmetric eﬀects in the variance-covariance
matrix.
Panel B tests whether the standardized residuals of the four diﬀerent models vi-
olate the orthogonality conditions implied by the bivariate normal distribution. The re-
sults indicate that there is skewness, kurtosis, cross-skewness, and cross-kurtosis left in the
standardized residuals. Here, the test statistics for the joint test are much lower for the
regime-switching models than for the constant correlation and BEKK model. In particular,
the regime-switching volatility models perform much better in the tests for kurtosis and
cross-kurtosis, which suggests that regime-switching models do better in proxying for the
fat tails in the return’s distribution.
The distribution tests on the standardized residuals suggest that the regime-
switching models perform slightly better. This is however not satisfactory as a formal
test for the existence of regimes. Unfortunately, there is no straightforward test for regimes
as the usual χ2 asymptotic tests do not apply because of the presence of nuisance parame-
ters under the null. This means that starting e.g. in regime 1, all parameters under regime
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two are not identified under the null hypothesis of no regimes. Hansen (1996) developed an
asymptotic test that overcomes this problem. As this procedure is diﬃcult to implement,
I will use an empirical likelihood ratio test similar to Ang and Bekaert (2002b). Given the
computational burden of such a test, I compare only the constant correlation model with
the regime-switching normal model. The likelihood ratio statistic of the regime-switching
model against the null of a one-regime model is 55.8. To derive the small sample distrib-
ution of this statistic, I simulate 500 series of 1130 returns (the same length of the series
on which the models were estimated) based on the constant correlation model. On each
series, both the constant correlation and regime-switching normal model are estimated, and
the likelihood ratio test statistic is calculated. The results show that only 0.40% of the
likelihood ratio test statistics are larger than 55.8, hereby rejecting the null of one regime.
Finally, the regime classification measure (RCM) is 28.87, implying that on average, the
most likely regime has a probability of more than 90 percent (see table 3). This means
that the regimes are well distinguished. Finally, the residuals from the four models were
regressed upon a set of information variables9. For none of the models, the hypothesis that
all instruments had a zero influence could be rejected.
While all models seem to give relatively similar results, I take the residuals from
the regime-switching normal as input for the second-step estimation, as this model produced
the lowest test statistic for both the univariate and bivariate joint test for normality, as the
null of one regime is rejected, and as the regime classification performance is satisfactory.
The estimation results for the bivariate regime-switching normal model are given in table 4.
9The following information variables were used (all lagged once): the world dividend yield in excess of
the one month US T-Bill rate, the change in the US term structure, and the change in the three-month US
interest rate, and the change in the US default spread. For Europe, the same variables were constructed
based on German series.
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The results suggest that the European and US equity markets are both at the same time in
high and low volatility states. The volatility in Europe and the US is respectively about 2.1
and 1.7 times higher in the high volatility regime. Notice also that on average the volatility
in the US is higher than in Europe. Conform the findings of table 2 and previous literature, I
find that the correlation is significantly higher in the high volatility regime (0.80 versus 0.56
in the low volatility regime). Using a Wald test, this diﬀerence is found to be statistically
significant at a 5% level10. This confirms that correlations between equity markets are high
exactly when the diversification eﬀects from low correlations are most needed. In addition,
the mean returns are negative or insignificant in times of high volatility, but significantly
positive in the low volatility state. This result suggests that the much studied relationship
between risk and expected returns may be regime dependent. Finally, figure 2 plots the
filtered probability of being in the high volatillity regime. Most of the time, both the EU
and US market are in the low volatility regime, and switch for short periods of time to the
high regime. Peaks coincide with the debt crisis in 1982, the October 1987 stock market
crash, and the economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. Similarly, the financial crises
in Asia and Russia, the LTCM debacle, and the start of a market downturn since the end
of 2000 have clearly increased market volatility at the end of the sample.
As argued before, shock spillovers from the aggregate European market to the
local countries may be overestimated, as the EU index consists partly of the local returns.
Therefore, for each country, I construct a matching European index that is a market-
weighted average of all the countries’ index returns, but excludes the returns of the country
under investigation. The country-specific EU and US innovations are then obtained by
10The test statistic is 4.0497, which has a probability value of 4.42%.
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estimating the regime-switching normal model on the US and adapted EU returns.
3.4.2 Univariate Volatility Spillover Model
In this paragraph, I report and discuss the estimation results of the univariate
volatility spillover models with and without regime shifts in the shock spillover parameters.
The (adapted) EU and US innovations obtained in the first step estimation are orthogonal-
ized, assuming that the EU innovations are driven by a purely idiosyncratic shock and by
a US shock (see appendix 1). The US return innovation as well as the orthogonalized EU
innovations serve as input for the univariate volatility model presented here. Notice that
this orthogonalization procedure has consequences for the expected absolute value of the
spillover parameters. This can be seen as follows. Suppose I know that the US and EU
volatility explain about the same proportion of the total volatility of a particular country
and that shocks are on average of the same magnitude. Then the volatility spillover pa-
rameters will generally not be equal unless EU and US shocks are unrelated. If they are
related, part of EU shocks will be explained by US shocks, and the pure EU shocks - this is,
the full EU shocks orthogonal to the US shocks - will be small relative to the full EU shocks.
Consequently, to have the same impact on the local volatility, the EU spillover parameter
at time t will have to be higher than the one of the US. How much higher depends upon
the conditional variance-covariance matrix at time t. Therefore, one should only compare
the size of EU and US spillover parameters between countries, but not with each other. To
compare the relative importance of EU and US news, one should look at what proportion of
the local variance each of them explains separately. Finally, notice that both the EU and US
market are influenced by other regions, such as Latin-America and Asia. Part of US return
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innovations will be caused by news in these regions. The orthogonalization procedure will
hence make EU shocks not only orthogonal to pure US shocks, but to some extend also to
shocks in other regions. However, that component will still be part of the US innovation.
Therefore, the spillover intensity from the US market should merely be interpreted as a
world eﬀect rather than a pure US eﬀect.
A Volatility Spillover Model without Regime Shifts
Table 6 shows the estimation results of the univariate volatility spillover model
without regime switches. All spillover parameters are significant at the 1 percent level. The
EU shock spillover parameter is on average 0.64, but shows considerable cross-sectional
variation (ranging from 0.35 for Austria to 0.93 for Spain). In addition, the shock spillover
intensity is on average higher for EMU countries than for non-EMU countries (averages of
respectively 0.67 and 0.60). Shock transmission from the US amounts on average to 0.41.
This means that a 1 percent decrease in the US stock markets leads ceteris paribus to an
average decrease of 0.41 percent in the diﬀerent European equity markets. Contrary to the
estimates of γeu, the US spillover intensity parameters are fairly similar across countries.
Interestingly however, the average γus is higher for non-EMU countries than for EMU
countries (0.46 versus 0.39), even though this result is to a large extent driven by the high
spillover intensity for Sweden.
A Volatility Spillover Model with Regime Shifts in the Spillover Parameters
This section discusses the estimation results for the three univariate volatility
spillover models with regime shifts in the spillover parameters, and compares those with
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the standard constant spillover model (CSM). For each country, the best performing model
is chosen on the basis of three criteria: (1) by comparing the critical values of a standard
normality test on the standardized error terms (see section 3.3.3), (2) by a likelihood ratio
test, and (3), for the regime-switching models, by comparing their regime classification
performance. The performance statistics are reported in table 7.
Panel A of table 7 reports the results from a normality test on the standardized
residuals of the diﬀerent models. I only report the joint test for normality, this is the
hypothesis of mean zero, unit variance, no autocorrelation (up to order 4) in both the stan-
dardized and squared standardized residuals, no skewness, and no excess kurtosis11. One
can directly see that the models with regime-switching in the spillover parameters perform
much better than the single regime model. On average, the test statistic is 11.2 times lower
for the models with regime-switching12. While the single regime model is rejected for all
countries, the regime-switching models are only rejected for three countries13. The regime-
switching models do overall slightly better on modelling the mean and variance of the local
returns. The large diﬀerence in test statistic with the constant spillover case is largely due
to a much lower test statistic for excess kurtosis (and to some extent also for skewness).
This suggests that the regime-switching models perform much better in modelling the tails
of the distribution. The distinction between the diﬀerent regime-switching models is less
clear-cut. While the model with joint switches in the spillover parameters (JRS) produces
on average the lowest test statistics, it only performs best in three of the thirteen cases,
11The reported test statistics follow a χ2 distribution with 12 degrees of freedom.
1211.2 is calculated as the ratio of the average test statistic for the constant spillover model, and the
average of those of the three regime switching models
13As a rough indication of the relevance of regime switches, I reject regime switching in the spillover
parameters if none of the three regime switching models has a probability value of more than 5 percent.
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compared to five times for the model with independent regime switches (IRS) and the fully
flexible model (FULL).
In panel B of table 7, I calculate likelihood ratio tests to see whether the diﬀerent
models are significantly diﬀerent from one another. Column 1 and 2 compare the constant
spillover model with the JRS and IRS models. As argued before, standard Likelihood Ratio
(LR) tests do not follow a standard χ2 distribution asymptotically because of the presence
of nuisance parameters under the null hypothesis. Therefore, I derive the distribution
by Monte-Carlo simulation. First, for each country, the LR-test statistic is calculated as
follows:
LRNRS↔RS = −2 log (LNRS − LRS)
where LNRS and LRS represent the likelihood values of the constant spillover model and
one specific regime-switching spillover model respectively. I then simulate 500 series of 1128
returns based on the constant correlation model. On each of these series, both the constant
correlation and regime-switching spillover model are estimated, and a LR test statistic is
calculated. Finally, the significance of the likelihood ratio test statistic LRNRS↔RS is ob-
tained by calculating how many of the 500 simulated LR values are larger than LRNRS↔RS.
Columns three till five compare the fully flexible model with the other models. Now the
probability values are taken from a standard χ2 distribution. Notice that only the IRS
model is truly nested, and that the other test statistics suﬀer from the same problem of
having undefined parameters under the null hypothesis. The estimation of the fully flexible
model is however too challenging to make the derivation of an empirical distribution feasible
within a reasonable amount of time14. Therefore, I report probability values taken from a
14Not only is the optimization process of the fully flexible model time consuming, the chance of being
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standard χ2 distribution as an indication - but not more- for significance. In all countries,
the single regime model is rejected in favor of the JRS or IRS model, confirming previous
results that regime switches in shock spillover intensity are important15. There is no easy
test statistic available to compare the JRS and IRS model. However, one can get a feeling
for the statistical diﬀerence between the two models by comparing their LR test statistic
against the single regime model. In eight of the 13 cases, the LR test statistic is substan-
tially higher for the IRS than for the JRS model. The JRS model seems to perform best
only in case of Austria, France, Denmark, and Sweden. These results suggest that for these
countries, the EU and US shock spillover intensity are governed by the same underlying
factors, while for the other countries, the factors may be very diﬀerent16. For most coun-
tries, the fully flexible model (FULL) does not perform statistically better than the best of
the JRS or IRS model. The (informal) χ2 test statistic is only statistically significant for
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
In panel C of table 7, I analyze the regime qualification performance of the diﬀerent
regime-switching models. Column one till three report the regime classification (RCM)
measure derived in section 3.3.2.2. and the associated probability of the most likely regime,
assuming that the other states share the remaining probability mass between them. As
was clear from table 3, the RCM’s are only comparable if the number of states is constant.
Therefore, to compare the JRS model with the IRS and FULL model (both have 4 states),
in column four and five, I calculate what the RCM would be in the two state case. To do so,
stuck in a local optimum is also larger than for the more simple models. Suppose that for every simulated
time series the estimation is started from 10 diﬀerent starting values, as to guarantee a global optimum.
This would mean that for each country 5000 optimizations would have to be performed in order to obtain
a trustful small sample distribution for the Likelihood Ratio tests.
15Not all Monte-Carlo simulations have been done, so this is a preliminary result.
16In paragraph 4.3., I will try to find out what those factors are.
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I allocate the probability of the most likely regime to state 1, and the probability of the three
remaining states to state 2. Finally, the last column reports the model that distinguishes
best the diﬀerent states. In nine of the thirteen cases, the JRS model distinguishes best
between the diﬀerent regimes: on average, it allocates 85.8 percent to the most likely regime,
compared to 77.4 and 75.2 percent for the IRS and FULL model respectively. In addition,
in eight cases, the most likely regime in the JRS model has a probability of more than 85
percent, compared to only three and zero times for the IRS and FULL model. The relatively
worse regime classification performance for the IRS and FULL models does not come as a
surprise, as these models allow for more flexibility. Overall, it is fair to say that all models
distinguish relatively well between the diﬀerent states, as nearly always, the most likely
regime has a probability above 75 percent.
In conclusion, all tests indicate strongly in favor of regime-switching shock spillover
intensities. While in most cases the diﬀerent performance statistics for the regime-switching
models point in the same direction, I will choose the best model based upon the (empirical)
likelihood ratio test statistics. The last column of panel B of table 7 shows for each country
the model with the highest LR test statistic (versus the NRS model). However, given the
its large number of parameters the FULL model is only chosen if it performs statistically
better than the CRS and IRS model. In what follows, the regime-switching shock spillover
intensities are those estimated using the best performing model.
Table 8 investigates whether the shock spillover parameters are statistically diﬀer-
ent across regimes. The Wald tests are distributed as a χ2 distribution with one degree of
freedom. Nearly all EU and US shock spillover parameters are significantly diﬀerent across
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regimes. Only for Denmark and Switzerland do the results seem to suggest that there is no
significant diﬀerence between the high and low spillover regime.
To get an understanding of the magnitude and evolution of shock spillover intensity
through time and across countries, table 9 reports average shock spillover intensities over
diﬀerent subperiods, while figure 3 plots the shock spillover intensities through time for the
diﬀerent countries. The latter are calculated as
γeui,t =
#statesX
j=1
P (Si,t = j|Ωt)γeui
¡
Seui,t = j
¢
γusi,t =
#statesX
j=1
P (Si,t = j|Ωt)γusi
¡
Susi,t = j
¢
where P (Si,t = j|Ωt) is the ex-post probability of being in state j, and γzi (Szi,t = j) the shock
spillover intensity from z = EU,US to country i in state j. Let us first inspect the spillover
intensity from the EU market (left hand side of figure 3, Panel A of table 8). In all countries,
the sensitivity to EU shocks is larger during the 1990s. The largest increases are found in
Austria (+93%), Germany (+187%), and Denmark (+141%), the lowest in Ireland (+8.7%),
the Netherlands (+1.5%), and Norway (+0.4%). Looking at shorter subperiods, I find that
the largest increases were observed in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the
1990s. Sensitivities stay more or less the same during the 1996-1999 period, to decrease
again after 1999. This result is surprising, given that during 1996-1999, Europe was going
through a period of monetary integration and exchange rate stability, culminating in the
introduction of a single currency in the EMU member countries. These results suggest that
the economic integration (boosted by the Single European Act (1986)) as well as eﬀorts
to further liberalize European capital markets were more important in bringing markets
closer together than the process towards monetary integration and the introduction of the
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single currency. While the sensitivity to EU shocks has increased substantially (on average
+45.3%), the rise in US shock spillover intensity was not so pronounced (on average, +13%).
Exceptions are Austria (+127%), Germany (+38%), Netherlands (-13%), and Denmark (-
13%). These results show that the importance of EU shocks is rising relative to those of
US shocks.
Table 10 reports the proportion of total return variance that can be attributed to
EU (panel A) and US shock spillovers (panel B). Over the full sample, EU shocks explain
about 15 percent of local variance, while US shocks account for about 20 percent. While
the US - as a proxy for the world market - is still the dominant force, the proportion of
variance attributed to EU shocks has increased substantially more: from 10% during the
1980s to 20% during the nineties (increase of 96.1%) for Europe; for the US from 16% to
24% (increase of 50.2% only)17. The EU variance proportion is on average higher for EMU
than for non-EMU countries (17% versus 13%). However, while for EMU countries the EU
variance proportion increased with 81%, it increased with 146% for non-EMU countries.
Over the 1990s, the largest EU variance ratios were observed in France and Spain (27%);
the lowest in Austria (12%), Norway (15%) and Switzerland (16%). While the US variance
proportions are on average similar across countries (20%), the evolution has been diﬀerent:
during the 1980s, the fraction of local shocks explained by US shocks was higher for non-
EMU countries (18% versus 15%). However, the picture has flipped during the 1990s, in
which 25% of EMU equity market shocks are explained by US shocks compared to 23% only
for non-EMU countries. The Dutch index has a very high US variance ratio of 44%, as it
17The proportionally larger increase in EU (US) variance ratios compared to EU (US) shock spillover
intensity is due to an increase in the average ratio of EU (US) market volatility to total local volatility.
Notice that this in itself is an indication of larger correlations between countries.
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is dominated by companies who have high proportions of their cash flows outside Europe.
Also France (31%), Germany (27%), Sweden (28%), and Switzerland (28%) have high US
variance ratios, while Austria (10%) and Denmark (14%) are relatively isolated from the
US market.
3.4.3 Economic Determinants of Shock Spillover Intensity
The advantage of regime-switching models is at the same time also their weakness:
they let the data decide in what state the economy is at a specific time. As argued in the
introduction, little is known about what factors determine shock spillover intensity and in
what fashion. In this section, I relate the latent state variable Seui,t to a large set of economic
and financial variables that may influence shock spillover intensity. The dependent variable
Seui,t takes on the value of one when the ex-post probability of being in the high spillover
state is larger than 50 percent, and zero otherwise18. I focus on the the EU shock spillover
intensity as to investigate the eﬀect of the intense eﬀorts aimed at opening European capital
markets, and at strengthening the economic and monetary integration in the EU. Many of
the explanatory variables I use are standard in the literature, and have been used - even
though not all at the same time - by e.g. Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 1997), Chen and Zhang
(1997), Beck et al. (2000), Ng (2000), Bekaert et al (2002a), and Fratzscher (2001). The
instruments used can be grouped under the following headers.
18Alternatively, I estimated the relationship between the diﬀerent information variables and the probability
weighted EU shock spillover intensity using GMM (with correction for autocorrelation in the dependent
variable). Results are qualitatively very similar to the logit analysis presented here. Results are available
upon request.
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Market Development and Integration19 More developed financial markets are likely
to share information more intensively, as they are, on average, more liquid, more diversi-
fied, and better integrated with world financial markets than smaller markets. In addition,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996) found that countries with larger stock markets are usu-
ally better institutionally developed, with strong information disclosure laws, international
accounting standards, and unrestricted capital flows, hence with lower asymmetric infor-
mation costs. An often used proxy for stock market development is the ratio of equity
market capitalization to GDP (MCAP/GDP ). Bekaert and Harvey (1995) and Ng (2000)
among others found that countries with a higher MCAP/GDP are on average better inte-
grated with world capital markets. Therefore, we expect a positive influence from market
development on shock spillover intensities.
Economic Integration through Trade To the extent that economic and financial in-
tegration go hand in hand, variables that proxy for trade integration may be useful in
explaining the time-varying nature of shock spillover intensity. The more economies are
linked, the more they will be exposed to common shocks, and the higher information shar-
ing will be. This argument is particularly valid for European Union countries, as these
countries went through a period of significant trade integration. Much of this progress was
made in the aftermath of the Single European Act (1986). Chen and Zhang (1997) found
that countries with heavier bilateral trade with a region also tend to have higher return
correlations with that region. Similarly, Bekaert and Harvey (1995) found that countries
19Lack of high quality data prevent me from looking at more detailed characteristics of market develop-
ment. Turnover data (relative to market capitalization or GDP) for instance may provide information about
the eﬃciency or liquidity - and hence attraction - of the equity market. For most markets however, turnover
data is only available from the beginning of the 1990s.
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with open economies are generally better integrated with world capital markets. An often
used proxy for trade integration is the size of the trade sector. More specifically, I test
whether the ratio of import plus export of country i with the EU to GDP is significantly
positively correlated with the EU shock spillover intensity.
Business Cycle There is considerable evidence that correlations between equity markets
are higher during recessions than during growth periods (see e.g. Erb et al. (1994)). In the
model proposed here, this may be due to an increase in the volatility ratio (σeu,t/
p
hi,t, σus,t/
p
hi,t)
or to an increase in the EU and US shock spillover intensity. As I focus on the latter, I focus
on the relationship between γeui and γ
us
i and the evolution of the business cycle. Previous
authors have investigated correlations conditional on the ex-post state of the business cycle
(e.g. the NBER oﬃcial ”recession dates”). However, given the forward looking character of
equity prices, it seems more natural to use a forward looking business cycle indicator. Here,
I will relate the OECD leading indicator for the aggregate EU (US) market- more specifi-
cally, the deviation from its (quadratic) trend20 - to the EU (US) shock spillover intensity.
By separating conditional correlations into a spillover and volatility component, I am able
to test whether the increase in correlations during recessions is due to an increase in shock
spillover intensity or not.
Shock spillover intensity may not only depend upon the state of the EU (US)
business cycle, but also on how the local economy is expected to perform relative to the
aggregate business cycle. Erb et al. (1994)) for instance also found that correlations are
generally lower when business cycles are out of phase. This may be especially relevant for
20Results are robust to the use of a linear trend, as well as of Hodrick-Prescott filtered series.
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countries whose business cycle moves asymmetrically relative to the EU (US). Similarly,
a reduction of cross-country business cycle asymmetries will increase return correlations
through a convergence of cash flow expectations. To test whether countries and/or periods
with large business cycle asymmetries are characterized by lower return correlations, I in-
clude a dummy that records whether or not the economy of country i is out of phase with
the EU and US economy21.
Monetary Integration and Exchange Rate Stability While the Single European
Act (1986) boosted real integration, with the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the process to-
wards monetary integration was started. This process culminated in the introduction of a
single currency in 12 European countries in January 1999 and a single monetary authority,
the European Central Bank (ECB), as a sole conductor of monetary policy. In the run-
up towards the euro, monetary policy coordination and the requirement to fulfill several
convergence criteria did not only make inflation and nominal interest rates converge across
countries, but also created an environment of exchange rate stability22. The convergence
in real interest rates as well as the reduction (elimination) of currency risk premia resulted
in a convergence of cross-country discount rates, and hence a more homogeneous valuation
of equity. In addition, the introduction of the euro directly removed a number of existing
21This dummy is calculated as follows. First, a (quadratic) trend is fitted for the OECD leading indicator
of each country, as well as for the EU and US. Second, deviations from this trend are generated. Positive
deviations indicate a boom; negative deviations a recession. Third, for each country, a EU (US) ”out-of-
phase” dummy is created. This dummy has a value of one when the deviation of the OECD leading indicator
from its trend has a diﬀerent sign for the EU (US) and the country under investigation, and zero otherwise.
22Exchange rate stability was the aim of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) started in 1979. Several
devaluations in the summer of 1992 and 1993 resulted in a widening of the fluctuation marging from 2.25
percent to 15 percent around parity. However, exchange rate stability was a prerequisite for countries willing
to participate to the euro. Necessarily, all countries now part of the euro zone had stable exchange rates
vis-a-vis each other’s currency in the second half of the 1990s. However, exchange rate volatility was also
low for the other EU countries.
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barriers to cross-border investments. The EU matching rule, requiring that liabilities in
foreign currency be matched for a large percentage by assets in the same currency, can no
longer prevent insurance companies, pension funds, and other financial institutions with
liabilities denominated in euro from investing in any country within EMU. The lower cur-
rency hedging costs and the elimination of currency risk should induce investors to increase
their holdings of pan-European assets, leading to an increase in information sharing across
European capital markets. As a measure of monetary policy convergence, I use the dif-
ference between local inflation and the EU15 inflation average23. The eﬀect of exchange
rate stability is determined by fitting a GARCH(1,1) model on the exchange rate returns of
country i vis-a-vis the ECU, and using the estimated conditional variance as an explanatory
variable for γeui .
A potential problem is that some of the explanatory variables are highly correlated.
This is especially relevant for the trade variable and the market development variable.
Therefore, I use the trade variable, and the part of market capitalization over GDP that
is orthogonal to the trade variable. A univariate logit regression is used to relate the
binary dependent variable Seui,t to the explanatory variables. Robust standard errors are
computed using quasi-maximum likelihood. Results are reported in table 11. Many of
the explanatory variables enter significantly. The trade integration variable is positive and
significant in all countries except for Austria, Ireland, and Norway. This suggests that trade
has been an important catalyst for increased information sharing between equity markets.
Inflation enters negatively and significantly for all countries, except for Austria, Germany,
23Long-term nominal or real interest rates could not be included because for many countries these series
were not available over the full sample.
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and Switzerland, indicating that equity markets share more information in a low-inflation
environment. The deviating result for Germany may be explained by the surge in inflation
after the German reunification, a period that coincided with a rapid increase in spillover
intensity. The similar result for Austria is likely to be explained by the high degree of
correlation between the German and Austrian equity market. Finally, Switzerland had fairly
low inflation levels all over the 1990s. While Austria and Belgium appear to be negatively
aﬀected by sudden increases in currency volatility, for most other countries, the spillover
intensities are positively or insignificantly related to currency volatility. This somehow
confirms the empirical regularity that correlations between markets increase in times of
turmoil, more specifically during a currency crisis24. This was especially apparent during the
exchange rate turmoil in the summer of 1992 and 1993. In addition, these results show that
this eﬀect persists even if one corrects for the changes in the ratio of EU market volatility
to local volatility. The market development indicator - market capitalization over GDP -
is positive and significant in 7 cases and insignificant (at a 5 percent level) for the other
countries. The ”high world volatility dummy” is nearly always positive, but only significant
for The Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. In most countries, shock spillover intensity is
significantly related to the state of the European business cycle. In Germany, Ireland,
Denmark, and Switzerland, the shock spillover intensity increases in times of recessions.
This result is consistent with the results of Erb et al. (1994). However, in Austria, Belgium,
Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden, the opposite seems true. The same mixed
results prevail when looking at the dummy measuring whether the local business cycle is
24Theoretically, one would expect that the gradual decrease of currency risk in Europe and the consequent
decrease in currency risk premium would increase correlations between markets. This is however not what
I find.
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out of phase with the European cycle. While for some countries it is the case that their
spillover intensity decreases when they are out of phase with the European business cycle,
the opposite seems true for other countries.
A simple test for Contagion
The model used here allows for a simple test of contagion. This test is very similar
to the test proposed by Bekaert et al. (2002c). They define contagion as ”correlation over
and above what one would expect from economic fundamentals”. The authors estimate a
two-factor model that is similar to the one used here, in a sense that the two factors are the
regional market - in my case, the European market - and the US market. Correlations will
change when the volatility of the factors changes; by how much is determined by the factor
sensitivities. While both models allow for time-variation in the factor sensitivities, the way
to do so is quite diﬀerent. In their model, the evolution of the sensitivities is governed
by a bilateral trade variable, compared to a latent regime variable in my model. I believe
that the model used here has some advantages. First, as shown in the previous section, the
variation of the sensitivities through time is influenced by more factors than trade alone.
Second, as argued by Ang and Bekaert (2002b), regime-switching models may do better in
capturing asymmetric correlations.
The contagion test of Bekaert et al. (2002c) is based on the argument that in
the case of no contagion, there should not be any correlation left between the error terms.
They investigate this hypothesis during various crisis periods by estimating the following
regression:
eˆi,t = b1 + (b2 + b3Di,t)eˆm,t + ui,t
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over diﬀerent crisis periods, where eˆi,t is the local market’s residual, eˆm,t the residual from
a benchmark index (here, EU and US index), and Di,t a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if it coincides with the crisis being looked at, and zero otherwise. Clearly, much
of the power of this test will depend upon the ability of the factor specification to model
conditional correlations. To the extend that the specification used here is a better model
for conditional correlations, also the test for contagion should be more powerful. I estimate
the following specification by GMM25
eˆi,t = b1 + (b2 + b3Di,t)eˆeu,t + (b4 + b5Di,t)eˆus,t + ui,t
where eˆeu,t and eˆus,t are the orthogonalized residuals from the bivariate model for EU and
US returns. Contrary to Bekaert et al. (2000), I let the data decide when world equity
markets are going through a crisis period. Therefore, Di,t takes on a one when the EU and
US are jointly in a high volatility state, and zero otherwise. So this is a test of whether there
has been contagion over the full sample and during the crisis moments occurring during the
sample (I do not look a crises individually). Overall contagion from the aggregate European
market (excluding the country being looked at) would be there if b2 and b3 are jointly
diﬀerent from zero, while b3 measures the extra contagion during crisis periods. Similarly,
we cannot reject contagion from the US markets when b4 and b5 are jointly diﬀerent from
zero; here b5 measures the extra contagion during crisis periods.
Results are contained in Table 12. There is some evidence of contagion from the
EU market to the German equity market (at a 5 percent level). However, for all other
countries, the hypothesis of no contagion cannot be rejected. The evidence is stronger for
25with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (Barlett kernel, Newey-West
bandwith selection (6))
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contagion from the US market. For France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland, the parameters b4 and b5 are jointly significant. Looking more into detail,
one can see that this is mainly due to the high significance of b5, which measures whether
correlation between local and US residuals is higher during crisis periods.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether the eﬀorts for more economic, monetary, and
financial integration in Europe have fundamentally altered the intensity of shock spillovers
from the US and aggregate European equity markets to 13 European stock markets. The
innovation of the paper is that the EU and US shock spillover intensity is allowed to switch
between a high and low state according to a latent regime variable. Three regime-switching
shock spillover models are derived that diﬀer in the way switches in the EU and US spillover
intensity interact. I find that regime switches in the spillover intensities are both statistically
and economically important. For nearly all countries, the probability of a high EU and US
shock spillover intensity has increased significantly over the 1980s and 1990s, even though
the increase is more pronounced for the sensitivity to EU shocks. It may be surprising to
some that the increase in EU shock spillover intensity is mainly situated in the second part
of the 1980s en the first part of the 1990s, an not during the period directly before and
after the introduction of the single currency. In fact, in many countries, the sensitivity to
EU shocks dropped considerably after 1999. Over the full sample, EU shocks explain about
15 percent of local variance, compared to 20 percent for US shocks. While the US - as a
proxy for the world market - continues to be the dominating influence in European equity
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markets, the importance of the regional European market is rising considerably.
Next, I look for the factors that have contributed to this increased information
sharing. I consider instruments related to equity market development, economic integration,
monetary integration, exchange rate stability, and to the state of the business cycle. Results
suggest that countries with an open economy, low inflation, and well developed financial
markets share more information with the regional European market. There is some evidence
that shock spillover intensity is related to the business cycle.
Finally, a test for contagion is derived similar to the one proposed by Bekaert et al.
(2002c). They define contagion as ”correlation over and above what one would expect from
economic fundamentals”. If the model used here is correct (what the specification tests
tend to suggest), changes in conditional correlation will be entirely driven by changes in the
conditional EU (US) and local market volatility, and switches in the EU (US) shock spillover
intensity. The hypothesis of no contagion can be tested by investigating the correlation
between the model’s residuals. I discover a statistically significant correlation between local
residuals and those of the US market during crisis periods. There is however no evidence
of contagion from the regional European market to the local equity markets.
The methodology developed in this paper may prove useful in analyzing many
other interesting issues. First, it may be useful to investigate the capacity of this type
of models in capturing asymmetric correlations between markets. A model that features
both regime switches in spillover intensity and the level of volatility seems promising in this
context. Second, this methodology is especially appropriate in analyzing the interaction
between diﬀerent asset markets, in casu the foreign exchange, money, bond, and equity
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markets. Third, instead of applying this methodology to shock spillover models, it may be
interesting to investigate whether also prices of risk are subject to regime switches, and if
so, what economic factors force these to switch.
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Appendix 1: Derivation of orthogonalized innovations
The univariate shock spillover model allows us to quantify the relative importance
of EU and US shocks on the different European equity markets. However, as is likely that a
common news component drives part of the EU and US returns, I make the local European
returns conditional on the innovations from the US and the orthogonalized innovations from
the European aggregate market. The innovations from Europe and the US are orthogonal-
ized by assuming that the EU return is driven by a purely idiosyncratic shock and by the
US return shock. Similar to Ng(2000), the orthogonalized European and US innovations
are denoted respectively by eeu,t and eus,t,and are given by:
εt =
 εeu,t
εus,t
 =
 1 kt−1
0 1

 eeu,t
eus,t
 = Kt−1et
εt|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0,Ht)
et|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0,Σt)
Σt =
 σ2eu 0
0 σ2us

where kt−1, σ2eu, and σ2us are calculated such that Ht = Kt−1ΣtK′t−1. Under these assump-
tions, it is straightforward to show that kt−1 is determined by the ratio of the covariance
between EU and US innovations and the variance of the latter:
kt−1 =
Covt−1 (εeu,t, εus,t)
V art−1 (εus,t)
=
Heu,us,t
Hus,t
The orthogonalized innovations can then be calculated as:
et =
 eeu,t
eus,t
 =
 1 −kt−1
0 1

 εeu,t
εus,t
 = K−1t−1εt
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while the variance-covariance matrix is given by:
Σt = K−1t−1HtK
′−1
t−1
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Appendix 2: Derivation of transition matrix in case of indepen-
dent states.
By way of example, we derive the third column of the transition matrix given in
equation (3.14), supposing that the states variables Seui,t and S
us
i,t are independent.
P (Si,t = 3|Si,t−1 = 1) = P (Seui,t = 1 and Susi,t = 2|Seui,t−1 = 1 and Susi,t−1 = 1)
= P (Seui,t = 1|Seui,t−1 = 1)P (Susi,t = 2|Susi,t−1 = 1)
= P eu(1− P us)
P (Si,t = 3|Si,t−1 = 2) = P (Seui,t = 1 and Susi,t = 2|Seui,t−1 = 2 and Susi,t−1 = 1)
= P (Seui,t = 1|Seui,t−1 = 2)P (Susi,t = 2|Susi,t−1 = 1)
= (1−Qeu)(1− P us)
P (Si,t = 3|Si,t−1 = 3) = P (Seui,t = 1 and Susi,t = 2|Seui,t−1 = 1 and Susi,t−1 = 2)
= P (Seui,t = 1|Seui,t−1 = 1)P (Seui,t = 2|Seui,t−1 = 2)
= P euQus
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P (Si,t = 3|Si,t−1 = 4) = P (Seui,t = 1 and Susi,t = 2|Seui,t−1 = 2 and Susi,t−1 = 2)
= P (Seui,t = 1|Seui,t−1 = 2)P (Seui,t = 2|Seui,t−1 = 2)
= (1−Qeu)Qus
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Appendix 4: Derivation of the second-step loglikelihood in case
of regime-switching
In the previous paragraph, the trivariate likelihood for US, EU, and local returns
was split into a bivariate system for EU and US returns, and a univariate likelihood for
the local returns, where the latter model is conditional on the return innovations from the
bivariate model. In this appendix, I show how the univariate likelihood is constructed in
case of regime-switching in the two spillover parameters. The case where both the spillover
parameters and the local volatility can switch, is analogous. For the sake of generality, we
focus on the case where no structure is added to the transition matrix. We start from the
following model:
ri,t = µi,t + εi,t
εi,t = ei,t + γeui,Seui,t eˆeu,t + γ
us
i,Susi,t
eˆus,t
ei,t|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0, σ2i,t)
We suppose that the spillover parameters γeui and γ
us
i can be in two states only:
γeui,t =

γeui,1 if S
eu
i,t = 1
γeui,2 if S
eu
i,t = 2

and
γusi,t =

γusi,1 if S
us
i,t = 1
γusi,2 if S
us
i,t = 2

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The combination of Seui,t and S
us
i,t creates a new state variable Si,t, which is defined as:
Si,t = 1 if Seui,t = 1 and S
us
i,t = 1
Si,t = 2 if Seui,t = 2 and S
us
i,t = 1
Si,t = 3 if Seui,t = 1 and S
us
i,t = 2
Si,t = 4 if Seui,t = 2 and S
us
i,t = 2
We make no assumptions about the interaction between the different states. In this general
case, the transition matrix Π is given by
Π =

p11 p12 p13 p14
p21 p22 p23 p24
p31 p32 p33 p34
p41 p42 p43 p44

where pij = P (St = j|St = i). The only structure imposed is that pi1 + .... + pi4 = 1,
for i = 1, ..., 4, and that all pij = 0. As shown in appendix 4, we want to maximize
f(ri,t|eˆeut , eˆust ,Ωt−1; θi). For notational ease, we will omit eˆeut and eˆust from the formulas.
Recall that ri,t is subject to switches between four regimes:
f(ri,t|Ωt−1; θi) =
4∑
j=1
f(ri,t, Si,t = j|Ωt−1; θi)
=
4∑
j=1
f(ri,t|Si,t = j,Ωt−1; θi)P (Si,t = j|Ωt−1; θi)
=
4∑
j=1
f(ri,t|Si,t = j,Ωt−1; θi)pjt
where pjt = P (Si,t = j|Ωt−1; θi) is the ex-ante probability of being in state j.
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If conditional normality is assumed, we get that
f(ri,t|Si,t = j,Ωt−1; θi) = 1√2pihit
exp
{−(rit − µit − γeui,Seui,t eˆeu,t − γusi,Susi,t eˆus,t)2
2hit
}
We can decompose the ex-ante probability of being in state j as follows:
P (Si,t = j|Ωt−1; θi) =
4∑
k=1
P (Si,t = j|Si,t−1 = k)P (Si,t−1 = k|Ωt−1; θi), j = 1, ..., 4.
where P (Si,t−1 = k|Ωt−1; θi) represents the filtered probability, which indicates the state
of the economy at time t, using all the information available at time t. The latter can be
further decomposed:
P (Si,t−1 = k|Ωt−1; θi) = P (Si,t−1 = k|ri,t−1,Ωt−2; θi)
=
P (Si,t−1 = k, ri,t−1|Ωt−2; θi)
P (ri,t−1|Ωt−2)
=
f(ri,t−1|Si,t−1 = k,Ωt−2; θi)P (Si,t−1 = 1|Ωt−2; θi)
4∑
j=1
f(ri,t−1|Si,t−1 = j,Ωt−2; θi)P (Si,t−1 = j|Ωt−2; θi)
Given initial values for the ex-ante probabilities, one can construct the likelihood iteratively.
The parameters of the model are estimated by maximizing the loglikelihood function with
respect to θi :
£(ri,t|Ωt−1; θi) =
T∑
t=1
lnφ(ri,t|Ωt−1; θi)
The model and the construction of the information set imply that the loglikelihood function
can be written as
£(ri,t|Ωt−1; θi) =
T∑
t=1
lnφ(ei,t|Ωt−1; θi)
where the density function φ(.) is a weighted average of the four state dependent densities,
where the weights are determined by the ex-ante probabilities:
φ(ei,t|Ωt−1; θi) =
4∑
j=1
f(ei,t|Si,t−1 = j,Ωt−1; θi)P (Si,t−1|Ωt−2; θi)
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Table 3: Regime Classification Measure
This table reports the Regime Classification Measure (RCM) under different
number of regimes (two till four) and for different probabilities for the first
state, assuming that the other states evenly divide the probability mass left
between them. The RCM is given by
RCM2 = 1− k
k − 1
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
(
pi,t − 1
k
)2
where k is the number of states, and pi,t = P (St = i|Ωt−1) .
RCM
4 States 3 States 2 States
0.250 100.000 - -
0.346 98.356 99.963 -
0.385 96.778 99.408 -
0.423 94.675 98.188 -
0.462 92.045 96.302 -
0.500 88.889 93.750 100.000
0.539 85.207 90.533 99.408
0.577 80.999 86.649 97.633
0.615 76.266 82.101 94.675
0.654 71.006 76.886 90.533
0.673 68.179 74.029 88.018
0.712 62.130 67.816 82.101
0.750 55.556 60.938 75.000
0.789 48.455 53.393 66.716
0.827 40.828 45.183 57.249
0.865 32.676 36.307 46.598
0.904 23.997 26.766 34.763
0.923 19.461 21.746 28.402
0.942 14.793 16.559 21.746
0.962 9.993 11.206 14.793
0.981 5.063 5.686 7.544
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 4: Estimation Results for the Bivariate Models for EU and US returns
This table reports estimation results from a bivariate constant correlation model, a bi-
variate BEKKmodel, a regime-switching normal model, and a regime-switching GARCH
model for the EU and US returns over the period January 1980 - August 2001. All
returns are weekly Deutschmark denominated total returns. In Panel A, we report a
battery of specification tests for the different models. First, it is tested whether the stan-
dardized residuals violate the orthogonality conditions implied by a standard normal
distribution. ”Mean” and ”Variance” tests whether there is fourth-order autocorre-
lation left in the standardized and squared standardized residuals. ”Covariance” tests
whether the product of the standardized EU and US residuals is autocorrelated up to
order 4. These test statistics are chi-square distributed with four degrees of freedom.
”Joint” tests the mean, variance, and covariance jointly, and is χ2(12) distributed.
”Asym” tests whether the (co-)variance reacts asymmetrically to return innovations
(Wald test on parameters in matrix D in the variance specification). In panel B, it is
investigated whether the standardized residuals violate the conditions of the bivariate
standard normal distribution. Specifically, it is tested whether the skewness, excess
kurtosis, cross-skewness, and cross-kurtosis are significantly different from zero. These
tests are all χ2(1) distributed. The ”joint” statistic tests the conditions jointly, and is
χ2(6) distributed. Probability levels are reported in squared brackets.
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Panel A: Univariate Specification Tests for Bivariate Models for EU and US returns
UNIVARIATE TESTS Mean Variance Covariance Joint Asym
EU US EU US
Constant Correlation Model 8.898 3.202 5,615 2.415 58.189 65,647 13.289
[0.064] [0.525] [0.229] [0.659] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
BEKK model 11.045 3.217 6.321 0.859 61.317 66,197 15.891
[0.026] [0.526] [0.176] [0.930] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Markov-Switching Normal 15,092 3.379 6,971 1,765 45,348 51.762 -
[0.005] [0.497] [0.137] [0.779] [0.000] [0.000] -
Markov-Switching GARCH 10.198 3.4606 7.8483 4.082 45.0608 51.8548 6.223
[0.037] [0.484] [0.097] [0.544] [0.000] [0.000] [0.045]
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Table 5: Estimation Results for the Bivariate regime-switching Normal Model
for EU and US returns
This table reports estimation results for the bivariate regime-switching normal model
for EU and US returns. The model allows the returns rt = [reu,t, rus,t] to be drawn
from two different bivariate normal distributions:
rt|Ωt−1 =
{
N(µt−1 (S1) ,H (S1))
N(µt−1 (S2) ,H (S2))
(3.27)
The regimes follow a two-state Markov chain with transition matrix:
Π =
(
P 1− P
1−Q Q
)
(3.28)
where the transition probabilities are given by P = prob(St = 1|St−1 = 1;Ωt−1), and
Q = prob(St = 2|St−1 = 2;Ωt−1). In the mean equation, only the intercepts α0 are
made regime dependent:
µt = µt−1 = α0 +Art−1
where α0 = [αeu, αus]
′
, and A = [αeueu, α
us
eu;α
eu
us, α
us
us] . Probability levels are reported
in squared brackets.
EUROPEAN RETURNS US RETURNS
state 1 state 2 state 1 state 2
Volatility 0.0327 0.0156 0.0404 0.0236
[0.0161] [0.0000] [0.0090] [0.0000]
Correlation 0.8062 0.5605
[0.0498] [0.0523]
Constant -0.0052 0.0039 -0.0041 0.0048
[0.0339] [0.0001] [0.1516] [0.0000]
P 0.9297 [0.0086]
Q 0.9871 [0.0031]
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Table 6: Univariate model with constant shock spillover intensity
This table reports estimation results for the univariate model with constant shock
spillover intensity. This model is given by
ri,t = µi,t−1 + εi,t
εi,t = ei,t + γeui eˆeu,t + γ
us
i eˆus,t
µi,t = βi0 + βi1ri,t−1 + βi2reu,t−1 + βi3rus,t−1
ei,t|Ωt−1 v N(0, σ2i,t)
σ2i,t = ψi0 + ψi1e
2
i,t−1 + ψi2σ
2
i,t−1 + ψi3max (−ei,t−1, 0)2
where eˆeu and eˆus are respectively the European and US market shocks obtained from
a first step estimation. Notice that eˆeu is different for every country, as the European
market portfolios are formed using the returns from all countries but the country that
is being looked at. ***, **, and * means significant at a 1, 5, and 10 percent level
respectively.
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Table 7: Comparison of Different Univariate Spillover Models with
Switches in the Spillover Parameters
Panel A of table 7 reports the critical value of the joint test for normality of the resid-
uals of four univariate volatility spillover models with different assumptions about the
regime-switching properties of the spillover parameters: (1) No Regimes (NRS), (2)
Common Regime Switches (CRS), (3) Independent Regime-Switches (IRS), and (4) a
fully flexible transition probability matrix for the spillover parameter states (FULL).
More detailed information about this statistic is provided in paragraph 3.3.2.1. Table
B reports the Regime Classification Measure for the different regime-switching shock
spillover models, as described in paragraph 3.3.2.2. and table 3. Panel C tests whether
the models are significantly different from one another. Column one tests whether
the model with joint regime switches perform statistically better than the constant
spillover model, column two whether the IRS and JRS are statistically different, and
column three JRS against the FULL model As in these tests the alternative hypothesis
is not specified, the likelihood ratio test statistics are compared with their empirical
distribution, obtained by a Monte Carlo analysis. In column two, likelihood ratio test
investigates whether the FULL model can be simplified to the IRS model. Given that
the latter model is nested in the former, the significance of the test statistic can be
obtained from a χ2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom. The values between brackets
represent probability values. Finally, panel D tests whether the spillover parameters are
significantly different across regimes. The Wald test is distributed as a χ2 distribution
with 1 degree of freedom. Probability levels are reported in squared brackets.
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Panel A: Specification Tests
NRS CRS IRS FULL
Austria 1106.37 32.48 46.06 39.91
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Belgium 74.92 15.70 10.75 11.85
[0.000] [0.205] [0.550] [0.458]
France 224.12 18.47 16.11 14.07
[0.000] [0.102] [0.186] [0.296]
Germany 203.72 30.95 18.84 19.47
[0.000] [0.002] [0.092] [0.078]
Ireland 97.02 16.80 17.99 19.44
[0.000] [0.157] [0.116] [0.078]
Italy 75.47 32.84 29.25 24.75
[0.000] [0.001] [0.004] [0.016]
Netherlands 36.86 13.21 15.48 17.43
[0.000] [0.354] [0.216] [0.134]
Spain 101.99 24.97 20.29 17.49
[0.000] [0.015] [0.062] [0.132]
Denmark 32.79 11.97 11.16 12.18
[0.001] [0.448] [0.515] [0.431]
Norway 131.34 13.40 8.98 7.90
[0.000] [0.341] [0.705] [0.793]
Sweden 201.00 19.83 19.48 20.08
[0.000] [0.070] [0.078] [0.064]
Switzerland 306.00 39.50 27.32 26.61
[0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.009]
UK 657.26 18.76 15.07 16.42
[0.000] [0.094] [0.238] [0.173]
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Panel B: Likelihood Ratio tests
CRS>NRS1 IRS>NRS1 FULL>CRS2 FULL>IRS3 CHOICE4
Austria 81.38 72.91 6.90 15.37 CRS
[0.000] [0.000] [0.735] [0.052]
Belgium 9.92 20.52 17.99 7.39 IRS
[0.250] [0.096] [0.055] [0.495]
France 42.24 27.90 2.42 16.76 CRS
[0.000] [0.048] [0.992] [0.033]
Germany 106.65 126.15 45.96 26.46 FULL
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Ireland 27.23 40.14 14.96 2.06 IRS
[0.000] [0.000] [0.133] [0.979]
Italy 33.49 42.12 13.16 16.96 IRS
[0.000] [0.000] [0.215] [0.031]
Netherlands 51.02 82.30 48.08 16.80 FULL
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.032]
Spain 10.40 18.60 15.84 7.64 (FULL)
[0.424] [0.133] [0.104] [0.469]
Denmark 44.14 20.60 2.68 26.22 CRS
[0.000] [0.119] [0.988] [0.001]
Norway 3.36 36.20 35.64 2.80 IRS
[0.798] [0.031] [0.000] [0.946]
Sweden 59.86 55.48 14.88 19.26 CRS
[0.000] [0.000] [0.136] [0.014]
Switzerland 70.92 69.40 20.80 22.32 CRS
[0.000] [0.000] [0.023] [0.004]
UK 120.38 128.66 19.54 11.26 IRS
[0.000] [0.000] [0.034] [0.187]
1probability values obtained through a Monte-Carlo analysis
2assumed to be distributed as a χ2 distribution with 12 degrees of freedom
3distributed as a χ2 distribution with 10 degrees of freedom
4model with highest LR test statistic. FULL is only chosen if it does statistically better
than IRS/CRS.
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Panel C: Regime Classification Measure
Implied CRS
CRS IRS FULL IRS FULL Best
Austria 32.90 52.71 29.74 70.41 42.08 CRS
89.2% 72.3% 84.8%
Belgium 63.75 33.82 54.83 48.10 77.25 IRS
76.9% 84.3% 71.2%
France 28.18 64.74 37.19 80.00 48.30 CRS
89.9% 62.8% 80.6%
Germany 31.09 44.28 49.25 60.71 62.18 CRS
89.7% 77.4% 72.7%
Ireland 25.92 43.03 41.05 60.03 58.37 CRS
91.1% 79.3% 79.9%
Italy 34.95 30.93 44.50 45.10 60.81 CRS
87.7% 85.0% 77.5%
Netherlands 38.13 33.67 41.07 47.93 61.03 CRS
87.5% 83.5% 77.90%
Spain 74.32 2.74 53.43 3.39 72.23 IRS
72.4% 98.4% 71.4%
Denmark 35.83 14.39 39.34 21.38 56.44 IRS
88.7% 92.9% 83.0%
Norway 21.25 52.71 61.27 70.41 88.77 CRS
94.1% 72.3% 64.1%
Sweden 57.55 64.08 35.27 81.09 51.38 FULL
81.6% 64.4% 81.5%
Switzerland 51.32 43.65 55.91 58.76 71.83 CRS
82.2% 58.8% 69.3%
UK 49.60 48.52 62.22 66.06 78.40 CRS
84.8% 75.4% 63.8%
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Table 8: Wald Test for difference in shock spillover parameters
This table investigates whether the shock spillover intensities for the EU and US are
statistically different across regimes. More specifically,we test the null hypotheses that
γeui (St = 1) = γ
eu
i (St = 1), and that γ
us
i (St = 1) = γ
us
i (St = 1) against the
alternative hypothesis that they are statistically different. Both Wald test statistics are
χ2 distributed with 1 degree of freedom.
EU US
Austria 3.985 5.325
[0.046] [0.021]
Belgium 22.121 8.624
[0.000] [0.003]
France 5.572 140.629
[0.018] [0.000]
Germany 38.369 49.325
[0.000] [0.000]
Ireland 26.701 11.308
[0.000] [0.001]
Italy 14.108 19.569
[0.000] [0.000]
Netherlands 3.714 4.235
[0.054] [0.040]
Spain 4.587 6.493
[0.032] [0.010]
Denmark 0.576 9.466
[0.448] [0.002]
Norway 19.243 1.256
[0.000] 0.262
Sweden 5.698 36.150
[0.017] [0.000]
Switzerland 0.017 1.319
[0.895] [0.251]
UK 13.655 2.032
[0.000] [0.154]
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Figure 3: Time-Varying Volatility Spillovers from EU and US Markets to the
Local European Equity Markets
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Chapter 4
A Multi-Asset Intertemporal
CAPM with Regime Switches in
the Prices of Risk.
4.1 Introduction
Many theoretical and empirical studies have elaborated on the relation between
the market risk premium and the conditional market variance. However, at present time,
there does not seem to be a consensus regarding the sign and magnitude of this important
relationship. The recent literature has tested conditional versions of the static CAPM of
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966), and Black (1972), in which both first and
second moments have been made time-varying and conditional on the investor’s information
set. While some studies find a significantly positive relationship between expected returns
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and the conditional market variance (French, Schwert, and Stambauch (1987), Campbell and
Hentschel (1992)), many others have found a significant negative or an insignificant positive
relationship between expected excess returns and conditional market variance (Campbell
(1987), Turner, Startz, and Nelson (1989), Baillie and DeGennaro (1990), Nelson (1991),
Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993), De Santis and I˙mrohog˘lu (1997), and Bekaert
and Wu (2000)).
This paper revisits the relationship between the expected market return and con-
ditional risk. We improve upon previous literature in four ways. First, while most studies
focus on the equity market, we estimate a joint model for the equity, bond, and money
market. In practice, the various fixed income securities comprise a substantial component
of all liquid investment opportunities. A more representative portfolio would include T-bills
and government bonds as well as stocks. In line with Bollerslev et al. (1988) and Fried-
man and Kuttner (1992), it is shown that a multi-asset single-factor model helps to solve
the issue of a positive/insignificant or negative/significant price of risk typical of univariate
unifactor models. Second, we allow for asymmetry in the conditional variance-covariance
specification. There is ample evidence that stock return volatility is negatively correlated
with stock returns (see e.g. Black (1976), Christie (1982), French et al. (1987), Schwert
(1990), Nelson (1991), Campbell and Hentschel (1992), Cheung and Ng (1993), Glosten et
al. (1993), Bae and Karolyi (1994), Braun et al. (1995), Duﬀee (1995), Ng (1996), Bekaert
and Harvey (1997), and Bekaert and Wu (2000) among others). While evidence for asym-
metry is much lower for bond and money market returns, Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2001)
find that shocks in the bond market have an asymmetric impact upon the conditional equity
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market variance. The results in this paper, which also considers the treasury bill market
apart from the government bond and equity market, suggest that the conditional equity
market variance reacts asymmetrically to both stock and treasury bill returns, but not to
government bond markets. However, we do not find evidence for asymmetry in the condi-
tional variance of treasury bill and government bond returns. Next we investigate whether
estimates for the price of market risk depend, both in sign and magnitude, upon the actual
specification of the covariance dynamics. We find that estimates are relatively stable, es-
pecially when obtained from maximizing a student − t distributed likelihood function (as
opposed to the normal distribution). Third, we extend the one-factor conditional CAPM to
a two-factor Intertemporal CAPM. As argued by Merton (1973), risk-averse rational agents
do not only want to hedge against market risk, but also against future adverse changes in
the investment opportunity set. Scruggs (1998) shows that the exclusion of intertemporal
risk factors may cause the estimated price of market risk to be biased downward, which may
explain the often statistically insignificant or even negative estimates for the price of market
risk. We find that the price of market risk continues to be positive and significant when
an intertemporal factor is allowed for. Furthermore, our results suggest the intertemporal
risk premium to be relevant for treasury bills and government bonds, both in magnitude
and statistical significance, but not for stocks. Fourth, we allow for time variation in the
prices of market and intertemporal risk. Several studies have found that the relation be-
tween conditional mean and return changes through time, see e.g. Campbell (1987), Harvey
(1989), Kandel and Stambaugh (1990), Whitelaw (1994), and Harvey (2001) among others.
Furthermore, there is some evidence that the relationship between conditional risk and re-
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turns may be nonlinear. In a theoretical paper, Veronesi (2000) shows that the relationship
between expected returns and return volatility depends nonlinearly upon the uncertainty
in the economy. Several empirical studies have related expected stock and bond returns
to conditional variances and macroeconomic fundamentals in a non-linear fashion by us-
ing the regime-switching model of Hamilton (1988, 1989, 1990, 1994). Examples are given
by Hamilton and Lin (1996), Chauvet and Potter (2001), Whitelaw (1998), Boudoukh,
Richardson, Smith, and Whitelaw (1999), Chauvet (1999), Mayfield (1999), Perez-Quiros
and Timmermann (2000, 2001), as well as the first paper in this dissertation. What these
studies typically find is that the return-risk ratio is dependent on the business cycle: ex-
pected returns required by investors per unit of volatility are larger during business cycle
troughs than during peaks. As imposing a constant and linear relationship may seriously
bias the estimated risk-return relationship, we allow the prices of market and intertemporal
risk to switch between two states according to a latent regime variable, hereby allowing for
a nonlinear relationship between market and intertemporal risk and expected returns. To
our knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate a multi-asset intertemporal CAPM with
regime switches in the prices of risk. Two regimes are identified, that appear to be related
to economic expansions and recessions respectively. While during expansions investors tend
to look more at market risk, during recessions the focus shifts to intertemporal risk.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses Merton’s (1973) Intertem-
poral CAPM, while the empirical methodology to test it is presented in section 3. The data
set is described in section 4. In section 5 the results are presented and, finally, section 6
concludes the paper.
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4.2 Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model
The asset pricing model that drives investors’ optimal portfolio choices is assumed to be
Merton’s (1973) continuous-time Intertemporal CAPM. The main intuitions behind this
theory, the asset pricing restrictions which it implies, and the discussion on the prices of
risk are briefly reviewed here.
While the static CAPM of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966), and
Black (1972) is derived under the assumption that investors live for only one period, in the
real world consumption and investment decisions span longer horizons. In such a dynamic
economy, the investment opportunity set changes over time; these changes are governed by
one or more state variables, Xl, l = 1, . . . ,m. Risk-averse rational agents will thus anticipate
and hedge against the possibility that investment opportunities may adversely change in
the future. Because of this hedging need, the equilibrium expected returns on securities
will depend not only on “systematic” or “market” risk (as in the traditional CAPM), but
also on “intertemporal” risks. As is well known, market risk is measured by the covariance
of asset returns with the market returns. Similarly, intertemporal risks are given by the
covariance of security returns with state variables.
In line with Merton (1973), it is assumed that both rates of returns on assets
and state variables follow a standard Brownian motion and that the risk-averse repre-
sentative agent maximizes his expected intertemporal utility function subject to a wealth
constraint. Let J (W (t),X(t), t) be the derived utility function of wealth, i.e. J (W,X, t) ≡
maxE
R T
t U (C, s) ds, where W (t) is the wealth value, X(t) a vector of state variables,
E the expectation operator, U (C, t) the utility function, and C(t) the instantaneous con-
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sumption flow. The solution of the optimization problem yields the following set of pricing
restrictions:
E (Ri,t+1|Ωt) = λM,t
nX
j=1
Cov (Ri,t+1, Rj,t+1, |Ωt )wj,t + (1)
mX
l=1
λFl,tCov (Ri,t+1,Xl,t+1, |Ωt ) ,
for i = 1, . . . , n. All returns, Ri,t+1, are in excess of the riskfree interest rate. E(·|Ωt) is the
expectation of excess returns on security i, Cov (Ri,t+1, Rj,t+1, |Ωt ) and Cov (Ri,t+1,Xl,t+1, |Ωt )
are, respectively, the covariance between returns on asset i and j, and the covariance be-
tween returns on security i and the state variable Xl. Both first and second moments are
conditional on the current information set Ωt. wj,t is the optimal wealth share of each
risky asset. λM,t ≡ −JWW,tWt/JW,t is the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
(provided that JWW,t < 0), where JW,t and JWW,t denote the first and second derivatives,
respectively, of J (W,X, t) with respect to W . Since λM,t measures how sensitive expected
excess returns are to changes in the market risk, it is interpreted as the price of market risk.
Similarly, since Cov (Ri,t+1,Xl,t+1, |Ωt ) measures the exposure of asset i to the risk stem-
ming from changes in the investment opportunity set, λFl,t ≡ −JWXl,t/JW,t, l = 1, . . . ,m,
can be interpreted as the price of intertemporal risk. As before, JWXl,t is the derivative of
the marginal utility of wealth with respect to the state variable Xl.
Note that the conditional multi-factor model nests the traditional CAPM as a
special case: If the marginal utility of wealth is state-independent, i.e. JWXl,t = 0, which
happens for agents with one period lives, Merton’s Intertemporal CAPM reduces to the
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classical CAPM. The second term in equation (1) reflects the need to hedge against adverse
shifts in the investment opportunity set. A change in Xl such that future consumption
decreases given future wealth represents an “unfavorable” shift in investment opportunities.
As long as JW,t > 0 and investors are risk-averse, i.e. JWW,t < 0, the price
of market risk must be always positive. However, the model does not impose any sign
restriction on the price of intertemporal risk. In particular, if JWXl,t > 0 (< 0), λFl,t is
negative (positive). When λFl,t and Cov (Ri,t+1,Xl,t+1, |Ωt ) have the same sign, the risk
premium required to hold asset i increases; vice-versa, if the price of intertemporal risk and
the covariance between the return on security i and the state variable Xl have diﬀerent
signs, the required total risk premium should decrease.
4.3 The Empirical Model
As in Bollerslev, Engle, and Woolridge (1988), we suppose that the return on the
US market portfolio is given by the market weighted returns on three assets, being the
return on the broad US equity market portfolio rS,t, the return on a 10 year US government
bond rB,t, and the return on a 6-month US Treasury bill rTB,t. Suppose the return vector
is represented by rt = [rS,t, rB,t, rTB,t]
0 , while the respective weights of the diﬀerent assets
at time t are given by wt = [wS,t, wB,t, wTB,t]
0 . Furthermore, we consider the case of one
intertemporal risk factor only. Consequently, we have that n = 3, and m = 1. Under the
assumption that investors are rational, the set of pricing restrictions in equation (1) provides
the following statistical model:
187
rt+1 = λM,t
3X
j=1
hj,t+1wj,t + λF,thn+1,t+1 + εM,t+1, (2)
where rt+1 represents the 3×1 vector of security excess returns, hj,t+1 is the 3×1 vector of
conditional variance/covariances of each asset with itself/others, hn+1,t+1 the 3×1 vector of
conditional covariances of each security with the state variable, and εM,t+1 the 3× 1 vector
of conditional error terms. As before, λM,t and λF,t are, respectively, the prices of market
and intertemporal risk, while wj,t is the optimal wealth share of risky asset j.
The theoretical model does not impose any restriction on the parametrization of
the dynamics of the intertemporal risk factors. We remove the expected part of the factor
by regressing the factor ft+1 upon a constant, and lags of the factor ft, as well as of the
asset returns:
ft = β0 +
LX
l=1
(β1lft−l + β2lrS,t−l + β3lrB,t−l + β4lrTB,t−l) + εf,t+1 (3)
where L is the optimal lag length. As argued in the introduction, a proper test of this model
requires a good specification of the conditional variance-covariance matrix of εt = [εM,t, εf,t].
In this paper, we use the BEKK model of Baba et al. (1989), Engle and Kroner (1995),
and Kroner and Ng (1998), extended as to allow for asymmetry:
Ht+1 = VV
0
+Aεtε0tA
0 +BHtB0+Dηtη
0
tD
0 (4)
where
ηt−1 = max {−εt, 0} (5)
and V, A, B, D are 4× 4 matrices of unknown parameters1, with elements vij , aij , bij ,
1Note that V is an upper triangular matrix. Therefore it only contains [(n+m) (n+m+ 1)] /2 unknown
parameters. V0V is, in fact, a Cholesky decomposition of the GARCH constant term, which ensures the
positive definiteness of the process.
188
and dij . This model has several advantages over other multivariate GARCH models. The
constant correlation model of Bollerslev (1990) restricts the correlations to be constant over
time, which contradicts with the recent evidence of time-varying correlations (see e.g. Erb et
al. (1994), Longin and Solnik (2001), Ang and Bekaert (2002), and Ang and Chen (2002)).
The vech model of Bollerslev et al. (1988) does even have a larger number of parameters than
the BEKK model, while the positive definiteness is not guaranteed during unconstrained
estimation. The factor ARCH of Engle et al. (1990) assumes that the covariance matrix is
driven by the conditional variance of one asset, which seems overly restrictive in the current
setting. Finally, the dynamic correlation model of Engle (2000) has not been extended yet
to a GARCH-M context.
An important drawback of the BEKK model is the large number of parameters to
estimate. Unconstrained, a system of 4 equations has 58 parameters. To keep the size of
the parameters manageable, we impose additional constraints. Surprisingly, the variance-
covariance structure between stocks and short and long bonds has not been extensively
analyzed, even less when asymmetric eﬀects are allowed for. In the empirical part, we
impose diﬀerent constraints upon the general BEKK model. While we oﬀer an economic
rationale for the constraints we impose, ultimately, we let the data decide about the required
degree of complexity of the BEKK model.
Merton’s Intertemporal CAPM will be first estimated assuming that the prices
of market and intertemporal risk are constant. Thereafter, they are allowed to vary over
time, but to take on two values only. In particular, the coeﬃcient of risk aversion will be
equal to either λM1 or λM2, and the prices of intertemporal risk to either λF1 or λF2. Let
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St be the latent state variable that governs time variation in both the price of market and
intertemporal risk. At each point in time, the price of market risk is
λM,t =



λM1 if St = 1
λM2 if St = 2
while the prices of intertemporal risk are
λF,t =



λF1 if St = 1
λF2 if St = 2
The time evolution of the unobserved state variable St is assumed to follow a first-order
Markov chain:
P (St = 1|St−1 = 1) = p
P (St = 2|St−1 = 2) = q
where p and q represent the constant probabilities of remaining in the past state. Similarly,
1 − p and 1− q are the constant probabilities of switching between states. The transition
probability matrix is then given by
Π =


p 1− p
1− q q


while the mean equation is given by
rt+1 = λM (St)
3X
j=1
hj,t+1wj,t + λF (St)h4,t+1 + εt, (6)
Thanks to the transition probabilities, it is possible to determine the ex-ante probabilities,
conditional on information available up to time t:
P (St+1 = k|Ωt; θ) =
2X
j=1
P (St+1 = k|St = j)P (St = j|Ωt; θ) , k = 1, 2 (7)
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where θ is the vector of unknown parameters and P (St = j|Ωt; θ) represents the filtered
probability, which indicates the state of the economy at time t. By Bayes’ rule, the latter
can be written as
P (St = k|Ωt; θ) = f (Gt+1|St = k,Ωt; θ)P (St = k|Ωt−1; θ)2P
j=1
f (Gt+1|St = j,Ωt; θ)P (St = j|Ωt−1; θ)
, k = 1, 2 (8)
where f (Gt+1|St = k,Ωt; θ) is the likelihood function for the data conditional on the in-
formation set and the latent regime variable St, and Gt+1 = [rt+1, ft+1]
0 is the vector of
asset returns and the intertemporal risk factor. Given the conditional density function and
initial starting values for the ex ante probabilities, equations (7) and (8) can be iterated
recursively to compute the state probabilities and the parameters of the likelihood function.
The conditional density function is assumed to follow a multivariate normal dis-
tribution within each state:
f (Gt |St−1 = k,Ωt−1; θ ) = 1p
2πn |Ht (θ)|
exp(εt (θ,St−1 = k)0Ht (θ)−1 εt (θ,St−1 = k))
(8)
where n = 3. The parameters of the model are estimated by maximizing the following
loglikelihood function with respect to θ:
L (Gt |Ωt−1; θ ) =
TX
t=1
lnφ (Gt |Ωt−1; θ ) , (7)
where the density function φ (.) is a weighted average of the two state-dependent densities:
φ (Gt |Ωt−1; θ ) =
2X
j=1
f (Gt|St−1 = j,Ωt−1; θ)P (St−1 = j|Ωt−2; θ)
where the weights P (St−1 = j|Ωt−2; θ) are the ex-ante probabilities derived in equation (7).
191
The parameters of the model are estimated by maximizing the following likelihood function
with respect to θ:
L (Gt |Ωt−1; θ ) =
TX
t=1
lnφ (Gt |Ωt−1; θ ) , (7)
where Gt+1 = [rt+1 ft+1]
0 is the vector of asset returns and factors and T is the sample size.
The conditional density function φ (Gt |Ωt−1; θ ) is assumed to follow a multivariate normal
distribution:
φ (Gt |Ωt−1; θ ) = 1p
2πn |Ht (θ)|
exp(εt (θ)0Ht (θ)−1 εt (θ)) (8)
even though we will also consider multivariate student − t distribution. The vector of
unknown parameters θ is estimated by combining two numerical algorithms of optimization:
The Newton-Raphson and the BHHH (Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman, 1974) methods.
The former, though more primitive, has proved useful in identifying the optimal region in
the parameter space; the latter is a refinement of the first and is widely used in the empirical
GARCH literature.
4.4 Data Diagnosis
In the spirit of Bollerslev et al. (1988), a portfolio composed of three assets is
considered: US stocks, 6-month US Treasury bills, and 10-year US government bonds. This
allows for the inclusion of a large variety of liquid investment opportunities. All observations
are from the last trading day of the month, and cover a period from January 29 1960 to
December 31 1998, for a total sample size of 468. All returns are in excess of the 1-month
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risk-free rate as computed by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the
University of Chicago. To measure total (excess) stock returns, the S&P 500 composite
index is used, which is market-value-weighted and includes dividends. Holding returns on
6-month T-bills and 10-year government bonds are again from CRSP.
The market values of corporate equities are from the Flows of Funds Accounts
of the United States (Federal Reserve), while the maturity distribution of interest-bearing
public debt held by private investors is taken from the Federal Reserve Bulletin and the
Treasury Bulletin. Data on the outstanding public debt are provided in par values and,
therefore, need to be converted into market values. This is accomplished by multiplying
the diﬀerent maturity categories of the debt, (i.e. within 1 year, 1 to 5 years, 5 to 10 years,
and 10 years and over), by the price indices computed by Cox (1985).
Descriptive statistics for the three assets are given in Table 1. Panel 1A shows that
all distributions are skewed and leptokurtic at the 1% significance level, a clear indication
of non-normality. This is confirmed by the Jarque-Bera normality test. The Ljung-box
(LB) statistic indicates that excess equity and 10-year government bonds returns exhibit
no autocorrelation. As for the excess holding yields on 6-month T-bills, autocorrelation
is somewhat more relevant, as the Ljung-Box statistics is significant at the 1% level. An
ARCH tests (of order 12) on the other hand reveals significant heteroskedasticity in all
series, suggesting the need for a conditional heteroskedasticity model.
Unconditional correlations among assets (Panel 1B) are all positive and significant
at a 1% level. The magnitude of the correlation coeﬃcients suggests that diversification
across assets is beneficial. Finally, unconditional correlations among squared returns (Panel
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1C) are all significant at a 1% level.
Finally, Figure 2 plots the weights of the three assets over time. Over the full
sample, the market portfolio is largely dominated by stocks (about 70 percent), compared
to about 10 percent for treasury bills and 20 percent for bonds.
4.5 Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results obtained from the econometric procedure de-
scribed in section 3. First, we present the estimation results for a multi-asset conditional
CAPM with constant prices of market risk. In our three asset setup, systematic risk for each
asset is a market-weighted average of the asset’s own conditional variance, and its covari-
ances with the other assets. Therefore, estimation results for the price of market risk may
very well depend upon a correct specification of the conditional variances and covariances.
We first evaluate the performance of a general asymmetric BEKK model, and then test
the potential validity of some more restricted models. Furthermore, we investigate to what
extent the estimates for the price of market risk depend upon (1) the specific conditional
variance-covariance specification, (2) the inclusion of an intercept, and (3) the choice of the
distribution in the likelihood function. Scruggs (1998) argued that the price of market risk
may be biased downwards when no intertemporal risk factor is allowed for. Therefore, in
section two, we extend the model to a multi-asset intertemporal CAPM. Given the strong
leading indicator properties of the short rate (see e.g. Fama (1981) and more recently Ang
et al. (2003)), we choose the yield on a 3-month treasury bill as an extra factor. Finally, in
section 5.3., we allow for time variation in both the price of market and intertemporal risk
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by means of a regime-switching model.
4.5.1 A Multi-Asset Conditional CAPM with Constant Price of Market
Risk
In this section, the following model is estimated:
rt+1 = c+ λM
3X
j=1
hj,t+1wj,t + εt+1, (4.1)
εt+1|Ωt ∼ i.i.d. N (0,Ht+1) (4.2)
Ht+1 = VV
0
+Aεtε
0
tA
0 +BHtB0+Dηtη
0
tD
0 (4.3)
ηt = max {−εt−1, 0} (4.4)
where rt+1 represents the 3 × 1 vector of security excess returns (respectively on Stocks,
Treasury Bills, and Long-Term Government Bonds), λM is the constant price of market
risk, wj,t is the wealth share of each risky asset. εt is a 3× 1 vector of innovations that is
normally distributed with zero mean and variance-covariance Ht. Finally, V,A,B, and D
are 3× 3 parameter matrices2.
Variance-Covariance Dynamics
Panel A of Table 2 reports the estimation results for the full asymmetric BEKK-
in-mean model. One problem with the BEKK model is that many of the parameters enter
the variance-covariance equations in quadratic form. Therefore, similar to Bekaert and Wu
(2000), we discuss the estimation results using the more informative vech representation of
Bollerslev et al. (1988), which shows directly the sensitivity of the conditional variance to
2V is an lower triangular matrix of intercepts.
195
past conditional variances and covariances, past squared residuals and cross residuals, as
well as to past squared asymmetric shocks and cross-asymmetric shocks. Panel B and C
of Table 2 show the estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors for the conditional variance
and covariance series respectively. Quasi-maximum likelihood standard errors are obtained
by applying the delta method to the original variance-covariance matrix.
Conditional Variances Panel B of Table 2 reports the estimation results for the variance
equations. For all markets, the coeﬃcient on the lagged conditional volatility is significant
at a 1 percent level. Interestingly, the persistence of the money and bond market is substan-
tially higher than that of the equity market: 0.81 and 0.76 versus 0.50. This may in part
be explained by the large and significant relationship between conditional equity market
volatility and past bond market volatility. This suggest that turmoil in the bond market
also increases total conditional risk in the equity markets. Apart from this link, there is
no evidence that lagged variances in one market determine conditional volatility in another
market.
We find that the conditional volatility of both the government bond and treasury
bill market increases in response to both bond and treasury bill return shocks. The coeﬃ-
cients on the squared own returns shocks are 0.25 for the treasury bill market, and 0.32 for
the government bond market. Furthermore, squared shocks in the treasury bill market have
a positive and significant eﬀect on the bond market, and the other way around. Notice that
the eﬀect of a return shock in the treasury bill market on the bond market’s conditional
variance is about twice the size of the eﬀect of bond market innovations on the treasury
bill conditional variance (0.083 vs. 0.047). Interestingly, shocks in the equity market do
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not appear to have any eﬀect on the conditional treasury bill and bond market volatility.
Finally, we do not find evidence for asymmetry in both markets, as none of the parame-
ters related to the own and other market’s squared asymmetric residuals enter significantly.
This suggests that changes in the conditional bond and bill market volatility depend on the
magnitude, but not the sign of treasury bill and bond market returns.
Findings are markedly diﬀerent for the equity market. While none of the coeﬃ-
cients on the squared residuals are significant, there is strong evidence for asymmetry. More
specifically, the conditional equity market volatility increases in response to negative return
shocks in both the equity and treasury bill market, but is virtually unaﬀected by positive
return shocks. The coeﬃcients on the asymmetric equity and treasury bill return innova-
tions are respectively 0.10 and 0.58. While asymmetry in equity return volatility is well
known, the asymmetric response to treasury bill market shocks is to my knowledge a new
result. Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2001) estimated a bivariate model for equity and bond
market returns, and found that conditional equity market volatility reacts asymmetrically
to bond return innovations. The results in this paper, which also considers the treasury bill
market apart from the bond and equity market, suggest that the asymmetry goes primarily
through the treasury bill market.
Some other features of the estimates for the conditional equity market volatility are
noteworthy. First, persistency appears to be much lower than estimates commonly obtained
from univariate GARCH model, or from diagonal BEKK models. Explicitly allowing for
dependency upon lagged shocks in bond and treasury bill markets greatly reduces the overall
persistency of the conditional equity market volatility. This is somehow in accordance with
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the results obtained by Glosten et al. (1993) and Scruggs (1998). They found that the
estimated persistency of the conditional equity market variance greatly decreases when the
nominal short term interest rate is included as an additional instrument in the variance
equation. Second, while conditional equity market volatility reacts strongly to negative
equity and treasury bill shocks, the sensitivity to squared equity market shocks is extremely
low (0.002). In fact, one of the disadvantages of the BEKK model is that it does not allow
for a so called strong form of asymmetric volatility, where positive return shocks decrease
conditional volatility. Further research may therefore consider models that do allow such
behavior, e.g. the asymmetric dynamic covariance (ADC) model of Kroner and Ng (1998).
The news impact curves of Engle and Ng (1993) are a useful graphical tool to in-
vestigate the diﬀerent impact of news implied by the various volatility models. These curves
shows how past return shocks aﬀect the conditional volatility, holding the past conditional
variances constant at their unconditional sample mean. As we did not find evidence for
asymmetry in the conditional volatility of treasury bills and government bond, we restrict
the analysis here to stock market volatility. Figure 3 shows the impact of respectively eq-
uity market and treasury bill shocks on the conditional equity market volatility. Shocks
range from -5% to 5%. The grey and black line show respectively the impact of a return
shock implied by a symmetric and asymmetric BEKK model. One can directly see that the
impact of news is markedly diﬀerent for a symmetric and asymmetric model. First, both
negative equity market and treasury bill return innovations have a much higher impact on
the conditional equity market variance in the asymmetric model. Second, equity market
volatility hardly increases in response to positive return innovations when the asymmetric
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BEKK specification is assumed to be the correct model, while the symmetric model im-
plies an equal response to positive and negative shocks of the same order. In Figure 4,
we plot a bivariate generalization of the news impact curve. Panel A and B plot the news
impact surface for the symmetric and asymmetric model respectively. The surface shows
the impact of shocks in the equity market (X-axis) and the treasury bill market (Y-axis)
on the conditional equity market variance. The graph clearly shows that the conditional
equity market variance increases most when both equity market and treasury bill shocks are
negative, while positive shocks in any of the markets do appear to have a negligible eﬀect
only on the conditional equity market variance.
Finally, Figure 5 plots the conditional variances of respectively the equity, treasury,
and government bond markets. Stock market volatility increases in the early ’70s, a period
of recession as reported by NBER, during the contraction following the first oil shock in
1973, at the time of the stock market crash in 1987, and during the 1997/1998 Asian-
Russian-Latin-American crisis. Conditional T-bill volatility has a first peak during the
economic crisis following the first oil shock in 1973. Volatility is especially high between
1979 and 1982, a period in which the Federal Reserve deviated from its usual practice of
targeting interest rates, preferring nonborrowed reserves. Finally, the money market also
suﬀered from the stock market crash in 1987. Bond market volatility increased slightly
during the economic recession at the beginning of the 1970s, but raised considerably in the
early 1980s due to the Federal Reserve’s new policy. It is only in the 1990s that government
bond return volatility dropped to the low levels of the 1960s and the second half of the
1970s.
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Conditional Covariances Panel C of Table 2 reports the impact of past variances,
covariances, squared and cross (asymmetric) residuals on conditional covariances. Again,
we use the more informative vech representation of the BEKK model. To increase the
readability of the tables, we omit parameters that are smaller than 0.0253.
The conditional covariance between equity market and treasury bill returns ap-
pears to be driven by events in the treasury bill and bond market rather than in the equity
market. More specifically, the covariance does not seem to be related to both squared and
asymmetric innovations in the equity market, and neither to the level of equity market
volatility. On the other hand, both shocks in the treasury bill and bond market have a
positive eﬀect on the covariance between equity and treasury bill returns. Moreover, a
negative innovation in the treasury bill market further increases the conditional covariance:
a positive unit shock raises conditional covariance with 0.12, while a negative shock raises
the covariance by 0.17. This pattern is clearly reflected in Panel A of Figure 6, which
plots the news impact surface, assuming that there are no shocks in the government bond
market. Further evidence in favor of asymmetry is oﬀered by the cross product of asym-
metric residuals. All combinations of jointly negative return innovations result in higher
conditional covariance between stocks and bills. While stock market shocks, both positive
and negative, do not seem to aﬀect the conditional covariance between stocks and treasury
bills, both positive and negative treasury bill shocks have a positive but asymmetric impact
on the conditional covariance. Finally, the relation between treasury bill and equity market
returns depends positively on past volatility in the treasury bill market, and on the covari-
ance between bonds and bills. Surprisingly, the equity-bill market covariance is strongly
3In addition, none of the omitted parameters proved to be statistically significant.
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negatively related to its own covariance. The covariance series is plotted in the top panel of
Figure 7. The covariance is relatively low during normal periods, but increases when there
are more pronounced shocks in the bond and treasury bill market.
The results for the conditional covariance between equity and bond market are to
a large extent similar to the ones for the equity and bill market. The main diﬀerence is the
strong negative eﬀect of negative innovations in the treasury bill market on the covariance
between stocks and bonds, which, as is especially apparent from the right graph in Panel
B of Figure 6, neutralizes most of the increase in covariance resulting from the symmetric
part of the model.
The covariance between treasury bill and bond market returns (see bottom graph
of Figure 7) is quite persistent: 78% of the previous period’s covariance is transferred to the
predicted covariance. In addition, the covariance reacts positively to squared innovations
in both the treasury bill and bond market, but negatively to their cross product. This
explains why the news impact surface plotted in Panel C of Figure 6 is close to zero when
both treasury bill and bond market shocks are negative.
Likelihood Ratio Tests While the asymmetric BEKK is a very general model for the
variance-covariance dynamics of asset returns, its disadvantage is the large number of para-
meters to be estimated. In this section, we investigate the potential validity of some more
restrictive models.
In table 3, we present a number of likelihood ratio tests, taking the full asymmetric
BEKK model as a benchmark model. First, we test whether the often imposed assumption
of symmetric A, B, and D parameter matrices is accepted by the data. The likelihood
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Ratio tests soundly rejects this assumption. This does not come as a surprise, given that
the results from the full specification clearly indicated that shocks from one market to the
other are not reversed with an identical intensity. For instance, while treasury bill market
shocks have a strong eﬀect on equity market variance, the opposite is not at all true. Not
surprisingly, also the assumption of diagonal A, B, and D parameter matrices is strongly
rejected, as is the even more restrictive Ding-Engle specification4. The next four tests
focus on asymmetric eﬀects. We respectively reject the assumption of no asymmetry at all
(D =0), no cross-asymmetry (diagonal D), as well as the restriction of asymmetry in the
equity returns only (D =0, except for d11). Finally, we cannot reject that only the three
most significant asymmetry parameters from the full specification, d11, d12, d23, diﬀer from
zero. Therefore, as to reduce the number of parameters, in what follows, we impose the
constraint that only d11, d12, d23 are non-zero in the D parameter matrix. These parameters
take care respectively of the asymmetric impact of equity market returns on equity market
volatility, and of the asymmetric shock transmission from the treasury bill market to the
equity market, and the bond to the treasury bill market. A similar procedure is followed for
theA and B parameter matrices. While both the assumption of a diagonalA and B matrix
are soundly rejected by the data, the likelihood ratio test suggests that the parameters
a12, a13, a21, a31, b21, b23, b31, b32 are redundant. The constrains (a21, a31, b21, b31) eliminate
eﬀects from the stock to the other markets, which did not prove to be important, both
in size and significance level. A similar argument holds for b23 and b32, which govern the
volatility dependency between the treasury bill and bond markets. Finally, results from
4Ding and Engle (1994) showed that under the assumption of covariance stationarity, the intercept term
can be substituted by H0 (110 − aa0 − bb0) , where H0 is the unconditional covariance matrix of the residuals,
and a and b the diagonal elements of the A and B respectively.
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the full model did not suggest significant shock spillovers from the treasury bill and bond
market to the equity market, so that a12 = a13 = 0.
Relationship between Expected (excess) Returns and Conditional Risk
Estimates of the price of market risk are reported in Table 4. Panel A reports
quasi-maximum likelihood estimates obtained by maximizing a normally distributed likeli-
hood function. As argued before, estimates for the price of market risk may depend upon
the specification of the variance-covariance dynamics. Therefore, we report estimates for
the price of market risk under various assumptions about the dynamics of the variance-
covariance matrix.
When the constant is omitted from the model, estimates for the price of market
risk are positive, significant, and remarkably similar across models. The only case when
the price of market risk is negative (and insignificant) is when no asymmetry is allowed for.
Parameter estimates for the other models range from 3.84 to 4.09, and are all significant at
a 5 percent level. For none of the specifications, a likelihood ratio test could not reject the
null hypothesis of equal prices of risk across the three assets.
However, as argued by e.g. Scruggs (1998), estimates for λM may be biased
upwards when no intercept is allowed for. Because both the average excess market return
and the conditional market volatility are positive, the slope is forced to be positive when
no constant term is included. Scruggs (1998) estimates a univariate conditional CAPM for
the U.S. equity market and finds that the price of market risk becomes insignificant when
a constant term is introduced. Therefore, we estimate the diﬀerent specifications with a
constant. The results are contained in the last three columns of Panel A of table 4. The
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likelihood ratio test in the last column tests the null hypothesis of a zero intercept. In
none of the specifications, the intercept is significantly diﬀerent from zero. Despite this,
the inclusion of a constant term has a large impact on the estimate for the price of market
risk. While in all specifications, the estimated price of market risk is positive, it becomes
insignificant in three of the five instances. The results also show that the conclusions may
depend upon the variance specification chosen, as the price of market risk is positive and
significant when e.g. a symmetric BEKK is used to model conditional heteroskedasticity. As
a conclusion, we find that the price of market risk is positive, does not diﬀer across assets,
but that both the size and significance depends upon the specification of the variance-
covariance dynamics as well as on the inclusion of an intercept.
While previous work has considered the robustness of estimates for the price of
market risk to the inclusion of an intercept and diﬀerent conditional risk specifications, no
one has to my knowledge investigated the role of the distribution chosen for the likelihood
function. Therefore, we have estimated the diﬀerent models assuming a student− t distrib-
uted likelihood function. The estimation results are contained in Panel B of Table 4. Similar
to previous findings, the intercept is not statistically significant from zero. Interestingly, the
price of market risk continues to be significant when an intercept is included. This suggests
that a student− t distributed likelihood function may provide for a better approximation of
the joint return distribution. Low standard errors relative to univariate models may also be
the result of the multi-asset approach of this paper, as adding more information increases
the power of the tests. These results also suggest that the weak relation between expected
returns and risk may be caused by the omission of additional assets rather than the omission
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of extra priced risk factors, as argued by Scruggs (1998).
Specification Tests Table 5 reports a number of specification tests on the standardized
residuals of the diﬀerent models. The standardized residuals are computed as (P0t)
−1 εt,
whereHt =P0tPt.We consider both estimation results obtained from minimizing a normally
and student-t distributed likelihood function. Similar to Bekaert and Harvey (1997), we
use the generalized method of moments by Hansen (1982) to test a number of moment
conditions generally associated with a well specified model. MEAN tests whether the means
and three autocorrelations of the standardized residuals are zero, while VAR tests whether
the means and three autocorrelations of the squared standardized residuals are statistically
diﬀerent from 1. For the individual assets, both tests are asymptotically χ2 distributed
with 4 degrees of freedom, while the joint test statistic is χ2 distributed with 12 degrees of
freedom. COV tests whether there is third order autocorrelation left in the standardized
cross residuals (product of a pair of residuals divided by their corresponding conditional
covariance), and is distributed as a χ2(3) for the individual assets, and as a χ2(9) for a joint
test. Finally, SKEWNESS and KURTOSIS test whether there is skewness and kurtosis left
in the standardized residuals. Both are distributed as a χ2(1). Notice that both the size
of the sample as well as the use of estimated residuals may imply that the test statistics
no longer follow a chi-square distribution. A Monte Carlo analysis performed in Bekaert
and Harvey (1997) shows however that by evaluating at the asymptotic critical values, one
tends to over-reject the null hypothesis of a correct specification, making this a conservative
test.
As can be seen from the first part of Table 5, the MEAN test does not provide
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evidence against the specification for equity and bond returns. There is however autocor-
relation left in the standardized treasury bill errors, which is not surprising given the large
autoregressive components in treasury bill returns at the one hand, and the absence of
lagged returns in the specification of the mean equation. Results from the VAR test show a
similar picture, at least for the estimates obtained from a normally distributed likelihood.
The VAR test statistic for bills is substantially lower when the model is estimated with a
student-t distributed likelihood, even though this is somehow at the detriment of the results
for bonds. Finally, results contained in the second part of Table 5 suggest that the various
models do well in modelling the covariance dynamics between the various asset’s returns
(COV). Furthermore, as can be seen from the SKEWNESS and KURTOSIS test statistics,
the models do absorb the skewness and kurtosis observed in the raw data rather well.
While the full asymmetric BEKK model often has the lowest test statistics, the
result do not seem to depend too much on the actual specification of the conditional variance-
covariance dynamics. Test statistics are however on average slightly lower when results are
obtained from maximizing a student-t distributed likelihood function.
4.5.2 A Multi-Asset Intertemporal CAPM with Constant Prices of Risk
In this section, we present estimation results for a multi-asset Intertemporal CAPM.
This model extends the traditional conditional CAPM with one intertemporal risk factor,
as to allow investors to hedge against adverse changes in the investment opportunity set.
Similar to Scruggs (1998), we investigate whether the estimates for the price of market
risk are robust to the inclusion of an intertemporal risk factor. As an additional factor,
we choose the three-month nominal interest rate. This variable has been widely used in
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the stock return predictability literature, see e.g. Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), Campbell
(1987), Harvey (1989), Ferson (1990), Ferson and Harvey (1991, 1993), Whitelaw (1994),
Pesaran and Timmermann (1995), Pontiﬀ and Schall (1998), Ferson and Harvey (1999),
and Bossaerts and Hillion (1999) among others. Recently, Ang and Bekaert (2002) showed
that the nominal short-rate is a more robust predictor of stock returns than dividend and
earnings yield. Furthermore, evidence in Ang et al. (2003) suggest that the short rate may
be a better predictor of GDP growth than the e.g. term spread. Furthermore, we allow both
the price of market and intertemporal risk to be diﬀerent for each asset. More specifically,
the following model is estimated:
rt+1 = c+ λM ¯
3X
j=1
hj,t+1wj,t + λF ¯ h4,t+1 + εM,t+1, (4.5)
ft+1 = β0 + β1ft + β2rS,t + β3rB,t + β4rTB,t + εf,t+1 (4.6)
εt+1 = [εM,t+1, εf,t+1]
0|Ωt ∼ i.i.d. Student− t (0,Ht+1, ν) (4.7)
Ht+1 = VV
0
+Aεtε
0
tA
0 +BHtB0+Dηtη
0
tD
0 (4.8)
ηt = max {−εt−1, 0} (4.9)
where rt+1 represents the 3 × 1 vector of security excess returns (respectively on Stocks,
Treasury Bills, and Long-Term Government Bonds), λM is the asset dependent constant
prices of market risk, wj,t is the wealth share of each risky asset, hj,t+1 is the 3× 1 vector
of conditional variance/covariances of asset j with the other assets, ft+1 the time t − 1
level of the three-month nominal US treasury bill rate, h4,t+1 the 3×1 vector of conditional
covariances of each asset with innovations in the intertemporal risk factor, and λF the asset
dependent constant prices of intertemporal risk. Given the evidence in the previous section,
we estimate the parameters of this model by maximizing a student−t distributed likelihood
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function with ν degrees of freedom. To limit the number of parameters, we assume that A
and B are diagonal matrices, while asymmetry is only allowed in the volatility specification
for equity returns. We think this is justified for the following reasons. First, results in the
previous section suggest that estimates for the price of market risk are not overly sensitive
to the actual choice of the variance-covariance specification. Second, it is important to keep
the parameter space small in anticipation of the specification with time-varying prices of
market and intertemporal risk in the next section.
The parameter estimates are contained in Panel A of Table 6. We allow both the
price of market and intertemporal risk to be diﬀerent across assets. The price of market risk
is positive and significant for all assets, even if an intercept is allowed for. A Likelihood Ratio
test in Panel B of Table 6 shows that the intercept is not significantly diﬀerent from zero.
Further tests indicate that the prices of market risk are jointly diﬀerent from zero, but not
diﬀerent across assets. The price of intertemporal risk is negative and significant for treasury
bills and government bonds, but positive and insignificant for equity returns. A Likelihood
Ratio tests clearly rejects the null hypothesis of a jointly zero price of intertemporal risk. As
for the price of market risk, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal prices of intertemporal
risk, even though this is probably to a large extent caused by the large standard error
for λF,S . Specification tests in Panel C are overall in support of the specification. More
specifically, in the majority of the cases, test statistics are lower than those implied by
estimates of the multi-asset conditional CAPM in the previous section. The MEAN tests
continues to indicate autocorrelation in the disturbance term for treasury bills, even though
the test statistic is much lower.
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Figure 8 plots the market (MRP), intertemporal (IRP), and the total risk premium
(TRP) for each asset. Notice that as over the whole sample the market portfolio never has
less than 60% equity, the total market risk premia is dominated by the conditional equity
market variance (for equity), and by the conditional covariance with equity returns (for
treasury bills and bonds).
As can be seen from Panel A, the total risk premium for stocks is dominated by
the market risk premium. Not only is the price of intertemporal risk insignificant for stocks,
the total intertemporal risk premium is in addition very small. Therefore, the total risk
premium mimics closely the conditional equity market variance, which rises at the beginning
of the 1960s, during the recession at the start of the 1970s, during the contraction caused
by the first oil shock in 1973, at the time of stock market crash, and finally during the
1997/1998 Asian-Russian-Latin-American crisis.
Panel B plots the diﬀerent components of the total risk premium for treasury
bills. From the intertemporal risk premium picture, being λF,TB < 0, it is evident that
the covariance between the returns on treasury bills and the short rate is almost always
negative. The negative price of intertemporal risk means that the elasticity of marginal
utility of wealth with respect to the short rate is positive, i.e. JW,SR > 0. Fama (1981)
showed that unobserved negative shocks to real economic activity induce a higher nominal
short rate through an increase in the current and expected future inflation rate. Therefore,
λF,TB < 0 means that when the short rate goes up, signalling a recession, the marginal
utility of wealth increases as well, hereby increasing the risk premium for treasury bills.
This indicates that treasury bills follow a kind of pro-cyclical pattern, and can therefore
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not be considered a good hedge against inflation. The market risk premium for government
bonds, depicted in Panel C, shows a similar pattern to the premium for treasury bills.
The intertemporal risk premium is positive most of the times, which indicates that also
government bonds do not serve as a hedge against business cycle contractions.
Figure 9 plots the contribution of the intertemporal risks premium as a proportion
of the total risk premium over time. To improve the readability, we report Hodrick-Prescott
filtered proportions. The intertemporal risk premium has a positive impact upon the total
risk premium for bonds during the crises at the beginning of the 1970s, during the period
of volatile interest rates at the beginning of the 1980s, during the economic crisis at the
beginning of the 1990s, and during the 1997/1998 Asian-Russian-Latin-American crisis.
Similar to what we have found before, the intertemporal risk premium does only contribute
in a minor way to the total risk premium.
4.5.3 A Multi-Asset Intertemporal CAPM with Time-Varying Prices of
Risk
In the previous paragraphs, we have kept the price of market and intertemporal
risk constant over time. While the original Merton model does not allow explicitly for
time variation in the prices of risk, a large literature has emerged showing that prices of
market risk (coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion) vary with economic conditions (see e.g.
Campbell (1987), Harvey (1989), Kandel and Stambaugh (1990), Whitelaw (1994), and
Harvey (2001) among others). In an attempt to capture structural changes in preferences
or wealth distribution, most papers use a set of information variables that proxy for business
cycle conditions. One potential danger of this approach is that the relation between risk and
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return may be superimposed by the econometician by the choice of the information variables.
Furthermore, there is some evidence that the relationship between conditional risk and
returns may be nonlinear. In a theoretical paper, Veronesi (2000) shows that the relationship
between expected returns and return volatility depends nonlinearly upon the uncertainty
in the economy. This observation has been confirmed empirically by Hamilton and Lin
(1996), Chauvet and Potter (2001), Whitelaw (1998), Boudoukh, Richardson, Smith, and
Whitelaw (1999), Chauvet (1999), Mayfield (1999), Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000,
2001), who use regime-switching methodology to introduce time variation in the price of
market risk. The literature on time-varying prices of intertemporal risk is quite scarce. In
a recent paper though, Gerard and Wu (2003) show that also the price of intertemporal
risk varies with the business cycle. In this section, we make both the price of market
and intertemporal risk time-varying by means of Hamilton’s regime-switching model. This
model has the advantage of being nonlinear, while no a priori assumptions are made about
the factors driving changes in the degree of risk aversion. To economize on parameters,
we assume that both the price of market and intertemporal risk are driven by the same
latent variable. We do allow however the price of intertemporal risk to diﬀer between
assets, so that λF = [λF,S , λF,TB, λF,B, ]
0 . Given the evidence that prices of market risk are
not statistically diﬀerent across assets, we assume λM to be the same for all assets. More
specifically, the following model is estimated:
rt+1 = c+ λM (St)
3X
j=1
hj,t+1wj,t + λF (St)¯ h4,t+1 + εM,t+1,
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where the latent regime variable is defined as:
Pr (St = 1|St−1 = 1) = p
Pr (St = 2|St−1 = 2) = q
where P and Q represent the constant probabilities of staying in the past state. Finally,
the transition probability matrix is defined as:
Π =


p 1− p
1− q q


The variance-covariance matrix Ht+1 and the specification for the intertemporal risk pre-
mium are as in the previous section.
Estimation results are contained in Panel A of Table 7. First, parameter estimates
do not seem to depend much upon the inclusion of a constant. Moreover, the likelihood
ratio test in Panel B cannot reject that the intercept is zero. The prices of market and
intertemporal risk show evidence of two regimes. In the first state, the price of market and
intertemporal risk is high, while in the second state the price of market and intertemporal
risk is low. In the first state, the price of market risk is of similar magnitude as in the
single regime models. In the second state however, the price of market risk is close to
zero, and statistically indiﬀerent from zero. A likelihood ratio test across regimes rejects
though the null hypothesis of both zero and equal prices of market risk. Also the prices
of intertemporal risk are markedly diﬀerent across regimes. In the first regime, the price
of intertemporal risk is positive, while in the second regime, it becomes negative. Similar
to the case of constant prices of risk, the price of intertemporal risk is only significant for
treasury bills and government bonds. A number of likelihood ratio tests indicate that the
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prices of intertemporal risk are both jointly diﬀerent from zero as well as diﬀerent between
regimes for treasury bills and government bonds, but not for stocks. The specification tests
are generally supportive of the model, and mostly of similar magnitude of those from the
intertemporal CAPM with constant prices of risk. Interestingly, the MEAN test for treasury
bills has decreased further.
To interpret the results, in Figure 8, we plot the filtered probability of being in the
first state (high price of market and intertemporal risk). The shaded areas represent the
oﬃcial recession periods of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). We find
some evidence that the regimes are associated with the business cycle. More specifically, the
probability of regime 2 increases during the recessions of November 1969-November 1970
and November 1973-February 1975. Moreover, the recessions of 1980, 1991, and the turmoil
at the end of the 1990s are anticipated by the model. This indicates that state 1 and state
2 are associated to business cycle expansion and recession respectively. Notice however that
the second state is also observed during the period 1981-1985, a period not characterized
by a recession. This may reflect the relatively high levels of treasury bill and bond market
volatility during this period. This suggests that the latent variable is driven only partly by
business cycle dynamics.
We now relate the state dependent price of risk with the transition probabilities.
State 2, the ”recession state” is characterized by a negative price of intertemporal risk,
but a quasi zero price of market risk. As argued before, an increasingly negative price
of intertemporal risk indicates higher marginal utility of wealth with respect to the state
variable. As the covariance of the various assets with the short rate is generally negative, this
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means that the intertemporal risk premium increases during recessions. Therefore, investors
seem to focus mainly on intertemporal risk during recessions. In state 1, the ”expansion
state”, the picture reverses. The price of market risk is high and significant, while now
the price of intertemporal risk is positive. The latter is diﬃcult to explain. However, a
closer analysis of the covariance of the diﬀerent assets with the short rate indicates that
during expansion states covariance fluctuates greatly around zero, while in the recession
state it is on average negative. To see the contribution of the intertemporal risk premium
across time, Panel B of Figure 10 plots the proportion of the total risk premium explained
by the intertemporal risk factor. The contribution of the intertemporal risk premium is
nearly always positive, while it generally peaks during recessions. Notice that relative to
the multi-asset intertemporal CAPM with constant prices of risk, the proportion of the
intertemporal risk factor is considerably higher. This suggest that by imposing constant
prices of risk one tends to underestimate (overestimate) the relevance of the intertemporal
(market) risk premium.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper revisits the relationship between the expected market return and con-
ditional risk. More specifically, we tests the conditional Intertemporal CAPM of Merton
(1973) for stocks, treasury bills, and government bonds, where the short rate is included
as an intertemporal risk factor. First, we document several interesting results regarding
the interaction between the three asset’s second moments. We find that the conditional
equity market variance reacts asymmetrically to both stock and treasury bill returns, while
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treasury bill and government bond returns respond symmetrically to each other’s shocks.
Nevertheless, we find that the price of market risk is not overly sensitive to the specification
of the variance-covariance dynamics, especially not when the model is estimated with a
student− t distributed likelihood function. The price of market risk is positive and statis-
tically significant. This suggests that the inclusion of additional assets increases the power
and eﬃciency of tests of the conditional CAPM. We extend the model as to include an
intertemporal risk factor. We consider both the case of constant and time-varying prices of
intertemporal risk. Time-variation in the prices of risk is introduced by means of Hamil-
ton’s regime switching model. We find the intertemporal risk premium to be important
for treasury bills and government bonds, but not for stocks. Two regimes are identified
that appear to be related to economic expansions and recessions respectively. While during
expansions investors tend to look more at market risk, during recessions the focus shifts to
intertemporal risk. Our results also suggest that treasury bills and government bonds are
not good hedges against business cycle downturns.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
This table presents summary statistics for RS,t, RTB,t, and RB,t, respectively the excess
returns on the US S&P500 stock market, the holding returns on 6-month T-bills and 10-year
government bonds. Panel A presents some distributional statistics. Mean, min., max. and
standard deviation are in %. The Jarque-Bera (J-B) test for normality combines excess skew-
ness and kurtosis, and is asymptotically distributed as χ2m with m = 2 degrees of freedom.
The Ljung-Box Qm (L-B Qm) statistic tests the null hypothesis that all autocorrelation co-
eﬃcients are simultaneously equal to zero up to m lags; it is asymptotically distributed as
χ2m . For m = 12, the critical values at 95% and 99% confidence level are 21.026 and 26.217
respectively. Similarly, ARCH(m) tests whether the data exhibits significant ARCH eﬀects up
to order m. The test statistic is as well distributed as a χ2m with m degrees of freedom. Panel
B and C report respectively unconditional correlations of excess and squared excess returns
and the term spread. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote respectively significance at a 1%, 5% and 10%
level.
Panel A: Distributional statistics
Rstock,t Rbill,t Rbond,t
Mean 0.5650 0.0723 0.1683
Minimum −21.8907 −10.2824 −7.6147
Maximum 15.9939 9.7391 9.3758
Std. Dev. 4.2463 1.7411 2.246
Skewness −0.392∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
Kurtosis 5.152∗∗∗ 14.273∗∗∗ 4.453∗∗∗
Jarque-Bera 100.6∗∗∗ 2466.2∗∗∗ 48.9∗∗∗
L-B Q(12) 7.85 93.50∗∗∗ 17.11
ARCH(12) 21.40∗∗ 144.14∗∗∗ 83.3∗∗∗
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Panel B: Unconditional correlations of excess returns
Rstock,t Rbill,t Rbond,t
Rstock,t 1.000 0.2672∗∗∗ 0.2973∗∗∗
Rbill,t 1.000 0.4883∗∗∗
Rbond,t 1.000
Panel C: Unconditional correlations of squared excess returns
Rstock,t Rbill,t Rbond,t
Rstock,t 1.000 0.1701∗∗∗ 0.2393∗∗∗
Rbill,t 1.000 0.3799∗∗∗
Rbond,t 1.000
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Table 2: Estimation of a Multi-Asset Conditional CAPM
This table reports estimation results for a Multi-Asset Conditional CAPM, modelled through
an asymmetric BEKK-in-Mean model. The dependent variables are respectively monthly re-
turns on the S&P500 equity market, 6-month US treasury bills, and 10-year government bonds.
The model is specified as follows:
rt+1 = λM
3X
j=1
hj,t+1wj,t + εt+1,
Ht+1 = VV
0
+Aεtε
0
tA
0 +BHtB0+Dηtη
0
tD
0
ηt = max {−εt−1, 0}
where rt+1 represents the 3× 1 vector of security excess returns, λM is the constant price of
market risk, wj,t is the wealth share of each risky asset. εM,t is a 3× 1 vector of innovations
that is normally distributed with zero mean and variance-covariance Ht. Panel A reports the
parameter estimates of the full model. Panel B reports the direct sensitivities of the conditional
variances to past variances and (asymmetric) shocks, keeping the other variables constant.
We do not report the coeﬃcients on interaction terms such as εS,tεB,t. Panel C reports
the sensitivity of conditional covariances to past variances, covariances, (asymmetric) shocks,
and interactions between (asymmetric) shocks, while holding the other variables constant.
Parameters are based upon the original estimates for the asymmetric BEKK-in-Mean model.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are obtained by applying the delta method to
the variance-covariance matrix of the original estimates. Robust standard errors are calculated
using the procedure in Bollerslev and Woolridge (1992).
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Panel A: Estimation results of the Full Asymmetric BEKK model
Parameter Estimates Standard Errors
C 0.024*** - - 0.0045 - -
6.46E-04 1.86E-08 - 0.0036 0.0012 -
5.99E-05 2.19E-08 2.75E-08 0.0048 0.0074 0.0003
A 0.0412 -0.2436 0.2879 0.0871 0.2283 0.1494
-0.0180 -0.5011*** 0.2170*** 0.011 0.0391 0.026
-0.0069 -0.2876*** 0.5659*** 0.0227 0.0609 0.0486
B -0.7068*** 0.4961 0.7837*** 0.1133 0.3209 0.2192
-0.0024 0.8987*** -0.0240 0.0964 0.0339 0.0484
-0.0093 0.0658 0.8689*** 0.1248 0.0455 0.0655
D -0.3180*** -0.7633*** -0.0017 0.1054 0.2495 0.208
0.0123 -0.0634 -0.1211** 0.0235 0.1232 0.0544
-0.0701* 0.1909 0.0621 0.0404 0.1476 0.0488
λM 3.844** 1.483
Panel B: Impact of Variables on Conditional Variances
Variance residuals asymmetry
Stock Bill Bond Stock Bill Bond Stock Bill Bond
Stock 0.500 0.246 0.614 0.002 0.059 0.083 0.101 0.583 0.041
(0.029) (0.299) (0.138) (0.030) (0.208) (0.090) (0.045) (0.251) (0.173)
Bill 0.000 0.808 0.001 0.000 0.251 0.047 0.000 0.004 0.015
(0.003 (0.005) (0.010) (0.000) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.061) (0.012)
Bond 0.000 0.004 0.755 0.000 0.083 0.320 0.005 0.036 0.004
(0.003 (0.003) (0.017) (0.002) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007 (0.088) (0.083)
219
Panel C: Impact of Variables on Conditional Variances
Part 1 : Impact of Past Variances and Covariances
Variance Covariance
Stock Bill Bond Stock, Bills Stock, Bonds Bill, Bonds
Stock, Bills - 0.446 - -0.636 - 0.692
- 0.087 - 0.022 - 0.045
Stock, Bonds - 0.033 0.681 -0.051 -0.621 -0.563
- 0.001 0.040 0.009 0.049 0.087
Bill, Bonds - 0.059 - - - 0.776
- 0.002 - - - 0.006
Part 2 : Impact of Past Squared and Cross Residuals
Squared residuals Cross-Residuals
Stock Bill Bond Stock, Bills Stock, Bonds Bill, Bonds
Stock, Bills - 0.122 0.062 - - -0.197
- 0.013 0.001 - - 0.002
Stock, Bonds - 0.070 0.163 - - -0.221
- 0.005 0.008 - - 0.002
Bill, Bonds - 0.144 0.123 - - -0.346
- 0.013 0.011 - - 0.010
Part 3 : Impact of Past Squared and Cross Asymmetric Residuals
Squared residuals Cross-Residuals
Stock Bill Bond Stock, Bills Stock, Bonds Bill, Bonds
Stock, Bills - 0.048 - 0.029 0.039 0.093
- 0.010 - 0.002 0.001 0.002
Stock, Bonds - -0.146 - - - -0.048
- 0.007 - - - 0.011
Bill, Bonds - - - - - -0.027
- - - - - 0.0001
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Table 3: Likelihood Ratio Tests on Restricted Versions of the Asymmetric
BEKK Model
This table reports various likelihood ratio tests to test the validity of restricted versions
of the BEKK model. In column 2-3, we report what restrictions are imposed upon
the original model (Structure of A and B parameter matrices, Asymmetry Structure
). Column 4 reports the respective likelihood ratio value. Columns 5 and 6 show
respectively the degrees of freedom and probability values for the likelihood ratio tests.
Restricted means for the A/B matrix that a12 = a13 = a21 = a31 = b21 = b23 =
b31 = b32 = 0, and for asymmetry that d13 = d21 = d22 = d31 = d32 = 0.
Nr. A/B Matrix Asymmetry (D) Test Statistics D.o.F. Prob.
1 Symmetric Symmetric 79.0 9 [0.000]
2 Diagonal Diagonal 95.8 18 [0.000]
3 Ding-Engle No 154.7 24 [0.000]
4 Full No 106.1 9 [0.000]
5 Full Diagonal 25.3 6 [0.000]
6 Full Equity only 36.4 8 [0.000]
7 Full Restricted 9.7 6 [0.137]
8 Diag A, Full B Restricted 62.5 6 [0.000]
0 Diag B, Full A Restricted 53.6 6 [0.000]
10 Restricted Restricted 19.8 14 [0.136]
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Table 4: Estimates for the Price of Market Risk
This table reports estimation results for the price of market risk (λM) for diﬀerent
variance-covariance specifications. Panel A and B report maximum likelihood estimates
for respectively a normally and student-t distributed likelihood function. Apart from
this, both tables have the same structure. Column 1 shows the specific conditional
variance-covariance model. Column 2 and 3 report the estimate for λM , as well as
its corresponding quasi-maximum likelihood standard error, under the assumption of a
zero intercept. In column 4 and 5, the constraint of zero intercept is relaxed. Finally,
column 7 tests whether the intercept is truly zero. We report the probability obtained
from a likelihood ratio test (distributed as χ2 with three degrees of freedom).
Panel A: Estimates based upon a Normally Distributed Likelihood
No Intercept With Intercept Test on Intercept
λM St. Error λM St. Error Prob.
Asymmetric BEKK 3.84** (1.489) 1.24 (2.471) [0.441]
BEKK, No Asymmetry -2.45 (3.646) 4.19*** (1.408) [0.218]
Symmetric A, B, D 4.09*** (1.427) 7.06** (2.646) [0.294]
Diagonal A, B, D 4.07** (1.989) 1.734 (2.268) [0.157]
Restricted A, B, D 3.97** (1.871) 2.33 (2.101) [0.318]
Panel B: Estimates based upon a Student− t Distributed Likelihood
No Intercept With Intercept Test on Intercept
λM St. Error λM St. Error Prob.
Asymmetric BEKK 6.64*** (1.757) 5.07** (2.412) [0.578]
BEKK, No Asymmetry 6.20* (3.481) 4.96* (2.895) [0.374]
Symmetric A, B, D 7.92*** (1.764) 10.55*** (3.214) [0.341]
Diagonal A, B, D 7.26*** (2.281) 6.947** (3.0313) [0.299]
Restricted A, B, D 6.34*** (1.633) 6.68*** (2.110) [0.564]
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Table 5: Specification Tests
We perform specification tests on the standardized residuals of the various variance-covariance
specifications. MEAN tests whether the means and three autocorrelations of the standardized
residuals are zero, while VAR tests whether the means of the squared standardized residuals are
zero. For the individual assets, both tests are asymptotically χ2 distributed with 4 degrees of
freedom, while the joint test statistics is χ2 distributed with 12 degrees of freedom. COV tests
whether there is third order autocorrelation left in the standardized cross residuals (product
of a pair of residuals divided by their corresponding conditional covariance), and is distributed
as a χ2(3) for the individual assets, and as a χ2(12) for a joint test. Finally, SKEWNESS
and KURTOSIS tests whether there is skewness and kurtosis left in the standardized residuals.
Both are distributed as a χ2(1). For convenience, the table is split up in two parts. Part one
reports the test statistics for the MEAN and VARIANCE test, while part 2 shows those for
the COVARIANCE, SKEWNESS, and KURTOSIS test.
Part A: Test on Mean and Variance
Normally D istributed Likelihood Student-t d istributed L ikelihood
fu ll fu ll, no asym symmetric D iagonal restricted fu ll fu ll, no asym symmetric D iagonal restricted
TEST ON MEAN
Stocks 1.62 0.26 0.71 0.85 1.38 1.00 0.59 2.29 1.22 1.54
0.81 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.85 0.91 0.96 0.68 0.88 0.82
B ills 32.77 46.54 25.73 23.64 32.23 25.87 37.58 27.94 28.31 33.26
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bonds 6.29 7.33 7.94 4.02 4.35 7.08 6.50 8.29 6.36 5.75
0.18 0.12 0.09 0.40 0.36 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.17 0.22
Joint 43.14 58.83 44.27 49.85 46.06 38.46 49.80 36.97 37.97 38.81
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.00
TEST ON VARIANCE
full fu ll, no asym symmetric D iagonal restricted fu ll fu ll, no asym symmetric D iagonal restricted
Sto cks 5.40 4.66 0.78 4.91 5.26 6.22 7.20 9.59 10.87 7.31
0.25 0.32 0.94 0.30 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.12
B ills 17.21 23.22 36.81 28.70 18.56 8.60 9.52 7.84 11.25 10.98
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.03
Bonds 0.35 2.94 3.34 11.97 1.57 10.46 10.72 11.91 12.47 10.27
0.99 0.57 0.50 0.02 0.81 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04
Joint 29.91 34.40 41.57 49.78 32.13 19.34 20.53 20.69 24.96 21.69
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.04
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Part B: Test on Coariance, Skewness, and Kurtosis
Normally D istributed Likelihood Student-t d istributed Likelihood
fu ll fu ll, no asym symmetric D iagonal restricted fu ll fu ll, no asym symmetric D iagonal restricted
TEST ON COVARIANCE
Stocks, B ills 5 .64 6.31 6.05 8.37 5.79 5.19 2.10 5.08 2.87 5.23
0.23 0.18 0.20 0.08 0.22 0.27 0.72 0.28 0.58 0.26
Sto cks, Bonds 2.33 3.79 1.56 3.15 2.10 1.84 3.23 1.41 3.09 1.97
0.68 0.43 0.82 0.53 0.72 0.76 0.52 0.84 0.54 0.74
B ills , Bonds 6.05 7.59 6.50 9.72 6.78 7.34 11.58 7.00 10.39 7.64
0.20 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.11
Joint 15.87 17.07 15.28 21.25 16.55 15.82 19.15 14.74 14.01 16.57
0.20 0.15 0.23 0.05 0.17 0.20 0.09 0.26 0.30 0.17
TEST ON SKEWNESS
Stocks 2.35 2.96 2.61 2.60 1.51 2.59 2.44 2.47 2.51 1.83
0.13 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.18
B ills 0 .67 0.96 3.31 1.50 0.55 0.86 0.76 2.90 2.16 0.59
0.41 0.33 0.07 0.22 0.46 0.35 0.38 0.09 0.14 0.44
Bonds 1.74 1.90 1.30 2.78 1.68 2.51 2.67 1.66 1.94 3.34
0.19 0.17 0.25 0.10 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.20 0.16 0.07
TEST ON KURTOSIS
Sto cks 1.53 1.48 1.19 1.27 1.32 1.81 1.84 2.46 2.55 2.01
0.22 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.16
B ills 2 .13 1.95 1.99 1.97 2.63 3.04 3.86 3.35 3.02 3.21
0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07
Bonds 0.66 0.71 1.39 1.29 0.60 2.10 2.97 3.41 3.74 2.78
0.42 0.40 0.24 0.26 0.44 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.10
224
Table 6: Estimation Results for a Multi-Asset Intertemporal CAPM
This table reports estimation results for a Multi-Asset Conditional Intertemporal CAPM, where
the assets are respectively monthly returns on the S&P500 equity market, 6-month US treasury
bills, and 10-year government bonds. The model is specified as follows:
rt+1 = c+ λM ⊗
3X
j=1
hj,t+1wj,t + λF ⊗ h4,t+1 + εM,t+1,
ft+1 = β0 + β1ft + β2rS,t + β3rB,t + β4rTB,t + εf,t+1
εt+1 = [εM,t+1, εf,t+1]
0|Ωt ∼ i.i.d. Student− t (0,Ht+1, ν)
Ht+1 = VV
0
+Aεtε
0
tA
0 +BHtB0+Dηtη
0
tD
0
ηt = max {−εt−1, 0}
where rt+1 represents the 3 × 1 vector of security excess returns, λM is a 3 × 1 vector of
asset dependent prices of market risk, wj,t is the wealth share of each risky asset, hj,t+1 is
the 3× 1 vector of conditional variance/covariances of asset j with the other assets, ft+1the
time t− 1 level op the three-month nominal US treasury bill rate, h4,t+1 the 3× 1 vector of
conditional covariances of each asset with innovations in the three-month nominal US treasury
bill rate, λF a 3×1 vector of asset dependent prices of intertemporal risk, and ν the degrees of
freedom of the student-t distribution. Panel A reports the estimation results of the full model.
In Panel B, we test whether a number of restrictions can be imposed upon the model. Finally,
in Panel C, we report similar specification tests as in Table 5. Standard errors are calculated
using the matrix of second derivates.. ***,**, and * mean respectively significant at a 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
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Panel A: Estimation Results
No constant Constant
Param se Param se
c11 0.0119*** 0.0029 0.0127*** 0.0029
c21 0.0006*** 0.0002 0.0006*** 0.0002
c31 0.0015*** 0.0004 0.0016*** 0.0004
c41 -0.0008 0.0007 -0.0009 0.0007
c22 0.0013 0.0003 0.0014*** 0.0003
c32 0.0006 0.0004 0.0007 0.0004
c42 0.0001 0.0012 -0.0005 0.0013
c33 0.0019*** 0.0005 0.0021*** 0.0005
c43 -0.0004 0.0014 -0.0012 0.0015
c44 0.0033*** 0.0008 0.003*** 0.001
a11 0.123*** 0.042 0.123*** 0.039
a22 0.272*** 0.029 0.269*** 0.028
a33 0.214*** 0.024 0.208*** 0.024
a44 0.726*** 0.099 0.740*** 0.101
b11 0.900*** 0.038 0.8937*** 0.039
b22 0.938*** 0.011 0.938*** 0.019
b33 0.960*** 0.008 0.961*** 0.008
b44 0.681*** 0.061 0.666*** 0.056
d11 0.293*** 0.051 0.282*** 0.0622
c1 - - -0.0047 0.0054
c2 - - -0.0014 0.0014
c3 - - -0.0077** 0.0034
λM,S 7.95*** 2.151 12.41** 5.365
λM,TB 14.61* 7.911 28.50* 15.487
λM,B 11.80** 5.485 43.31*** 15.312
λF,S 8.38 14.858 7.23 14.101
λF,TB -17.29*** 5.035 -14.59** 5.551
λM,B -21.59*** 4.802 -18.32*** 4.879
υ 8.52*** 1.261 8.40*** 1.220
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Panel B: Likelihood Ratio Tests
No constant No constant
Zero Intercept - - 5.57 [0.135]
Zero Price of Market Risk 15.65 [0.001] 12.01 [0.007]
Zero Price of Intertemporal Risk 21.13 [<0.001] 15.02 [0.002]
Equal Price of Market Risk 0.86 [0.649] 3.91 [0.142]
Equal Price of Intertemporal Risk 3.89 [0.143] 2.99 [0.224]
Panel C: Specification Tests
MEAN VARIANCE COVARIANCE1 SKEWNESS KURTOSIS
Stocks (Sto cks, B ills) 1.88 7.29 3.19 2.33 2.62
0.76 0.12 0.36 0.13 0.11
Bills (Sto cks, Bonds) 26.77 6.54 2.75 2.40 0.69
0.00 0.16 0.43 0.12 0.41
Bonds (B ills , Bonds) 4.04 5.34 6.26 2.69 3.01
0.40 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.08
Joint 30.24 15.85 14.30 5.34 5.39
0.00 0.20 0.28 0.15 0.15
1Dependent series for COVARIANCE tests are in brackets
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Table 7: Estimation Results for a Multi-Asset Intertemporal CAPM with
Regime Switches in the Prices of Risk
This table reports estimation results for a Multi-Asset Conditional Intertemporal CAPM, where
the assets are respectively monthly returns on the S&P500 equity market, 6-month US treasury
bills, and 10-year government bonds. The model is specified as follows:
rt+1 = c+ λM (St)
3X
j=1
hj,t+1wj,t + λF (St)h4,t+1 + εM,t+1,
ft+1 = β0 + β1ft + β2rS,t + β3rB,t + β4rTB,t + εf,t+1
εt+1 = [εM,t+1, εf,t+1]
0|Ωt ∼ i.i.d. Student− t (0,Ht+1, ν)
Ht+1 = VV
0
+Aεtε0tA
0 +BHtB0+Dηtη
0
tD
0
ηt = max {−εt−1, 0}
Pr (St = 1|St−1 = 1) = P
Pr (St = 2|St−1 = 2) = Q
Π =
·
P 1− P
1−Q Q
¸
where rt+1 represents the 3 × 1 vector of security excess returns, λM (St) is the regime
dependent price of market risk, wj,t is the wealth share of each risky asset, hj,t+1 is the 3×1
vector of conditional variance/covariances of asset j with the other assets, ft+1the time t−1
level of the three-month nominal US treasury bill rate, h4,t+1 the 3× 1 vector of conditional
covariances of each asset with innovations in the three-month nominal US treasury bill rate,
λF (St) the regime dependent 3× 1 vectors of asset dependent prices of intertemporal risk,
and ν the degrees of freedom of the student-t distribution. P and Q are the probabilities of
staying in respectively the first and second state. Panel A reports the estimation results of
the full model. In Panel B, we test whether a number of restrictions can be imposed upon the
model. Finally, in Panel C, we report similar specification tests as in Table 5. Standard errors
are based upon the matrix of second derivatives. ***,**, and * mean respectively significant
at a 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Panel A: Estimation Results
No constant Constant
Param se Param se
c11 0.012** 0.005 0.0118** 0.0053
c21 0.001 0.001 0.0006 0.0005
c31 0.001 0.001 0.0008 0.0007
c41 -0.002 0.007 -0.0024 0.0067
c22 0.001** 0.001 0.0013** 0.0006
c32 0.000 0.001 0.0004 0.001
c42 -0.004 0.011 -0.0034 0.0109
c33 0.002* 0.001 0.0014 0.0009
c43 -0.004 0.015 -0.0043 0.0155
c44 0.000 0.001 0.0001 68.438
a11 0.255*** 0.090 0.252*** 0.091
a22 0.493*** 0.064 0.491*** 0.066
a33 0.389*** 0.055 0.389*** 0.057
a44 0.845*** 0.208 0.841*** 0.209
b11 0.902*** 0.057 0.903*** 0.057
b22 0.906*** 0.022 0.906*** 0.022
b33 0.931*** 0.016 0.931*** 0.017
b44 0.442*** 0.137 -0.450*** 0.139
d11 0.337*** 0.135 0.332*** 0.135
c1 - - -0.0004 0.007
c2 - - -0.0003 0.001
c3 - - 0.0003 0.002
λM , State 1 6.96** 3.459 7.147** 3.511
λM , State 2 -0.548 1.186 0.335 4.048
λF,S,State 1 34.550 42.280 27.28 43.361
λF,TB,State 1 52.51** 25.075 49.93** 24.852
λF,B,State 1 45.56* 22.562 51.11** 22.623
λF,S,State 2 -27.410 27.730 -18.97 18.41
λF,TB,State 2 -36.94** 14.960 -33.57** 15.526
λF,B,State 2 -39.20** 16.964 -43.37** 17.411
P 0.984*** 0.315 0.986*** 0.271
Q 0.972*** 0.345 0.977*** 0.325
ν 11.51*** 2.93 10.88*** 2.74
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Panel B: Likelihood Ratio Tests
No constant No constant
Zero Intercept - - 0.34 0.95
Zero Price of Market Risk 6.09 0.05 7.31 0.03
Diﬀerent Price of Market Risk across Regimes 3.51 0.06 2.98 0.08
Zero intertemporal price of risk, stocks 1.44 0.49 1.42 0.49
Zero intertemporal price of risk, bills 6.52 0.04 6.26 0.04
Zero intertemporal price of risk, bonds 6.16 0.05 6.00 0.05
Diﬀerent price of intertemporal risk, stocks 1.32 0.25 1.29 0.26
Diﬀerent price of intertemporal risk, bills 5.98 0.01 5.74 0.02
Diﬀerent price of intertemporal risk, bonds 5.91 0.02 5.79 0.02
Panel C: Specification Tests
MEAN VARIANCE COVARIANCE1 SKEWNESS KURTOSIS
Stocks (Sto cks, B ills) 1.88 7.18 2.08 2.29 1.73
0.76 0.13 0.56 0.13 0.19
Bills (Sto cks, Bonds) 11.36 8.61 2.66 1.30 0.12
0.02 0.07 0.45 0.25 0.72
Bonds (Bonds, B ills) 5.98 7.07 8.26 2.43 1.17
0.20 0.13 0.04 0.12 0.28
Joint 28.85 17.98 12.68 4.38 6.39
0.00 0.12 0.39 0.88 0.70
1Dependent series for COVARIANCE tests are in brackets
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Figure 1: Returns on US Stocks, Treasury Bills, and Government Bonds.
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Figure 2: Market Weights for US Stocks, Treasury Bills, and Government Bonds
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Equity (S&P500)
10-y US Government Bonds
6-m US T-Bills
231
Figure 3: Variance Impact Curves for Equity Market Portfolio
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Figure 4: Variance Impact Surface for Equity Market Portfolio
Panel A: Impact Surface for Equity Market Variance, Symmetric Model
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Panel A: Impact Surface for Equity Market Variance, Asymmetric Model
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Figure 5: Conditional Variance of Equity, Treasury Bills, and Bond Market
Returns
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Figure 6: Covariance Impact Surfaces
Panel A:Covariance Impact Surface for Stocks and Bills
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Panel B: Covariance Impact Surface for Stocks and Bonds
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Panel C: Impact Surface for Bonds and Bills
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Figure 7: Conditional Covariances between Equity, Treasury Bills, and Bond
Market Returns
60 62 65 67 70 72 75 77 80 82 85 87 90 92 95 97 00
0
1
2
3
x 10-3 Conditional Covariance between Stocks and Bills
60 62 65 67 70 72 75 77 80 82 85 87 90 92 95 97 00
0
1
2
3
4
x 10-3 Conditional Covariance between Stocks and Bonds
60 62 65 67 70 72 75 77 80 82 85 87 90 92 95 97 00
0
1
2
3
x 10-3 Conditional Covariance between Bills and Bonds
236
Figure 8: Components of Excess Returns: Conditional Intertemporal CAPM
Panel A: Excess Stock Returns
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Panel B: Excess 6-month T-Bills Returns
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Panel C: Excess 10-year Government Bond Returns
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Figure 8: Filtered Probability of State 1 for Multi-Asset Intertemporal CAPM
with Time-Varying Prices of Market and Intertemporal Risk1
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1Shaded areas represent NBER recession periods.
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Figure 9: Components of Excess Returns: Conditional Intertemporal CAPM
with Regime Switches in the Prices of Risk
Panel A: Excess Stock Returns
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Panel B: Excess 6-Month Treasury Bill Returns
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Panel C: Excess 10-year Government Bond Returns
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Figure 10: Proportion of Total Risk Premium explained by Intertemporal
Risk Premium
Panel A: Multi-Asset ICAPM with Constant Prices of Risk
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Panel B: Multi-Asset ICAPM with Regime Switches in the Prices of Risk
60 62 65 67 70 72 75 77 80 82 85 87 90 92 95 97 00
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Proportion of total Risk Premium Explained by Intertemporal Risk Premium
Model with Time-Varying Prices of Risk
Stocks 
Treasury Bills 
Government Bonds 
244
Chapter 5
Conclusion
During the last two decades, Europe has gone through an extraordinary period of
economic, monetary, and financial integration, culminating in the introduction of the single
currency in January 1999. These changes impacted on both the structure and functioning
of the financial system. Recent evidence suggests that Europe is gradually moving from an
intermediated to a market-based based financial system, while the diﬀerent European asset
markets are gradually becoming more and more integrated. The aim of the three papers in
this dissertation is to increase the understanding of the (changing) financial system.
The first paper, co-authored by Rudi Vander Vennet and Astrid Van Landschoot,
is entitled ”Bank Characteristics and Cyclical Variations in Bank Stock Re-
turns”. This paper contributes to the discussion on how to increase the stability of the
international financial system. More specifically, the paper investigates (1) whether banks
are vulnerable to changes in the prevailing credit conditions, typically associated with busi-
ness cycle downturns, and (2) whether banks can hedge against a deterioration in the credit
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conditions by holding a larger capital buﬀer, or by functionally or geographically diversi-
fying their activities. Given the large economic costs of banking crises, it is important to
have a thorough understanding of how the business cycle interacts with bank stability. The
question whether adequate capitalization is perceived by the stock market as a structural
hedge against negative economic shocks contributes to the ongoing discussion on Basel II,
which intends to introduce some elements of market discipline in the supervisory process.
Similarly, the examination of the impact of functional and geographical diversification of
banking institutions on their risk profile may provide useful input to the discussion on the
gradual broadening of banking powers. The results clearly indicate that bank stock returns
exhibit two states. The first state, which seems related to business cycle expansions, is
characterized by a low level of conditional volatility and a high mean return. Reversely, the
second state, typically observed during recessions and financial market turmoil, is associ-
ated with high volatility and a low mean return. Moreover, we show that the conditional
variance of bank stock returns is positively related to lagged changes in the nominal short-
term interest rate. We report a statistically significant link between bank stock returns
and three economic state variables. The sensitivities to these instruments is generally sub-
stantially higher (in absolute value) in the recession state. This indicates that banks react
asymmetrically to news over the business cycle, and are hence perceived to be riskier during
business cycle downturns. These results are in accordance with the increase in asymmetric
information faced by banks in business cycle troughs. We do not find that banks with a
diﬀerent strategy react in a systematically diﬀerent way to business cycle news contained in
our instruments. However, we do find some evidence suggesting that relatively poorly capi-
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talized and specialized banks react significantly stronger to business cycle news in recession
states relative to their better capitalized and diversified peers.
The second paper, entitled ”Volatility Spillover Effects in European Eq-
uity Markets: Evidence from a Regime-Switching Model” focuses entirely on
European Equity markets. As equity is eventually a claim on the real economy, the risk
factors driving European stocks may change when the underlying economy changes. Sim-
ilarly, increasing European (World) financial integration may induce a shift from local to
European (World) risk factors. In this paper, therefore, I investigate whether the eﬀorts for
more economic, monetary, and financial integration in Europe have fundamentally altered
the intensity of shock spillovers from the US and aggregate European equity markets to
13 European stock markets. The results of this paper are of direct relevance for portfolio
constructing and hedging strategies. Moreover, they hint about the impact of changes in
the economic and monetary environment on the pricing and integration of European equity
markets. The innovation of the paper is to introduce time variation in the shock spillover in-
tensities by means of a regime-switching model. I show that regime switches in the spillover
intensities are both statistically and economically important. For nearly all countries, the
probability of a high EU and US shock spillover intensity has increased significantly over
the 1980s and 1990s, even though the increase is more pronounced for the sensitivity to EU
shocks. Surprisingly, the increase in EU shock spillover intensity is mainly situated in the
second part of the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s, and not during the period directly
before and after the introduction of the single currency. In fact, in many countries, the
sensitivity to EU shocks dropped considerably after 1999. Over the full sample, EU shocks
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explain about 15 percent of local variance, compared to 20 percent for US shocks. While
the US - as a proxy for the world market - continues to be the dominating influence in Euro-
pean equity markets, the importance of the regional European market is rising considerably.
Next, I look for the factors that have contributed to this increased information sharing. I
consider instruments related to equity market development, economic integration, monetary
integration, exchange rate stability, and to the state of the business cycle. Results suggest
that countries with an open economy, low inflation, and well developed financial markets
share more information with the regional European market. There is some evidence that
shock spillover intensity is related to the business cycle. Finally, I report some contagion
eﬀects from the US to the local European equity markets during highly volatile periods.
The third paper, entitled ”A Conditional Intertemporal CAPMwith Regime
Switches in the Prices of Risk”, and co-authored by Lorenzo Cappiello, contributes to
a long outstanding discussion on what determines expected returns. While the paper focuses
on the US market, the results can be generalized to other markets. More specifically, we test
the conditional Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) of Merton (1973) for stocks, treasury bills,
and government bonds, where the short rate is included as an intertemporal risk factor.
The conditional CAPM argues that expected returns are proportional to the conditional
risk of the market portfolio. The ICAPM extends the single-period CAPM to a multi-period
model. Merton (1973) showed that in this case investors do not only want to hedge against
market risk, but also against intertemporal risk, i.e. the risk that investment opportunities
may adversely change in the future. The paper first gives a brief theoretical discussion of
the ICAPM. Next, we estimate a multi-asset conditional CAPM with a constant price of
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market risk. The market risk is governed by a flexilble multivariate GARCH model with
asymmetry. We document several interesting results regarding the interaction between the
three asset’s second moments. We find that the conditional equity market variance reacts
asymmetrically to both stock and treasury bill returns, while treasury bill and government
bond returns respond symmetrically to each other’s shocks. Nevertheless, we find that the
price of market risk is not overly sensitive to the specification of the variance-covariance dy-
namics, especially not when the model is estimated with a student - t distributed likelihood
function. The price of market risk is positive and statistically significant. This suggests
that the inclusion of additional assets increases the power and eﬃciency of tests of the con-
ditional CAPM. Next, we extend the model as to include the short rate as an intertemporal
risk factor. Many previous studies have shown that the short rate has leading indicator
properties both for the business cycle and for stock returns. We consider both the case of
constant and time-varying prices of intertemporal risk. Time variation in the prices of risk
is introduced by means of Hamilton’s regime switching model. We find the intertemporal
risk premium to be important for treasury bills and government bonds, but not for stocks.
Two regimes are identified that appear to be related to economic expansions and recessions
respectively. While during expansions investors tend to look more at market risk, during
recessions the focus shifts to intertemporal risk. Our results also suggest that treasury bills
and government bonds are not good hedges against business cycle downturns.
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